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There is currently considerable controversy within philosophy over how 
) 
a natural kind terms extension is determined. Adherents to traditional 
theories of meaning argue that extension is determined by intensional 
properties which usually consist of identifying description$. Recently 
a new, essentialist alternative to these traditional accounts has been 
advocated; proponents of this view maintain that a term~ extension 
includes all objects which are essentially the same as a given paradigm. 
} 
instance of the terms use. 
In the present thesis it is argued that both description theories 
and essentalism describe not how classification Dillst proceed but rather 
two alternative strategies for how a classification of natural kinds 
might be attempted. A term's extension is not determined in advance 
by either identifying descriptions or hidden essential properties since 
stress on either of these is itself a choice. This claim is 
exemplified by using empirical material drawn from the recent (post 1900) 
history of a classifictory science, botanical systematics. By means of 
this evidence it is shown that both "descriptionist" and "essentialist" 
strategies of concept application have been (and still are) pursued by 
different groups of taxonomists. 
One consequence of the position outlined above is that classifications 
are conventions and that they are evaluated instrumentally. The force of 
this argument is best illustrated by conceiving of classifications as part 
of a wider network of beliefs which are socially transmitted and sustained. 
Changes in networks are designed to further the interests to which a 
network is being put. It is argued here that the main kinds of interests 
which have been important in twentieth century systematics are 
1) interests in technical prediction and control and 2) professional vested 
interests. An important aspect of both these kinds of interests is that 
they are normally considered to be "internal" to science. It follows that 
to understand scientific knowledge from a sociological perspective does not, 
of necessity, entail commitment to "external" explanations of scientific 
change. 
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A Glossary of Some Botanical Terms 
A polyploid plant to which two different species have 
each contributed one or more sets of chromosomes. 
iv. 
(= amphidiploid) Allopolyploid which arises when an 
ordinary hybrid between two different species, containing 
a set of chromosomes from each parent, doubles its 
chromosome number. Allotetraploidy is a means of 
overcoming hybrid sterility. 
True sexual reproduction. 
Flowering plants • 
Reproduction which has the superficial appearance of 
being sexual but which takes place without fertilization 
and/or meiosis. 
Polyploid in which all the chromosomes come from the 
same species (and often the same individual). 
Plants without seeds or flowers. 
lichens, mosses and ferns. 
Includes algae, fungi, 
Phenetic (classification) A classification based on maximum overall 
similarity. 
Phylogenetic (= phyletic) classification A classification based on 
closeness of evolutionary descent. 




evolutionary history, not being descended from a 
common ancestor. 
A plant with more than the normal, diploid (2x) number 
of chromosome sets. Most polyploids are tetraploid (4x) 
or hexaploid (6x). 
Any part of a plant capable of growing into a new organism 
e.g. spore, seed, gemma, cutting. 
The original herbarium specimen from which a plant species 
was named and described. 
v. 
Introduction 
The research presented in this dissertation is unusual in several 
respects. It is an attempt to formulate a model of classification which 
will serve as a framework for understanding controversy within the 
classificatory sciences. In fulfilling this objective I have drawn on 
material from two fields normally considered as unrelated: the 
philosophy of meaning and the sociology of science. Moreover, I have 
tried to synthesize these two fields not in any abstract way, but 
through the use of historical material drawn from the history of 
botanical systematics. 
In the past scientific classification, and the classiflc•t.ry 
sciences in general, have been neglected by historians and sociologists 
of modern science. It is surely a symptom of this that one of the 
best textbooks of the history of biology in the twentieth century 
(Allan 1975) has no chapter on developments in either taxonomy or 
ecology. The reasons for this are not hard to guess - for taxonomy 
today is not regarded as a major "growth area" in biology and it is 
a discipline in which there have not been the spectacular developments 
evident in, say, molecular biology or genetics. 
However, there is a current revival of interest in classification 
in philosophy. Mu.eh of this new awareness that classification is a 
problematical subject stems from the uncertainty placed on the belief 
in an independent language of observation. Such a language, if it 
existed, would form a stable and unchanging base for the erection of 
scientific taxonomies. However, recent work in philosophy (e.g. Hesse 
1958, Feyerabend 1962) has cast severe doubt on the notion that there 
is any f:undamental difference between "observational" and "theoretical" 
predicates in science. 
Further, there has been a revived interest in the social sciences 
in classification. In social anthropology, where the knowledge under 
discussion is that of "primitive" socieites the study of the classification 
of natural kinds is routinely held to be illuminating in the information it 
can yield (for a review of this literature see Willis 1974). In another 
area, ethnomethodologists, who have sought to bring attention to the 
unexamined basis of social action and discourse and to the unexamined 
background of tacit assumptions which underlie practical reasoning 
in everyday life have found it necessary to treat classification as 
a problematic activity. To take just one example from a rapidly 
expanding literature, Garfinkel has shown that in accounting for a 
social event such as death we have to "do work", to actively maintain 
boundaries of classification. There are, according to Garfinkel, 
no rules which determine what final form these taxonomies take. 
Rather those "rules" are generated in the activity of classification 
itself (Garfinkel 1967: 14). For these reasons then, a·re-appraisal 
of the nature of scientific classification seems particularly 
appropriate at the present time •. 
vi. 
Chapter one sets the scene for what follows, through an examination 
of contemporary views concerning the nature of scientific taxonomies 
within science itself. As is shown in Chapter one, there is no 
agreement on the systematical principles which should underlie 
scientific taxononiy. On the contrary, modern systematics is an area 
where there is little agreement over methods, or even underlying 
objectives. In Chapter one I have set out to examine the broad 
divisions within current systematics, both at the level of theory and 
of methodology. Of particular importance is the distinction between 
classifications which are based on morphological description 
(orthodox taxonomy) and those based on genetical and cytological 
experimentation (biosystematics). 
division and its significance. 
Later chapters will enlarge on this 
The lack of consensus within modern plant systematics is itself 
revealing. It suggests that if there are set rules for determining 
a classification of natural kinds then these rules have certainly not 
yet been "found" by all taxonomists. However, there is a further 
objective. to Chapter one. It represents my own knowledge of taxonomy 
before I began the studies that led to the present dissertation. 
Naturally, in interpreting the historical material presented in later 
chapters I have attempted to set aside any prejudices this training 
gave and to display the views of earlier botanists within the framework 
of their own historical epoch. However, if I have only partly 
succeeded in this exercise (and perhaps partial success is all that 
can be hoped for) then Chapter one reveals the likely sources of 
bias in my historical treatment. 
Chapter two goes on to consider current theories about the nature 
of classification within philosophy. There is currently great 
division within the philosophical community over the question of how 
a terms extension is determined. According to traditional accounts 
of meaning, as exemplified by Copi (1972) and, in a modified form, 
by Searle (1953) a terms extension is determined by intensional 
properties consisting of identifying descriptions. Recently however 
a new account of extension has emerged which sees the extension of a 
term as including objects which are essentially the same as given 
paradigm. instances of the terms use. This essentialist alternative 
vii. 
to description theory is especially associated with the writings of 
Hiliary Putnam. However, in Chapter two it is argued that both 
description theories and essentialism, contrary to their adherents 
claims, describe only how a classification of natural kinds might be 
constructed. It is argued in Chapter two that a point of philosophical 
importance follows from this, namely that the extension of a natural 
kind term is not given in advance by either identifying descriptions or 
hidden essential properties, since stress on either of these is itself 
a choice. The position taken in this thesis is that classifications 
are conventions and that a naturalistic model of classification must 
allow for this. This is best done by considering our taxonomies as 
part of a wider network of knowledge. Changes in classification can 
then be seen as options designed to further the objectives behind a 
given network. What these objectives have been in botanical systematics 
is not discussed in Chapter two, but is a topic reserved for discussion 
after the empirical material presented in Chapters three, four and five. 
Chapter three deals with the earliest attempts to introduce 
experimental methods into taxonomy. The period of time covered in 
this chapter falls roughly within the two decades from 1900 to 1920. 
The major scientists whose work is discussed were geneticists, of whom 
viii. 
Alexis Jordan, Hugo de Vries and Jan P. Lotsy were of especial importance. 
As is shown in Chapter three the earliest attempts to experimentalise 
taxonomic procedures were promoted by scientists anxious to solve 
problems concerning the mechanism of speciation in plants and the 
apparently simple question:what is a species? A particularly 
interesting facet of these researchers is that they sought to locate 
the essence of a species in its hidden genetic microstructure. 
Ultimately these essentialist strategies of classification proved 
unsuccessful. The reasons for this failure lay outside taxonomy 
itself, in the increasing success of selectionist theories of 
speciation in the work of later geneticists and plant breeders. 
The period from 1920 to 1930 saw fresh attempts to experimentalise 
taxonomy, mainly by ecologists. Chapter four investigates the reasons 
for this shift and concentrates especially on the work of the American 
botanist F.E. Clements and the Swedish botanist G. Tu.reason. Clements' 
work is of interest because it represents an approach to the problems 
of species classification and speciation which was radically anti-
essentialist. Tu.resson's work is of significance because his 
genecological terminology used essentialist and descriptionist 
strategies of classification within a single system. This decade 
also saw an end to the debates over the mechanism of speciation. By 
1930 the selectionist theories championed by the genecologists had 
triumphed, opening the way for the "neo-Darwinian systhesis" of the 
1930's and 40's. 
In the period since 1930 the approaches of experimental taxonomists 
to classification became much more diversified. There was a resurgence 
of interest in the use of genetical and cytological criteria in 
taxonomy, especially as applied at and below the level of the species. 
However, other experimentalists came to question the value of trying 
to incorporate experimental information about species into any system 
of categories. A third trend discernible in this period is the 
emergence of combinational strategies of classification. Combinational 
strategies, as their name implies, involve an approach to classification 
which is neither descriptionist or essentialist but which combines 
elements of both these strategies. These various diverse trends within 
experimental taxonomy after 1930 are described at length in Chapter five. 
ix. 
Chapter six returns to the problems posed at the end of Chapter two, 
namely those of considering what kinds of goals and objectives have 
structured and informed the classification strategies pursued by 
different groups of taxonomists since 1900. Drawing on the empirical 
material of the previous three chapters it is argued that the concept 
of "different interests in technical prediction and control" is of 
value both in explaining the rise of experimental systematics and in 
accounting for the resistance to experimental methods encountered in 
the writings of orthodox taxonomists. The different classifications 
of orthodox and experimental taxonomists are conventions designed to 
further different technical interests. As such they are designed to 
emphasise different aspects of reality and a choice between them 
cannot be made by an appeal to what is "natural" or "objective" or 
"really out there in reality". Indeed this conventional aspect of 
classification applies with equal force to theories about speciation, 
as is shown in Chapter six. 
Finally, it is argued that different strategies towards classification 
cannot be explained in terms of technical interests or objectives alone. 
Vested professional interests and ideological concerns have also shaped 
the classification strategies adopted by twentieth century taxonomists. 
The role of these kinds of interest are discussed in Chapter seven. 
An important theme running through both chapters six and seven is 
that technical and professional interests (which appear to have been the 
major influences on twentieth century plant systematics) are internal 
to science. They constitute what Kuhn (1971: 304) calls, "the 
internalities that shape the development of any discipline". A 
sociological approach to scientific knowledge and growth does not 
necessarily entail "external" history of science. Both "internal" and 
"external" factors can effect the development of scientific cognition 
and to ignore either is to place in jeopardy a full understanding of 
the cultural phenomenon called science. 
A note on Historical Sources 
Very little historical work has been done on twentieth century 
systematics. In the historical material presented in chapters three, 
four and five I have relied in the main upon published, primary 
sources. However, in dicussing the wider context of twentieth 
century biology in which these developments in taxonomy were taking 
place I have relied quite extensively on secondary historical accounts 
and especiaJ.ly on the writings of Garland Allen (genetics), William 
Provine (Population genetics), Mark Adams (Russian Population genetics) 
and Ernst Mayr (evolution theory). 
x. 
The historical chapters in the thesis are intended primarily to 
illustrate the theoretical discussions about classification presented 
in chapters one, two, six and seven. As "pure" history they are 
deficient in several respects. I have concentrated aJ.most exclusively 
on taxonomy in English speaking countries or taxo~omists, like Turesson, 
who published most .of their research in English. Also, aJ.though the 
intellectual aspects of taxonomy are discussed in some depth no 
detailed attempt is made at an institutionaJ. history of taxonomy during 
the period covered by the text. Studies to rectify these lacunae 
are badly needed and hopefully the realisation of the theoreticaJ. 
interest of classifactory sciences to sociologists and philosophers will 
stimulate more research in this area. If the present thesis helps such 
a development then it will have fulfilled one of its major objectives. 
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Chapter One: The Nature of Scientific Classification part one: 
Some theories of classification current in plant systematics 
The object of the present chapter is to look at theories about 
the nature of scientific classification which are current in plant 
systematics. However, before discussing theory it will be necessary 
to examine the aims and methods of taxonomical research. General 
textbooks of plant systematics (e.g. Davis and Heywood 1963, 
Heywood 1967) divide plant taxonomy itself into four major fields: 
orthodox or morpho-geographical taxonomy, experimental taxonomy or 
biosystematics, numerical taxonomy and chemotaxonomy. We may thus 
begin by briefly considering the aims and methods of each of these 
research traditions within plant systematics. 
1. Orthodox taxonomy. According to Davis and Heywood (1963: 2), 
modern taxonomic research, regardless of the methods employed, has 
three basic underlying objectives: 
a. To provide a convenient method for identification and 
communication of information about the organisms which have been 
classified. 
b. To provide a classification which expresses natural 
1 relationships in the plant world. 
c. To detect evolution at work, discovering its processes 
and interpreting its results. 
However, which of these aims is the most important and whether 
they are in fact compatible aims for any one system of classification 
to achieve are issues which divide the taxonomic community. Orthodox 
taxonomists, in general, have denied that it is possible or desirable 
1. The term "natural" as used in current systematics has at least two 
distinct meanings. On the one hand it can mean a classification 
based upon overall resemblances. In this sense a natural 
classification uses properties from all parts of the plant - :root, 
stem, leaves etc., as opposed to an artificial classification which 
might just be based on, for example, the characters of the flower 
or fruit. However, a natural classification can also mean a 
classification which is based upon evolutionary relationships. 
Thus, both phylogeneticists and pheneticists see their classifications 
as "natural". 
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that any single classification should encompass all of these 
objectives. A classification which always reflects evolutionary 
processes is deemed to be incompatible with the needs of a 
classification designed for identification and communication. As 
Davis and Heywood put it: 
Classification should not be inconsistent with what 
evolutionary evidence is known, although there may be 
instances where it may be more convenient and serve more 
purposes if it is ••• We hold the view that more than 
one kind of classification is possible and acceptable, 
and that no one can be judged best for all purposes. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: xviii) 
Thus, the major aim of orthodox or 'classical' taxonomy is "to 
describe all existing kinds of plants, to classify them according to 
their resemblances and differences, and to name them according to a 
body of internationally agreed rules" (Heslop-Harrison 19.53: 109). 
The 'rules' referred to are those pertaining to nomenclature. These 
were originally formulated at the First Botanical International 
Congress in Paris in 1867 and have been the subject of much amendment 
and discussion ever since. 2 Briefly, these rules lay down conventions 
concerning the naming of plant taxa. In the modern code the ranks or 
hierarchy of categories which can be legitimately used in the naming 
of a plant are as shown in Table 1 • 1 • The code also deals with 
questions of priority concerning the naming of plants. A species 
binomial is not valid unless it is accompanied by a description, in 
Latin, of the characteristic properties of the new species. Also, 
where a plant has been named more than once it is normally the first 
name which is valid, although there are in fact many exceptions to 
this rule. It is another rule of the code that all individual plants 
belong to a species. The categories of the code are mutually 
exclusive; a given individual can only belong to one family, one 
genus, one variety, etc. 
2. So far as we are aware, no historical work has been done on 
nomenclatural aspects of taxonomy in the period from 1867 onwards. 
Such a study would be of great interest, but cannot be undertaken 
here. For an elementary textbook on nomenclatural aspects of 
plant and animal taxonomy see Savory ( 1962) • 
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Orthodox taxonomy is typically a non-experimental or descriptive 
science. The emphasis in this kind of taxonomy is placed on the 
examination of the visible (i.e. external) morphological characters 
of the plant which, it is argued, provide the easiest and most 
convenient properties for classification. It is also the oldest of 
the research traditions within taxonomy. According to Heywood 
(1967: 3) the morpho-geographical approach to classification had its 
culmination towards the end of the nineteenth century, although he 
adds that it remains an important component of current taxonomical 
research. 
Orthodox taxonomy is centred in, and dependent upon, the herbarium 
as an institution of taxonomic plant research.3 The herbarium is 
itself comprised of a large collection of dead plant material, dried 
and preserved on herbarium sheets and ordered according to some pre-
arranged system of plant families.4 The herbarium is a very old 
institution: there were herbaria in existence prior to the time of 
Linnaeus.5 Most herbaria began as the private collection of an 
individual, but in later times herbaria have become adjuncts of other 
institutions concerned with botanical research, e.g. many of the 
larger university departments of botany have herbaria. In Britain 
the three main herbaria are government controlled and financed as 
part of the scientific civil service. These national herbaria are 
located at Kew, in the British Museum of Natural History in South 
Kensington and in F.clinburgh. Kew, which is the largest, houses a 
collection of some~ million specimens (Davis and Heywood 1963: 261). 
Much of the day-to-day activities of the herbarium are concerned 
with the maintenance and preservation of this large collection of 
3. For some empirical data supporting this position see later in this 
chapter and also Crowson (1970: 281-291). 
4. In British herbaria the arrangement of plant families is usually 
taken from Bentham and Hooker (1862-83). 
5. Very little historicaJ. work of a general nature has been done on 
the history of herbaria as scientific institutions. For an 
account of their modern role in plant systematics see McNeill 
(1968). 
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plant material. New specimens coming into the herbariu.m must be 
mounted, identified and "layed into" (i.e. added to) the existing 
collection. The collection provides a reference system for new and 
unknown plant material so that herbaria undertake routine identific-
ation services for other institutions such as medical services and 
the police. 
Actual research within the herbarium will generally fall within 
one of two categories, viz. the production of floras and the 
preparation of monographs. Floras are lists of the plant species 
(with descriptions) of a particular area arranged in families and 
genera, together with keys to aid in their identification. Because 
the flora's primary function is to aid in the identification of 
plants, they usually contain little or no information of an 
experimental kind. 
Monographs are fairly detailed revisions of a particular plant 
group (usually a genus) • In modern monographs the importance of 
including biosystematical and experimental data where available is 
recognised and guidelines on the kind of biosystematical data which 
monographs should ideally contain were laid down at the Eighth 
Botanical International Congress in Paris in 1954. 6 Sometimes new 
experimental work may be undertaken as part of a monograph's revision; 
Babcock's ( 1947) monograph on Crepis is an example of a monograph of 
this kind. In other cases the author of a monograph may simply 
review the existing literature on experimental work for the group 
under study. Monographs, therefore, represent one area of research 
output where orthodox and experimental taxonomy tend to become 
combined. 
2. E?rnerimental Taxonomy. The first two decades of the twentieth 
century saw rapid developments within the fields of plant cytology 
and genetics. The application of information drawn from these fields 
6. G.L. Stebbins was the figure largely responsible for introducing 
these guidelines. A discussion of the Content of his proposals 
is given in Davis and Heywood (1963: 455-456). 
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to taxonomical problems resulted in the 1920's in the birth of the 
new discipline of experimental taxonomy or biosystematics. According 
to Heywood this new research tradition "replaced to a large extent 
conventional taxonomic approaches, especially in the universities" 
(Heywood 1967: 4). 
In contrast to orthodox taxonomists, experimentalists have 
strongly emphasised the importance of basing classification upon 
evolutionary and genetic criteria. As V. Grant puts it: 
A system of classification of the biological species must 
be judged, not on the basis of convenience, but according 
to whether it represents accurately or inaccurately the 
realities of nature. 
(Grant 1957: 58) 
In general experimental taxonomists have seen their aims as 
two-fold, involving firstly a new kind of approach to classification 
which will eventually replace orthodox taxonomy and secondly the 
setting up of a discipline whose function is to examine the nature 
of the evolutionary processes of plant speciation (cf. Davis and 
Heywood 1963: 451-452). However, in the more recent period (since 
1935), some experimentalists have questioned the compatibility of 
these two goals. This tension within experimental taxonomy will be 
dealt with more fully in later chapters. 
The methods of experimental taxonomy are diverse and drawn from 
a wide field of related disciplines, ranging from cytology, cyto-
genetics and genetics through to ecology and physiology. Amongst 
the most important tasks likely to be undertaken by the experimental 
taxonomist are: studies of chromosome number and its distribution in 
the species under study; standard transplantations of related forms 
into a uniform environment in order to assess the importance of 
hereditary and environmental factors on the plants' growth; and 
breeding tests to study the fertility of related populations. The 
field and laboratory, rather than the herbarium and library, are the 
centres of such investigations. 
3. Numerical Taxonomy. EKperimental taxonomy (or biosystematics) 
was a product of research begun in the 1920 's. Numerical taxonomy-1.s 
much more recent in origin, being a product of research carried out 
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mainly in the U.S. during the 1960's. The term "numerical taxonomy" 
implies more than simply the use of numerical methods and computers. 
The starting point of numerical taxonomy is the claim that neural 
estimates of resemblance are imprecise and subjective in comparison 
with proper statistical techniques (Sneath 1961: 98). The computer 
is used to ensure an equal weighting of characters and to prevent 
subjective weighting of one character over another. Because it was 
a tenet of the French philosopher Michel Adan.son (1727-1806) that a 
natural classification is one which gives equal weight to all 
characters, numerical taxonomists have referred to their position as 
neo-Adansonian taxonomy (Adanson 1757, 1763; Sneath 1962). 
Equal character-weighting means that classifications do not 
always reflect phylogenetic relationships or boundaries of gene-
exchange, a fact which has caused controversy between numerical 
taxonomists and proponents of evolutionary taxonomy (for an account 
of this controversy see Ruse 1973: 154-173). A second consequence 
of numerical taxonomy is that it often results in the formation of 
taxa which are polythetic. Numerical taxonomists have defined such 
taxa as ones in which "no single attribute is in theory sufficient 
and necessary for membership in the group so long as the members 
share a high proportion of characters" (Sneath and Sokal 1962: 856). 
This also is a controversial aspect of numerical techniques for, at 
the species level especially, the existence of polythetic taxa 
means that the task of constructing workable keys for identifying 
specimens becomes extremely difficult. A brief account of 
significance of numerical taxonomy to general philosophical issues 
concerning the nature of scientific classification is given in 
Appendix A. 
4. Chemota.xonom.y. A fourth research tradition which has become 
increasingly important within plant taxonomy since the 1960's is 
chemota.xonomy or biochemical biosystematics. Chemotaxonomy has been 
especially useful in examining hybrids - the outstanding example 
being the work of Alston and Turner (1959) on Baptisia. In the long 
run the most exciting possibility opened ~P by chemotaxonomy is that 
it may allow direct estimates of genetic similarity by means of 
- 1 -
techniques of DNA - hybridization. 7 However, many orthodox 
taxonomists have opposed the argument that chemical characters 
are somehow more basic or primary to classification than, say, 
morphological or anatomical characters (cf. Davis and Heywood 
1963: 222-2.58). 
The separation of orthodox taxonomy from the new approaches of 
biosystematics, numerical taxonomy and chemotaxonomy is not meant 
to imply that, on occasions, taxonomists may not deploy techniques 
taken from several of these fields in combination. Davis and 
Heywood in their account of the relationships between orthodox 
taxonomy and biosystematics argue that it is a mistake to stress 
too hig'hly the independence of these fields: 
We have gone into the relationships between orthodox 
taxonomy and the newer (experimental) disciplines at some 
length since there are widespread misunderstandings as to 
their relative roles - an unhealthy situation for the 
progress of our science. Perhaps the greatest misunder-
standing stems from the idea of separation between the 
two approaches. The separation is not between taxonomists 
and experimentalists but between some of their activities. 
Often the same botanists are engaged in both. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 4.58, underlinings 
in the original) 
The extent to which herbarium taxonomists employ experimental 
and quantitative techniques is a question which was investigated 
during an early phase of the present investigations. To this 
end a questionnaire was sent to the 82 taxonomists who are 
currently engaged in research at the three government herbaria in 
7. Nucleic acids can form molecular hybrids by base-pairing. The 
long-term value of such techniques is that they make possible a 
classification based directly upon genotypic (as opposed to 
phenotypic) resemblances. However, some of the early work 
applying this technique to plant taxa has yielded hig'hly 
anamalous results in terms of comparisons with established 
classifications for the groups in question (cf. Hoyer, McCarthy 
and Bolt 1964; Heywood 1967: 39-40). 
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"[) •t . 8 .uri ain. As a part of this questionnaire the scientists were asked 
to record those research activities in which they were involved 
during an average working week. The responses to this question for 
the 53 replies which were received are shown in Table 1.2. In Table 
1.2 activities 1 to 14 correspond to what is normally regarded as 
"orthodox" taxonomical methods. Activities 15 to 21 all involve 
experimental and numerical techniques which are usually considered 
to be part of the "new" systematics in the broadest sense. The 
results of this study can only be considered as very tentative. 
There is no information on the work g"Oing on in regional or local 
herbaria, or of the type of taxonomical research being undertaken in 
the universities. However, what information there is suggests that, 
in the major herbaria at any rate, there has been little move 
towards the adoption of numerical and experimental techniques. 
The persistence of orthodox taxonomy side-by-side with the new 
approaches of biosystematics, chemotaxonomy and numerical taxonomy 
is also evident from.the debates which are currently engaging 
taxonomists concerning theoretical issues within systematics. The 
diversity of methods in modern taxonomical research is reflected 
in these discussions. 
Theoretical issues in modern plant systematics 
The discussion below will be divided into four sections. Section 
one deals with the distinction between phylogenetic and phenetic 
theories of classification. Sections two and three examine current 
controversies concerning the way in which species could be defined 
and the problems concerned with the classification of intra-specific 
units. Finally section four deals with typological theories of 
variation and their distinction from populationist approaches to the 
study of variation. 
8. The list· of taxonomists working in these three herbaria was 
obtained by writing directly to the heads of the institutions 
concerned. We would like to take this opportunity to express 
our thanks to the staff of these herbaria for their help in 
replying to the questionnaire which was sent to them. 
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1. Phylogenetic and phenetic theories of classification 
A phylogenetic classification may be defined as a classification 
which is based upon closeness of evolutionary descent. A phenetic 
classification is one which is based upon maximum observable 
similarity. 
In practice phenetic and phylogenetic classifications are often 
identical because similarities between organisms are usually the 
result of evolution from a common ancestral population. However, 
this is not always the case because of the phenomena of convergence 
and parallelism. Parallelism is defined as "the development of 
similar features separately in two or more, genetically similar, 
fairly closely related lineages" (Heywood 1967: 18). Convergence 
is "the development of similar features separately in two or more 
genetically diverse and not closely related lineages and not due to 
a common ancestry" (Heywood 1967: 19). These terms are illustrated 
in Figure 1.1. ·As a result of convergence and parallelism a phenetic 
classification does not always provide an accurate reflection of 
phylogenetic descent. 
Both phylogenetic and phenetic theories of classification are 
very old and pre-date the rise of experimental taxonomy. The claim 
that classification should be based upon maximal numbers of characters 
is often traced back to the work of the French botanist Adanson.9 
The assumption that classification could reflect phylogeny was 
prevalent after the acceptance of evolution in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century and since that time a number of phylogenetic 
9. The claim that modern numerical taxonomy is "neo-Adansonian" is 
one which numerical taxonomists themselves make. From a historical 
perspective such a claim is dubious. Pratt (1977) has argu.ed that 
Adanson had a very different concept of overall resemblance to that 
deployed by modern phenetic taxonomists. Thus, for Adanson, the 
number of "characters" possessed by a plant was finite and what 
constituted a character was layed down in advance. For the modern 
taxonomist this is not true. 
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classifications have been attempted for the angiosperms. 10 However, 
although phylogeny is an older concept than experimental taxonomy, 
the rise of the latter in the 1920's and 30's was often seen as 
providing the pathway to a genuinely phylogenetic approach to 
classification (cf. Turrill 1939, and also Bennet 1964). However, 
the acceptance of phylogenetic principles is by no means universal. 
In their recent textbook Davis and Heywood argue that "the whole 
conception of phylogenetic classification is, we believe, a mistake 
except around the species level in favourable and well studied 
groups; and even there phyletic relationship often conflicts with 
genetic relationship as expressed by phenotypic resemblances" (1963: 
xviii). And, in taking this line, Davis and Heywood have received 
support from numerical taxonomists such as Sokal and Sneath (1963) • 
.An issue which is closely related to the question of the relative 
merits of phylogenetic and phenetic principles of classification is 
that of character weigh.ting. Character weighting may be defined as 
the giving of greater or lesser importance to one character over 
another in the production of a classification. Since the number of 
"characters" which can be employed to separate one species from 
another is potentially infinite, some character weighting is 
considered inevitable. Indeed, as Davis and Heywood (1963: 110-141) 
correctly maintain, the concept of what constitutes a "character" 
is itself problematical: 
••• the concept of characters as recognisable, separate 
entities is a product of man's necessity to communicate 
and therefore to describe. This explains why characters 
are so difficult to define. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 110) 
10. Although these different schemes have diverged widely in their 
details there is now general agreement that the Ranales 
(buttercups and magnolias) are the most primitive angiosperms 
and that the monocotyledons (grasses, etc.) were derived from 
the dicotyledons. The most recent attempts at a phylogenetic 
treatment of the angiosperms are those of Cronquist (1957) and 
Takhtajan (1958). 
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However, although selective weighting is an inevitable process 
which is not even avoidable in numerical taxonomy, phenetic 
taxonomists have maintained that characters should not be weighted 
on the basis of phylogenetic considerations. For example it was, 
according to Heywood (1967: 41), an assumption amongst many 
taxonomists that floral characters are particularly good for 
revealing evolutionary relationships. Such a priori weighting is 
rejected by pheneticists - all characters initially selected should 
be equally weighed and treated as of equal value until shown otherwise. 
A problem of this approach is that even where it is adopted the 
taxonomist may unconsciously and subjectively weight characters in 
his initial assessment of the plants with which he is dealing. It 
is a m~jor claim of numerical taxonomists that their techniques 
overcome this problem of subjective weighting and thus make possible 
a genuinely phenetic classification. 
2. Controversies over the definition of the term species 
Of all the units classified by taxonomists it is the species 
which are of greatest potential importance to other branches of 
biology. Theories of species and how they originate are central 
to evolutionary theory, genetics and cytogenetics. Ecologists 
and phytogeographers require species lists for the habitats or 
geographical area under study before serious ecological work can 
begin. For this reason it is perhaps not surprising that the 
question of how species should be classified and defined has been 
a source of continual controversy within systematics. The species 
problem "is, if nothing else, a problem" (Davis and Heywood 1963: 
89). 
In the past much of the controversy surrounding the term species 
involved a philosophical division between "nominalists" and "realists". 
Prior to the emergence of evolutionary doctrines species were widely 
held to have been created by God and to be immutable in form. As such 
they presented objective entities in nature whose existence was real. 
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, many biologists had 
concluded that species were abstractions and that in nature there 
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existed only the individual. For Bessey (1908: 218), "nature 
produces individuals and nothing more ••• species have been 
invented in order that we may refer to great numbers of individuals 
collectively." One of the central tenets of the "new systematics" 
of the 1930's and 40's was the reaffirmation of the objectivity of 
the species; species were real because they were reflections of real 
barriers to gene-exchange in nature. 
Although the debate between "nominalists" and "realists" still 
continues (of. Mayr 1957: 6), the major controversies in recent 
discussions of the species problem have centred around finding the 
correct operational definition of the term "species". Attempts at 
species definitions of this sort can themselves be grouped into 
three kinds (of. Meglitsch 1954): 
1 • Morphological or taxonomic species definitions. 
2. Biological or genetic species definitions. 
3. Evolutionary or phyletic species definitions. 
The taxonomic or morphological species concept is very old, and 
the use of external morphology to classify species is perhaps the 
most intuitively obvious way of approaching the problem of classifying 
biological natural kinds. According to this perspective, species 
are assemblages of morphologically similar individuals separated from 
other such assemblages by morphological gaps. Linnaeus was, in an 
important sense, an advocate of this approach for in practice he both 
described and defined his species on morphological criteria and 
Species Plantarum forms the official starting point for modern 
botanical species nomenclature as recognised by the International Code. 
Two morphological definitions of the species employed in recent 
textbooks of botanical systematics are as follows: 
(The species is) a community whose distinctive morphological 
characters are in the opinion of a competent systematist 
sufficiently definite to entitle it to a specific name. 
(Regan, quoted in Savory 1962: 63) 
(Species are) the smallest natural populations permanently 
separated from each other by a distinct discontinuity in the 
series of biotypes. 
(Du Rietz, quoted in Davis and Heywood 1963: 92) 
- 13 -
The recognition of species by morphological criteria has been 
one of the primary aims of orthodox taxonomy and the herbarium 
method is designed to facilitate such a task. Indeed, because 
the morphological species concept is so widely used by taxonomists, 
Davis and Heywood recommend that it should be termed the "taxonomic 
species concept" in recognition of its "overwhelming use by 
taxonomists as opposed to biosystematists, genecologists etc." 
(1963: 93). 
Historically, the morphological species concept has often been 
linked to typological thinking, i.e. to the view that all members 
of a species are essentially the same and that, therefore, one 
individual can be taken as representative of the species. Linnaeus 
himself is the prime example of a taxonomist who held to this 
principle (cf Stafleu 1971: 25-31). However, it is not correct to 
assume that the use of a morphological species concept necessarily 
entails a commitment to typology. Certainly, if species were 
constant and if they were always separated by essential properties 
of identity from other species, then the morphological species 
concept becomes a very easy one to apply. However, the acceptance 
that individuals of a species are not constant, either in their 
phenotype or genotype has not led to an abandonment of the 
morphological species concept but rather to its refinement: 
Taxonomists regard their specimens as samples of natural 
populations, not just herbarium samples. They base their 
decisions about specific delimitation on the presence or 
absence of morphological breaks in the variation shown by 
these populations ••• Population, as employed in this 
sense, means an assemblage of plants with a particular 
distribution: its paramaters are judged on morphological 
evidence. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 92) 
To summarise: adherents of morphological species concepts have 
sought to define species in terms of characters of populations which 
are ":phenotypical" in the modern usage of that term, i.e. in terms 
of characters manifested by an organism rather than in te:rms of the 
set of genes possessed by it. For :practical reasons external 
morphology has been the main source of such characters. In the past 
taxonomists have also held that some of these morphological characters 
are essential to a species, i.e. they are possessed by all member$ of 
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that species and they define the "essence" of that species. If such 
characters can be located, then a species can be described from a 
single specimen. However, a commitment of this kind to a "typological" 
or "essentialist" theory of variation not a necessary component of a 
morphological approach to the use of the term species. 
A completely different way of defining the term species has been 
to stress reproductive or genetic criteria as the means of distinguish-
ing one species from another.
11 
Such a biological species concept is, 
like the morphological species concept, very old. Linnaeus, although 
he delimited species on the basis of morphological criteria, nonetheless 
also believed it to be a further property of species that they would 
breed true under cultivation (cf. Stafleu 1971: 89). Indeed, for 
Linnaeus this was one possible means of distinguishing species from 
varieties - the latter, he held, would not breed true in subsequent 
generations. Two modern biological definitions of the species are those 
given by Grant and Mayr: 
Species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding 
natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from 
other such groups. 
(Mayr 1942: 120) 
According to the _biological species concept the species is 
a population set apart from the rest of the living world 
by reproductive isolating mechanisms. 
(Grant 1957: 54) 
Reproductive isolation is usually accompanied by distinctive 
morphological discontinuity. However, it has been one of the 
discoveries of biosystematics that this is by no means necessarily 
the case. On occasions populations with very distinct morphological 
differences may freely exchange genes. Alternatively, cases are 
also known of sibling species, i.e. populations which are good 
species in the biological sense but which are difficult or impossible 
to separate on the basis of morphological resemblance. For these 
and other reasons many taxonomists have denied that species in the 
11. For examples of actual taxonomic groups where those different 
species definitions have been employed see later chapters, 
especially chapter 6. 
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biological sense can be always incorporated into a group's taxonomic 
treatment .. The continued controversy over this issue is well 
illustrated by the following quotations from two recent text-books on 
plant systematics: 
As long as the concept of morpho-species is allowed to 
remain unmodified, taxonomy is handicapped in its 
efforts to contribute to biological progress 
(Savory 1962: 94) 
To abandon the practical, almost universal use of the term 
species in a primarily morphological-geographical sense for 
orthodox classification in favour of a restricted usage for 
impractical, largely theoretical units in terms of gene-pools 
and reproductive barriers, would surely be short-sighted and 
unrealistic. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 98) 
It follows, then, that definitions of species in terms of 
morphological and genetical criteria do not always lead in practice 
to the discovery of the same units or natural kinds. The same is 
also true if the third type of species definition is employed - the 
phylogenetic or evolutionary species concept. 
of this kind is given by Simpson: 
A species definition 
An evolutionary species is a lineage (an ancestral-descendant 
sequence of populations) evolving separately from others and 
with its own unitary evolutionary role and tendencies. 
(Simpson 1961: 153) 
For proponents of the biological species concept this definition 
of the species has the advantage of covering those groups of organisms 
where, because the breeding cycle is not sexual, a biological species 
definition is inappropriate (cf. Grant 1971: 37-45). However, such 
a definition can only really be of service where a good fossil record 
exists and for this reason it is a concept of the species which has 
had little direct application in angiosperm taxonomy. This species 
concept has been most consistently advocated amongst zoological 
paleontologists working on groups with a good fossil record (cf. 
Burma 1949a, 1949b; Mayr 1949; Crowson 1970: 57-67). 
Philosophers of biology sometimes seem prone to the misconception 
that the biological species concept and the evolutionary species 
concept are "logically" compatible with one another but not with the 
morphological species concept. Hull (1965: 2) talks of the biological 
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species concept as being an "operational" version of the evolutionary 
species concept. Similarly, Giray (1976: 322) has argued that "the 
gene pool concept of Mayr ••• and the evolutionary concept of Simpson 
are logically independent but nomically convergent."12 For this 
reason it is perhaps worth stressing that biological and phylogenetical 
species definitions do not always lead to the same units being regarded 
as species. That they do not is because some species are polyphyletic. 
A species may be said to be polyphyletic when some of its members have 
had quite distinct evolutionary histories, not being descended from a 
common ancestor which is also a member of that group. An interesting 
example of a case where this kind of speciation appears to have taken 
place is the grass Poa annua (cf. Tutin 1957). There is now bio-
systematic evidence that P. annua has .arisen several times from 
independent populations of P. infirma and P. supina. Of course this 
could be taken as evidence that P. annua is really two or more species, 
but this would be in conflict with the biological and morphological 
criteria for defining species which were considered earlier. Some 
more examples of polyphyletic groupings are discussed in chapter 6. 
In conclusion it is worth asking why there has been so much 
controversy surrounding the question of species definitions and why, 
as Simpson (1961: 149) puts it, "the problem ••• has probably caused 
more ink to flow than any other point in taxonomy." Blackwelder 
(1967) argues that much of the problem derives from the failure to 
distinguish between the various meanings of the term species, and 
Mayr (1957: 12) argues that the "hidden reason for so much disagreement" 
is the continuing attempt to find a single definition for the term 
species that will unambiguously define its usage. Hull (1965) also 
places strong emphasis on this interpretation and argues that the 
search for a single non-disjunctive species definition is itself a 
manifestation of Aristotelian thinking in biology, i.e. it is a 
product of the search for a single "essence" which will define a 
term's use. 
12. It is interesting that Giray and Hull found it necessary to lump 
together phylogenetic and biological species concepts.in this 
manner. Presumably both species concepts are seen as in harmony 
with "good" science (one being based on evolutionary theory and 
the other on genetics), so both have to be defended against "bad" 
orthodox taxonomy which lacks a modern approach. 
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However, there is an alternative approach to the problem of why 
there is a species problem, an approach which emphasises the close 
link between species concepts and the everyday practices and concerns 
of morphological and experimental taxonomists. The fact that most 
species "definitions" are in fact little more than operational 
prescriptions for how species groupings can be made means that there 
is a particularly close link in this instance between theory and 
practice. The species problem is such a sensitive issue in taxonomy, 
not just because species are important theoretical units in 
evolutionary and taxonomic studies; it is mainly an issue of concern 
because preference for one species concept over another involves 
commitment to one of a number of different and potentially rival 
sets of practices and techniques. These methods are, in turn, 
linked to different bodies of professional expertise and alternative 
institutional locations. The battle for the species is, from this 
perspective, just one aspect of the wider issues of methodology which 
have confronted taxonomists during the course of the current century. 
3. Controversies over classification below the level of the species 
The nature of the species has been a cause of considerable 
controversy between orthodox and experimental taxonomists. However, 
this controversy has not been restricted to classification at this 
rank. There has also been considerable disagreement over what units 
should be applied below the level of the species. 
Linnaeus originally provided for only a single rank below the 
level of the species, namely that of the variety. Further, Linnaeus 
held that varieties were due to accidents of cultivation and unworthy 
of the attention of serious botanists (Stafleu 1971: 63-66; Briggs 
and Walters 1969: 20-25). The modern International Code provides five 
categ;ories below the level of the species, i.e. subspecies, variety, 
subvariety, form and subform. However, like the species itself, 
these units have mainly been used by orthodox taxonomists for morpho-
geographical groupings. An example is the "subspecies". Most current 
herbarium taxonomists use the term subspecies to denote geographicaJ. 
races within the species whose morphological distinctness is not such 
as to permit specific delimitation (Davis and Heywood 1963: 98-100). 
Such units in evolutionary terms will often represent "incipient" 
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species and such morphological patterning is often a sign of partial 
reproductive isolation. However, subspecies can also be caused by 
the fusing of originally distinct species as a result of migration 
or the breakdown of ecological barriers. 13 In phylogenetic terms the 
morpho-geographical "subspecies" of the taxonomist cover a number of 
different evolutionary situations. It was a major facet of the work 
of experimental taxonomists in the 1920's, JO's and 40's that they 
tried to find alternatives to the traditional taxonomic ranks 
employed below the level of the species. 
4. Typological and population concepts in taxonomy 
Taxonomy is a science which pre-dates the theory of evolution. 
Typological approaches to variation are in part a consequence of 
that fact. Typology may be defined as the view that all members 
of a taxa posses a common ground-plan or essence. In terms of its 
history as an idea, typological thinking in taxonomy can be traced 
back to the influence of the early Greek philosophers and in 
particular to Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus (Hull 1965; Mayr 
1976: 26-29). At the species level typological thinking also fitted 
well the Christian concept of species as fixed forms created by 
intelligent design. 
The populationist approach to organisms denies that there are 
any common features which can constitute an essence or ground-plan 
for a species or for any other taxon. Instead, population thinking 
places great emphasis on the uniqueness of all phenomena in the 
organic world. According to Mayr (1959: 27) population thinking 
had its roots in Darwin's theory of evolution through natural 
selection, although it spread only slowly throughout biology during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. 14 
13. The history of the two British 'species' of oak Qu.ercu.s petraea 
and Q. robur illustrates this point. Originally found in 
different habitats and therefore rarely able to hybridize, human 
interference has meant that the two 'species' are now frequently 
found growing in the same woodland with hybridization and 
introgression a common result. 
14. The claim that Darwin's work embodied a populationist approach to 
the study of variation is discussed in more detail by F.gerton 
(1968) and (1970). 
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No modern taxonomist would deny that species evolve and that 
there is considerable intraspecific variation, both within the 
genotype and phenotype of the plant. However, recognition of this 
fact has not led to a complete abandonment of typological procedures 
and concepts, at any rate within orthodox taxonomy. Species are 
still named on the basis of a single specimen (the ~) which is 
then employed as a standard reference for the correct application 
of that name. And it is at least arguable that a typological 
approach to variation is inevitable in most taxonomy: 
It is quite true that the species and other taxonomic 
categories must today be considered as made up (ultimately) 
of populations, these should ideally be treated in terms of 
frequency distribution of the different variants of each 
character actually present at any time. It would be idle 
to pretend that more than a very limited amount of taxonomy 
can be practised in this way. In fact, taxonomists are 
inevitably forced to identify material by comparison with 
previously collected specimens, together with figures and 
descriptions, since the specimens used by the taxonomist 
are necessarily extracted from the population and only in 
very exceptional cases is he provided with (or can obtain) 
statistically adequate samples of the population. Thus 
every taxonomist builds up what one might call a typological 
picture based on his experience of each species ••• It is 
a warranted and inevitable procedure and a justifiable 
extension of typology. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 11) 
The argument of Davis and Heywood is not a plea for a return to 
the typological views of, say, Linnaeus or John Ray. However, it 
does suggest that the differences between "typological" and 
"populationist" approaches to the study of natural variation have 
been over-emphasised. A normal species is composed of millions of 
individuals and the population is, moreover, changing literally from 
moment to moment. It is obvious that a systematist, either of the 
biosystematical kind or an orthodox taxonomist working with a large 
number of specimens in a big herbarium, is only going to be able to 
record a tiny fraction of the enormous variability inherent in such 
a grouping. 
Conclusion 
Let us summarise the major points which have been made in this 
chapter concerning the nature of current theories in plant systematics. 
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Broadly speaking, the major areas of agreement and disagreement 
are as follows: 
1. There is general agreement that classification must rest upon 
the characteristics of the organisms in question. However, which 
characters should be considered most important (e.g., those of the 
phenotype or those of the genotype) for classificatory purposes is 
not a matter on which any degree of consensus has been achieved. 
2. There is general agreement that character weighting in some 
form is inevitable. Even in numerical taxonomy characters have to 
be selected. However, the value of weighting characters because of 
their presumed phylogenetic or evolutionary importance is denied by 
adherents of phenetic theories of classification. 
3. It is generally accepted that the notion of just what 
constitutes a "character" is difficult to define. This is a practical 
problem in numerical taxonomy where, because of the procedures adopted, 
characters have to be explicitly verbalised and coded in mathematical 
form. 
4. Whether biological classifications can or should always 
reflect evolutionary lineages is not a matter on which any consensus 
has been reached. 
5. Similarly, there is no consensus regarding the use of the 
natural kind term "species" and whether these groupings should be 
made using morphological, genetical and phylogenetical data as the 
primary criterion for species membership. 
6. It is accepted by practically all taxonomists that species 
evolve and that, in principle at least, no two individuals of a 
species are ever exactly alike in either their genotype or phenotype. 15 
However, whether it follows from this that all forms of typological 
thinking and procedures can be removed from taxonomy seems unlikely. 
15. The only exception here would be clones, which are alike in their 
genotype but have a different phenotype due entirely to 
environmental factors. 
- 21 -
Chapter Two: The Nature of Scientific classification part two: 
Some theories of classification current in the philosophy of meaning 
The examination of the nature and history of a classificatory 
science like plant systematics inevitably raises questions concerning 
the general nature of scientific classification. In what way do 
classificatory sciences differ from theoretical sciences like physics? 
Are the classifications used in science produced in some way which 
makes them fundamentally different from the classifications used in 
everyday discourse or within social institutions which are not a part 
of science? Do scientific classifications fundamentally differ in 
their nature and purpose from the classification schema devised and 
utilised by primitive societies? Does the activity of classifying 
in these different contexts, i.e. the scientific, the non-scientific, 
the primitive, involve different methods or models of classification, 
or are theseactivities manifestations, in different contexts, of a 
single underlying process? What determines the shape or form a 
classification takes in any given instance? How, and why, do 
classifications change and are such changes themselves determined 
and inflexible, or contingent and flexible? These are the kinds of 
questions which are raised and their solution demands an approach 
which synthesises perspectives current in both philosophy, 
sociology and history of science. 
In answering these questions it is necessary to begin with accounts 
of classification produced by philosophers, because it is from this 
source, i.e. the philosophy of science, philosophy of language and 
semantics, that nearly all existing theoretical work on classification 
derives. However, our own aims in constructing a theory of 
classification differ fundamentally from those of most philosophers. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to stress these 
differences of aim. 
In what follows, an attempt will be made to construct a model of 
classification from a naturalistic perspective. That is, we shall be 
concerned not with how human beings should carry out classification 
but how they actually do collectively carry out such activities. The 
normative element explicit or implicit in much of the writing of 
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philosophers when they talk about classification is absent in the 
account below. Their theories about how classifications ideally 
should be made are adapted to a different end. With a naturalistic 
account of classification inconsistencies between the theory and 
actual instances of classification carried out by scientists or 
others are real problems. One cannot take refuge in the admonition 
that the practitioners concerned should have done something else. 
In addition, whether the scientists could have proceeded more 
wisely or rationally will be of no concern in appraising our theory 
of classification, whereas it would generally be relevant to a 
philosopher when appraising such a theory. 
Fortunately, many philosophers who have tackled questions about 
scientific classification from an avowedly normative stance have, 
nonetheless, produced accounts which do yield valuable insights from 
a naturalistic perspective. 1 In the present chapter four such 
theories are discussed. Two, the simple description theory and the 
cluster description theory are linked to traditional philosophical 
doctrines of reference and meaning. The third has emerged from 
criticisms of those traditional doctrines by, amongst others, Saul 
Kripke, Hilary Putnam and Keith S. Donnellan. The final theory of 
classification discussed here had a slightly different origin, in the 
work on scientific metaphor and inference of Mary Hesse. Certain 
general and abstract arguments will be presented that demonstrate 
that one of these accounts, that stemming from Hesse's work, is 
preferable as the basis for a naturalistic account of classification. 
In following chapters this theme will be expounded more fully, using 
empirical material drawn from the history of botanical systematics, 
and certain consequences of the Hesse model will be more fully explored. 
With these preliminary remarks in mind it will now be possible to 
examine the first and historically the oldest and most entrenched of 
the four accounts of classification to be discussed, the simple 
description theory. 
1. There is an interesting parallel here with Kulm's (1970) account of 
cultural change in science. Kulm claims his work is normative, but 
its great value lies in its insights concerning the actual nature of 
scientific discourse. The claim to be normative is best ignored 
here and this is true also of Hesse's (1974) account of scientific 
classification and induction. 
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Simple Description Theory 
According to simple description theory we assign objects to a 
class by virtue of the discernible properties or attributes which 
these objects possess. Stated in formal terms simple description 
theory asserts that a term T can only be correctly assigned to an 
object X in virtue of that object's objective properties of T-ness. 
However, not all the properties of an object are necessary for 
its classification. Consider the natural kind term "mammal". The 
important features of a mammal are its possession of hair, milk 
glands and young which are born alive. These are the characters 
which distinguish or differentiate a mammal from other natural kinds 
e.g. reptiles and birds, with which a mammal might get confused. 
Thus, there is a distinction in traditional philosophical theories 
of classification between properties or attributes which are essential 
and those which are accidental. 2 Essential properties are those which 
any object must possess ·to be a member of that natural kind. They 
provide the criteria for separating members of closely related natural 
kinds. Accidental properties, in contrast, may be found in some 
members of the class but are non-essential for class-membership. 
Presence or absence of a tail would be an example of an accidental 
attribute for the natural kind term "mammal". 
In practice the essential properties of animals and plants were 
usually sought for in easily visible aspects of the organism such as 
external morphology and behavioural attributes. We can thus speak of 
essential properties as ma.king up an identifying description for the 
natural kind in question. 
Ta.ken together, the conjunction of essential properties provide 
a definition which governs a natural kind terms use. To put this 
another way, once we know the essential properties of a natural kind 
then we know how to determine the extension of that natural kind. 
2. According to Brown (1968: 10) this distinction was first made 
by Aristotle. 
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Mammals are just those animals with hair, milk-glands and live-bearing 
young. The extension follows automatically once the identifying 
description is known: 
identifying description 
( = conjunction of essential 
properties) 
Extension 
And a classification theory of this sort has categories which are 
mutually exclusive. For a:ny object, X, X is either "mammal" or 
"not mammal". Mammals will all possess certain essential properties 
common to all members of the class; things which are not mammals 
will lack one or more of these properties. 
Now this view of classification, or something very like it, is 
one which is associated with traditional philosophical accounts of 
meaning. The traditional account of meaning in philosophy holds 
that to know the meaning. of a term is to know its intension and 
that to know the latter allows the extension of the term to be 
determined: 
To understand a term is to know how to apply it correctly, 
but for this it is not necessary to know all of the objects 
to which it may be correctly applied. It is required only 
that we have a criterion for deciding of a:ny given object 
whether it falls .within the extension of that term or not. 
All objects in the extension of a given term have some common 
properties or characteristics which lead us to use the same 
term to denote them... The collection of properties shared 
by all and only those objects in a term's extension is called 
the intension or connotation of that term ••• Thus, the 
intenslon or connotation of the term "skyscraper" consists of 
the properties common and peculiar to all buildings over a 
certain height; while the extension or denotation of that 
term consists of the filnpire State Building, the Chrysler 
Building, the Wrigley Tower, and so on. 
(Copi 1972: 112)3 
3. More recently Copi has criticised this view and switched to the 
new essentialist theories of ext:ension advocated by Putnam and 
Kripke (see Copi 1977). 
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However, although the simple description theory has been of great 
importance both in systematics and in philosophy there are three 
important criticisms which can be launched against the model as a 
naturalistic account of all classification procedures. 
now be considered. 
These may 
The first criticism is that objects may deviate from the 
requirements of an identifying description without an accompanying 
change in a classification system being made. Consider what happened 
to the natural kind term "mammaJ." when the duck-billed platypus was 
discovered. Hitherto all mammals had been thought to bear live young 
in contrast to reptiles which layed eggs. The duck-billed platypus 
was egg-laying and if simple description theory is applied ought to 
have been regarded as belonging to the set "not-mammal". However, 
monotremes (of which the duck-billed platypus is an example) have hair 
and nipples and eventually came to be regarded as mammals. It could 
be argued that this simply changed the intension of the term "mammaJ.", 
but further problems arise if this view is taken. For example, some 
fossil reptiles certainly had hair and may have had nipple-glands. 
Just what are the essential properties of a natural kind and how can 
we guarantee in advance that they will never be subject to revision? 
Apparently we cannot guarantee anything of the sort. 
The second problem that can be raised against the simple description 
model is that objects can be found (or imagined) which fit every last 
requirement of an identifying description but which have further 
properties which make their classification problematic. Putnam(1975) 
gives some interesting examples. Thus, supposing half the pencils in 
the world turn out to be organisms?4 It is to be imagined that these 
"pencil-organisms" have all the superficial characterists of pencil-
artefacts, perhaps as a form of camouflage. Only electron microscope 
studies reveaJ. the tiny nerves and other organs which show these 
entities to be biological in their nature. For these animal pencils 
4. The example comes originally from the work of Rogers Albritton. 
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the identifying description has not changed but would scientists 
consider "pencil organisms" and "pencil artefacts" to be members 
of the same class? Surely not says Putnam and he concludes that: 
It follows that 'pencil' is not synonymous with any 
description - not even with a loose description. When 
we use the word 'pencil', we intend to refer to whatever 
has the same nature as the normal examples of the local 
pencils in the actual world. 
(Putnam 1975: 243, underlinings in original) 
A more realistic example of a similar phenomenon occurs in fungal 
taxonomy. Fungi undergo radical changes of structure during the course 
of their life-style. In several instances, parts of the life-cycle 
conform to the identifying descriptions of other classes of organ.isms. 
Indeed for this reason these parts of the life-cycle have sometimes 
received taxonomic recognition as, for example, protozoa. And yet 
when these "protozoa" were observed changing into fungi they were 
quickly re-classified as fungi. Why was this? They still fulfilled 
the identifying requirements of protozoa?5 
Thirdly, it can be argued that the simple description model, even 
if it overcame the two objections raised above, is inadequate as a 
solution to the problem of how classification is achieved. The problem 
of classification is that of how we are able to recognise one class of 
objects as distinct from another and by what criteria we are able to 
decide how best to sort out and designate different objects into different 
classes. Simple description theory solves both problems by postulating 
essential properties of identity which reside in the form (and occasionally 
in the function) of all members of a natural kind. However, as we saw in 
the last chapter the notion of what constitutes a ·property or character 
of a natural kind is itself problematical. And this is without even 
beginning to consider the problems raised above of how to sort out 
"essential" properties from "accidental" ones. 
5. For some examples see Alexopoulos (1952). A similar episode in 
zoological taxonomy is discussed by Winsor (1969). Thus, barnacle 
larvae used to be classified as crustacea. It was only much later 
that these "adult crustacea" were observed changing into barnacles, 
a group previously considered to be molluscs. This discovery 
prompted a fresh inquiry into the morphology of adult barnacles and 
eventually both adult and larval forms were moved into the crustacea. 
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For these reasons philosophers have tried to formulate new theories 
of classification. It is to these alternatives that we can now turn. 
Cluster Description Theory 
Simple description theory asserts that a natural kind terms 
extension is determined by a conjunction of properties which governs 
that term's proper usage. These essential properties make up the 
intension of the natural kind term and intension determines extension. 
One way of overcoming some of the problems associated with this 
view of classification while retaining most of the elements of the 
traditional view of meaning (i.e. that intension~ extension) is to 
conceive of the intension as consisting not of a conjunction of 
properties but of a cluster of properties. Thus, for a proponent of 
this view, no single property of a natural kind is essential to its 
classification but a sufficient number from the cluster of characters 
or properties is required. 
This theory of classification is best illustrated by example. 
Consider the following four 'objects': 
ABCD :BCDE CDEF EFGH 
On simple description theory if the letters A, B, C etc. stood 
for essential properties then there is no way these 4 entities could 
be placed into a single class. However, for a cluster description 
theorist they might be so classified. If the eight properties 
ABO ••• H a.re all regarded as important but not necessary properties 
and if possession of four or more of these properties is regarded as 
both necessary and sufficient for class membership then we are back 
to a position where: 
I 
(Cluster of Identifying 
descriptions) 
E 
Only now the intension is a cluster of properties instead of a 
conjunction. In the language of modern systematics a class of 
this kind would be polythetic (see Chapter 1). 
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Searle argues that a cluster description theory of this kind is 
6 applicable to our usage of proper names. However, as Searle also 
makes clear, the notion of "sufficient number of properties" is rarely 
layed down in advance: 
Suppose we ask users of the name "Aristotle" to state what 
they regard as certain essential and established facts 
about him. Their answers would be a set of uniquely referring 
descriptive statements. Now what I am arguing is that the 
descriptive force of "This is Aristotle" is to assert that a 
sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements 
are true of this object. Therefore, referring uses of 
"Aristotle" pre-suppose the truth of certain uniquely 
descriptive statements, but it is not ordinarily to assert 
these statements or even indicate which exactly are 
presupposed... The question of what constitutes the criteria 
for "Aristotle" is generally left open, indeed it seldom in 
fact arises, and when it does arise it is we, the users of the 
name, who decide more or less arbitrarily what these criteria 
shall be. If, for example, of the characteristics agreed to 
be true of Aristotle, half should be discovered to be true of 
one man and half true of another, which would we say was 
Aristotle? Neither? The question is not decided for us in 
advance. 
(Searle 1958: 171) 
One immediate point which philosophers might take as an objection 
to Searle's analysis is that it makes classification a matter of 
choice rather than logical necessity. As a matter of fact cluster 
description theory of the Searlian kind could easily be developed to 
overcome this objection. If the properties .of a class were layed down 
in advance and if the notion of what constituted a "sufficient number" 
of such properties was made explicit as well, then there would be no 
choice in deciding whether or not Aristotle really existed (provided 
that is, that everybody agreed to stick by the rules of the classif-
ication and everybody agreed what Aristotle's identifying description 
was composed of). A classification model of this type could perhaps 
be described as a "logicalised cluster description theory". However, 
from a naturalistic perspective such a development would be 001.lllter-
productive. Searle is surely right when he claims that the properties 
6. In taking Searle's acco1.lllt as being applicable to natural kind terms 
as well we are following conventional and accepted philosophical 
practice (of. Schwartz 1977; and also Putnam 1975: 152). 
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of an identifying description are rarely set down in advance and that 
the concept of sufficient number of properties in a cluster is rarely 
made explicit. They could be set down in advance and in certain 
procedures in modern taxonomy they are explicitly verbalised (see the 
discussion in Appendix A of Numerical Taxonomy). However, this is not 
the usual way that taxonomists proceed to construct a classification and 
even here choice is not really eliminated since what counts as a 
character or property has still to be decided and so does the number of 
those characters which will be sufficient for membership of the class. 
Such a procedure does not eliminate subjectively from classification; 
it simply removes it to a stage before the actuaJ. making of the 
classification itself. 
The advantage of cluster description theory is that it removes the 
problematical distinction between "essential" and "accidental" attributes 
or characters. On one reading of cluster description theories, at any 
rate, all the properties of a natural kind are potentially usable in 
that natural kinds classification.7 And if this position is taken then 
we have the kind of classification procedure advocated by phenetic 
taxonomists. Possession of no single property or even conjunction of 
properties settles matters in advance. 
considered and weighed equally. 
All characters must be 
However, as both Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972) have pointed out, 
description theory, even in this "cluster" form, inherits most of the 
problems inherent in simple description theories. What is common to 
both versions of description theory is their claim that a set of 
identifying descriptions (the Intension) determines the extension. 
Entities such as organismic-pencils, robot-cats and silicate-lemons 
remain just as problematic for this position as they did before. In 
all of these cases the entities imagined conform to the terms identifying 
description but would (ar;guably at least) not be considered to lie within 
the extension of the natural kinds pencil, cat and lemon respectively. 
7. Although. it must be remembered here that properties or characters are 
themselves human constructions. The number of properties or 
characters in, say, a buttercup is infinite so that the idea that 
"all" properties can be used in a classification is something of a 
fiction. 
- 30 -
As Putnam puts it, "the sense in which literally anything with the 
superficial characteristics of a lemon is necessarily a lemon, far from 
being the dominant one is extremely deviant. In that sense something 
would be a lemon, even if it had a silicon-based chemistry, for example, 
or if an electron-microscope revealed it to be a machine" (Putnam 1975: 
239, underlinings in original). 
The discovery that identifying descriptions, even of a cluster type, 
do not provide a basis for determining the extension of a natural kind 
term suggests two possibilities. One is that the notion of extension 
should be retained and that we should seek elsewhere for an explanation 
of how extensions are determined. This is the path taken by Putnam and 
the new essentialist school of classification theorists. The second (and 
more radical) move would be to abandon the idea that extension is pre-
determined by anything. Both of these possibilities will be considered 
in later sections, but we will begin with the first possibility, i.e. 
that extension is determined, but not by identifying descriptions. 
Putnam and the New Essentialist School of Classification Theory 
As we have just demonstrated above, traditional accounts of 
classification, both of the conjunction and cluster types, are linked 
with a theory of meaning which divides meaning itself into two 
components; intension and extension, and postulates a relationship 
of the form: 
I ) E • 
Now, a problem which has concerned philosophers for a long time is 
the question of what metaphysical status to ascribe to intensional 
properties. According to Putnam, intensional meanings were traditionally 
conceived as being in some manner mental entities and were thus thought to 
be private to the individual observer. Frege, and later Carnap, objected 
to this 'psychologistic' interpretation. For Frege intensions are public 
properties and their existence is real and independent of psychological 
awareness. Indeed, this explains why for Frege and Carnap intensions can 
be 'grasped' by more than one person and by different persons at different 
times (Putnam 1975: 134). 
However, as Putnam points out, this apparently radical move from a 
subjective to an objective account of intension is in fact not nearly 
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as far-reaching in its consequences as first appears. For even if 
intensional properties are conceived of in this manner, "grasping" 
the nature of such properties must still be a psychological act. 
And we are still working here within the framework of a traditional 
account of meaning. All that has taken place is a move from a 
relatively simple model of the form: 
I )E 
where I is the intension or essence of a term conceived of as a mental 
substance, to a slightly more complex model of the form: 
P ) I_____., E 
where P is a (presumably learned) psychological state or condition 
of memory etc. and I the terms intensional component of meaning 
now conceived of as a public entity with an objective existence. 
Either way, extension in the last analysis becomes dependent upon a 
psychological property and this Putnam will not accept: 
We claim that it is possible for two speakers to be in exactly 
the same psychological state, ••• even though the extension 
of the term A in the idiolect of one is different from the 
extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other. 
Extension is not determined by psychological state. 
(Putnam 1975: 139). 
Putnam sets out to prove this assertion with the aid of three 
examples referred to below as the "Earth/Twin Earth Water example", 
the "Aluminium-Molybdenum example" and the "Elm-Beech example" 
respectively. Let us briefly examine each of these in turn. 
1. The Earth/Twin Earth Water example 
Imagine there exists, somewhere in the universe, a planet which 
is identical to Earth in all but one respect, namely that on this planet 
"water" has the same macroscopic properties as water on Earth but a 
different microstructure. Let us call this chemical structuxe, which 
is quite different from H2o, XYZ. 
Earthians, say Putnam, on reaching Twin-Earth in their spaceships, 
may at first confuse Twin-Earth water with the real thing. However, 
upon discovery of their mistake they will report back to Earth something 
like: "On Twin-Earth the word 'Water' means XYZ!" They will not 
report back: "On Twin-Earth water is XYZ!" And we would wish to sa:y 
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here that the term "water" has different meanings on the two planets. 
On Twin-Earth water, what we call water, simply does not exist. And 
vice-versa. The extension of "water" in the Earthian sense (water E) 
is the set of all molecules of H2o (or something like that); similarly 
the extension of "water" in the Twin-Earthian sense is the set of all 
molecules of XYZ. 
But now imagine the state of affairs on Earth and Twin-Earth in 
1750, before scientists on either planet had discovered the micro-
structural properties of their respective water. Here Earthians and 
Twin-Earthians would apply the term "water" to different extensions 
or sets even though the ~ntensional properties would have been 
identical and they would be in the same "psychological state". It 
follows that here is one case at least where the move P·--t- I -7 E 
appears invalid. 
2. The Aluminium-Molybdenum example 
Imagine a situation like the last one, but now on Twin-Earth 
what Earthians call Aluminium is called Molybdenum and vice-versa. 
Thus on Twin-Earth pots and pans will be made of molybdenum (in the 
Earthia.n sense) while on Earth they a.re made of Aluminium. Here 
again when space-ship travel gets going Earthian and Twin-Earthian 
speakers may be mistaken into thinking that the terms "Aluminium" 
and ''Molybdenum" h~ve the same extension on both worlds, and their 
psychological states when they utter the words "Aluminium" and 
"Molybdenum" will be identical. However, the first spaceman who 
is a metallurgical sophisticate will realise the mistake and discover 
that on Twin-Earth "Aluminium" is really Molybdenum and "Molybdenum" 
is really Aluminium. Here again we have a case where the psychological 
state of a speaker and the descriptive properties which he associates 
with a given term do not appear to determine the extension of that term. 
3. The Elm-Beech Example 
Putnam, as a botanical non-sophisticate, claims that his own 
mental concept of an elm tree and a beech tree are the same and he 
associates the same descriptive associations with each word. And yet 
here again we can say that the extension of "elm" and "beech" are, 
for Putnam as for anybody else, unchanged, viz. the set of all elm 
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trees and all beech trees respectively. 
form P -7 I~ E is invalidated. 
Here again a move of the 
These then are Putnam's arguments for rejecting traditional accounts 
of meaning and reference. Other philosophers have recently put forward 
equally cogent arguments for taking the same view. 8 
What else can be learnt from these examples? The last two 
examples demonstrate what Putnam calls a division of linguistic labour. 
Thus anyone who uses terms like "elm" and "beech" or "Aluminium" and 
"Molybdenum" does not, of necessity, have to acquire the means of 
recognising the members of the extensions which these terms denote. 
How many city financiers who deal in gold stocks can tell the 
difference between gold and all other metals? The reason for this is 
that other members of the community (the experts) can determine the 
reference of these terms. And Putnam, plausibly enough, argues that 
this division of linguistic labour is in turn based upon the division 
of labour within society. 
However, Putnam also uses the examples discussed above to make a 
far more contentious point. This is the claim that natural kind terms 
are indexical expressions and that they act (in Kripke's terminology) 
as rigid designators (Kripke 1972). 
The force of this argument is best illustrated by example. Consider 
again the Earthian and Twin-Earthian usages of the natural kind term 
"water". As Putnam says there are two theoretical glosses which can be 
used to interpret what is happening here: 
1. That "water" is a world-relative term. By this theory "water" 
means water on both worlds but it just so happens that water on Twin-
Earth (w2) has a different molecular structure from water on Earth (w1). 
2. That "water" on w1 and w2 means different things. By this 
theory water is always H2o and it follows that the stuff called water 
on w2 is not, ipso facto, water. 
For Putnam there is no question that of these two approaches theory 
(2) is the one which is correct. What implications follow from this? 
8. Most notably Donnellan (1966). As Donnellan shows it is possible 
for reference to take place not only in the absence of an identifying 
description but even where that description is false. 
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Basically it follows that ostensive definition provides a rigid 
designation for the extension of natural kind terms. When I point 
to a beaker of liquid on Twin-Earth and say that it is water, what 
I mean is that it bears a same-essence relationship to water on this 
world, Earth. 9 If this samee relationship does not in fact hold, 
then I am mistaken. 
Once we have discovered the nature of water nothing counts 
as a possible world in which water doesnvt have that nature. 
Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is 
H20, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn't 
H2o. In particular, if a 'logically possible' statement is 
one that holds in some 'logically possible world', it isn't 
logically possible that water isn't H20. 
(Putnam 1975: 150-151, underlingings in original) 
A natura.l kind term may be in usage for a long time before a cross-
world relation._ of this kind is established. But, when such a relation-
ship is discovered, it means that the extension of the natural kind term 
is fixed for all possible worlds. The argument is not that the 
existence of such a relationship is an epistemic necessity. We may 
never know with absolute certainty whether our classifications do 
reflect the essential properties of natural kinds (although in science 
especially it is intended that they should do so). Rather the argument 
is that the existence of such cross-world relationships is a matter of 
metaphysical necessity. And to take such a position one has to be a 
realist not just in the sense of believing that a real world exists, 
but in the much stronger sense of believing that it is the nature of that 
real world which determines the correct usage of natural kind terms. 
Again, to clear up another point of possible misunderstanding, 
Putnam is not arguing that natural kind terms in current usage in our 
language must of necessity apply to substances with a unique physical 
basis. It could have turned out that water had two or more molecular 
structures. But in this case it would really be two natural kinds 
and not one. An interesting example of this which Putnam discusses 
is Jade. Although all jade has the same superficial characteristics 
it is in fact composed of two minerals, jadeite and nephrite, which 
are chemically quite distinct. 
9. What Putnam means by the concept of a 'same-essence' relationship 
will be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
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Indeed, Putnam even concedes that there may be some natural kind 
terms which apply to substances or objects with no shared micro-
structural properties at all. But in this case the terms extension 
will be fixed in a way which is quite different. 10 Also, natural kind 
terms of this sort will be common in lay language but increasingly rare 
in science. For it is the task of science precisely to discover the 
true essences which underlie the superficial appearance of the natural 
world. 
In its positive aspects then, Putnam's work amounts to nothing less 
than a new theory both as to the nature of meaning and the nature of 
reference. Let us consider meaning first. Meaning is traditionally 
divided into two components: intension and extension. Putnam keeps 
the notion of extension more or less as before, but he denies that 
intension determines extension. Instead extension is determined by the 
discovery of cross-world relations or essences and science is conceived 
of as an enterprise whose function is the discovery of these essences. 
This, then, is the first radical and new departure in Putnam's 
theorising about meaning. The second novel feature in Putnam's account, 
and it is a feature which we have not dealt with hitherto, is Putnam's 
introduction of the notion of stereotype. To understand the necessity 
for this notion we may consider again Putnam's deplorable, but understand-
able, ignorance concerning the difference between elm trees and beech 
trees ("the elm-beech example"). Putnam knows that the terms "elm" and 
"beech" denote different physical objects and that the terms have, 
therefore, different extensions. However, a botanical sophisticate 
might well still want to argue that Putnam does not understand, or at any 
rate does not fully understand, the meaning of the terms "elm" and "beech". 
Why is this? It is because Putnam does not know the properties of elm 
and beech trees which would allow him to correctly assign examples of 
each tree to their correct class (e.g. that beech trees have fruits and 
leaves of a certain type; that elm trees have fruits and leaves of 
another quite different type etc.). Descriptive properties of this 
sort, which typify a natural kind, form the stereotype of that term. 
Stereotypes are important in language, and communication without them 
would be impossible. But, and this is the central point, stereotypes 
10. In fact via a cluster of descriptions in the manner discussed by 
Searle (see Putnam 1975: 159). 
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do not determine extension. 11 That role, as we have seen, is aJ.lotted 
to cross-world relationships or essences. 
Stereotypes and cross-world relations solve some of the philosophicaJ. 
problems concerning meaning, but problems still remain when we come to 
consider the notion of reference. The traditionaJ. theory of reference 
centres on the old idea of intension (see Schwartz 1977: 13). A 
general term or name refers to whatever fits the characteristics the 
term or name means. However Putnam denies that names have an 
intension in this sense. In place of the descriptive theory of 
reference Putnam, and others, have argued that reference is established 
by something like a ca~sal chain (see especiaJ.ly Putnam 1973). When a 
name is first connected to a referent this involves a kind of "baptism". 
As long as later speakers in the chain intend to use the reference in 
the same way, successful acts of reference can be accomplished. When 
we refer to a term it is, therefore, not necessary to know the nature 
of the stuff we are naming. I may know nothing about electricity 
except that its presence in some mysterious way is connected with what 
does or does not happen when I switch on a light bulb. However, I 
can still make statements which are acts of successful reference and 
which contain the term "electricity" because there is a caijS.aJ. chain 
leading back from my use of the term to its original usage in the 
science of physics. 
How does all this shape up as a naturalistic theory of classification? 
Putnam clearly intends that his work should be taken in this way, for in 
the introductory remarks to his paper on The Meaning of Meaning he states 
the desire that his work will prove to be of value to linguists and 
other social scientists interested in the problems of language and syntax. 
However, as will be demonstrated in the next section, Putnam's work does 
not provide the basis for the naturalistic theory of classification for 
which we have been searching. 
Putnam's Theory of Classification: a critique 
The criticism of Putnam's work which follows can be stated in its 
bare outlines by means of the following five propositions: 
11. Stereotypes are thus very like intensions or identifying descriptions 
but differ because they do not determine the extension of a natural 
kind term. 
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1. That Putnam's theory of classification is one which is 
essentialist. 
2. That scientists themselves are often explicitly anti-essentialist 
in their self-conceptions of how they practice classification. 
3. That scientists are frequently anti-essentialist in their 
practice. 
4. That Putnam is in no position to judge this to be unusual or 
deviant practice on the part of these scientists. 
5. That the actual essentialism Putnam holds to describe 
scientific classification is itself obscure since he does not 
adequately analyze the nature of what is involved in a "same-essence" 
1 t . h' 12 re a ions ip. 
That Putnam is an essentialist is not, we would suspect, a charge 
which he himself would wish to deny. Popper iTI an often quoted 
passage from The Open Society and its Enemies defines essentialism as, 
"the view, held by Plato and many of his followers, that it is the 
task of pure knowledge or. 1science 1 to discover and describe the true 
nature of things, i.e. their hidden reality or essence." (Popper 
1950: 31). As we have seen, Putnam holds precisely this position 
and it is to science to which he looks for the discovery of these 
'cross-world relationships' or essences. 
Essentialism seems an odd label to attach to Putnam's work 
because, as a matter of historical contingency, essentialism in the 
past is a philosophy which has often been associated with idealist 
metaphysics. Putnam garbs his essentialism in the cloak of a 
realist metaphysics, but his doctrines remain no more-or-less 
essentialist for all that this is the case. 
Now the first point which can be made about Putnam's claim that 
science uncovers hidden essences which then provide the basis for 
12. These criticisms will be mainly directed at Putnam's analysis of 
meaning. The ca..v.sal theory of reference which Putnam presents 
can also be challenged from a naturalistic position. Thus, 
Kleiner (1977) has shown that a casual theory of reference does 
not (contra Putnam) entail that referential divergence may not 
occur during the history of a sciences development. A casual 
theory of reference is illuminating, but only if it is viewed 
as describing a network of beliefs which are socially transmitted 
(Kleiner 1977: 108). 
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classification is that if Putnam is right then scientists themselves 
have become curiously deluded about the real objectives of their 
research. For, as we saw in Chapter one, professional taxonomists 
are openly hostile to philosophical essentialism, and have deplored 
the "typological thinking" which results when such philosophical 
canons are pursued. Indeed one distinguished scientist and historian 
of taxonomy has gone so far as to argue that the removal of essentialist 
thinking from taxonomy has been the major factor in the progress which 
has been made in taxonomy during the period since Darwin: 
The assumptions of population thinking are diametrically opposed 
to those of the typologist. The populationist stresses the 
uniqueness of everything in the organic world. What is true for 
the human species - that no two individuals are alike - is equally 
true for all other species of animals and plants... All 
organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique features 
and can be described collectively only in statistical terms ••• 
For the typologist the type (eidos) is real and variation an 
illusion, while for the populationist the type (average) is an 
abstraction and only the variation is real. No two ways of 
looking at nature could be more different. 
(Mayr 1976: 27-28) 
Thus, when a modern taxonomist points, for example, at two herbarium 
specimens and makes an assertion of the form that, "these herbarium 
samples X and Y both belong to the same species Z", he is generally not 
postulating a same-essence relationship between them in the sense (if 
there is a sense) in which Putnam uses this term. There was a period 
when it was thought that the classification of species was possible 
using this kind of approach. But today even herbarium taxonomists, 
who in the past were the firmest adherents to this view, are firmly 
committed to populationist principles, which deny the search for 
essential properties in species, and which stress the uniqueness of 
everything in the organic world. 
Does this mean that we can dismiss Putnam's work already as a 
naturalistic solution to the problem of classification? It may 
seem strange that Putnam lmows the true nature of taxonomy better 
than taxonomists themselves seem to lmow it, but in fact this is 
far from conclusive. Scientists, like the rest of us, are not 
infallible. It could be argued that given more time and new techniques, 
the present pessimism within the biological community concerning their 
ability to discover the essential properties of natural kinds might 
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conceivably be changed. So we must give Putnam the benefit of the 
doubt on this occasion and seek more compelling reasons for doubting 
the views on classification which he sets forth. 
Much more compelling is the fact that the actual practice of 
scientists when producing classifications is often carried out in a 
manner which is contrary to Putnam's predictions. Other examples will 
be considered in the historical material which follows, but for the 
moment we can reconsider the practices of numerical taxonomists 
described briefly in Chapter one. As was explained in Chapter one 
the principle behind numerical taxonomy is that of equal-weighting 
of all characters used in the construction of a classification. As 
wide a selection as possible of characters are coded in mathematical 
form, and the computer is then used to ensure that all of these 
characters are treated as having equal value with no a-priori 
weighting. The resulting classifications are phenetic, i.e. based 
solely upon overall resemblance or similarity, rather than phylogenetic, 
a point which numerical taxonomists argue is of great value because it 
removes the kinds of phylogenetic speculations and assumptions (both 
explicit and implicit) in other forms of taxonomic procedure. 
Within numerical taxonomy no character is treated as more 
important than any other let alone as essential. All characters 
whether morphological, anatomical or biochemical are given equal 
rank. And yet numerical taxonomy is a part, and indeed a significant 
part, of current taxonomic science. Of course, Putnam is at liberty 
to argue that numerical taxonomy is bad science but, from a 
naturalistic perspective, we may simply note that it certainly is 
accepted as a part of taxonomy. It exists, and a naturalistic 
theory of classification must take account of its existence. It is 
not of course, the case that all taxonomists denounce essentialism 
in this manner. For example, as is shown in Chapter five, many 
experimental taxonomists have maintained (and still do maintain) that 
the micro-structural characters of plants are more important in 
classification than "superficial" external characters. However, 
for Putna.m's theory to hold it would have to be demonstrated that 
numerical taxonomists are acting illogically or irrationally in 
persisting to deny such claims and Putnam provides no grounds whatsoever 
for the warranting of such a conclusion. 
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In summary then, the beliefs and practices of working taxonomists 
call into question the validity of Putnam's theory. But even in its 
own terms there are inconsistencies and ambiguities of presentation 
which raise serious problems in Putnam's account. Putnam asserts 
that same-essence relations determine the extension of a term. 
However, same-essence relations do not exist until they are chosen as 
pa.rt of the development of a classification strategy. Before this 
step is taken any number of similarity relations exist which might 
be considered as essential. 
Thus, even within essentialism options remain. An interesting 
case discussed by Mellor (1977) concerns the discovery of isotopes of 
chlorine. Here if electronic microstructure is regarded as the 
essence of chlorine then the two isotopes a.re the same kind. But, if 
nuclear microstructure had been regarded as the essence of chlorine 
then two natural kinds would have been "discovered". In fact we took 
the first of these options, but both were possibilities. And, this 
being the case, the extension of the term chlorine could not have 
been fixed in advance on this world, let alone all possible worlds. 
If what has been said so far about "the new essentialism" is 
correct then it would be legitimate to enquire as to why talk of 
essences, cross-world relations, rigid designation and the like has 
proved so seductive to philosophers of science like Putnam. What 
makes the theory appear so attractive? As Mellor (1977) has pointed 
out in a valuable criticism of the writings of Putnam and Kripke, 
IIIllch of the apparent force of the argument stems from the exemplars 
chosen to present it. For example, in the elaboration of his idea 
Putnam pays particular attention to the use of chemical natural kind 
terms; water is a molecule of a certain kind, gold is an element with 
a certain atomic number etc. These examples have force because they 
a.re particular essentialist strategies which ca:rry the authority of 
science. And yet even in cases like these only a little imagination 
is needed to see the fallacy of the position which is taken. Imagine 
the hypothetical, but plausible, case of a society which like ours, 
uses g"Old in its economy as money, but which means by "gt>ld" not only 
what we call gold, but all other metals which bear golds superficial 
characteristics. Imagine in addition, that this society has no 
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institution within it comparable to modern chemistry. On learning 
from an outside source (or even from a tY})ical insider whose hobby 
happens to be chemistry) that their gold is "really" more than one 
natural kind because different exemplars of gold have different atomic 
numbers and the like, what is the likely response? Is the society 
likely to change its system of classification with respect to the 
natural kind term Gold? Surely not. The claims of the outsider, if 
they are believed at all, are surely more likely to be dealt with as a 
manifestation of the existence of different microstructural properties 
in a single natural kind than as the discovery of a hidden essence 
revealing a previous error in the classification. 
It is not, of course, the argument here that events would have to 
go in this way. :But the events could proceed as described above and 
if they were to do so there would be no grounds whatsoever for saying 
that the community acted in a manner which was illogical, irrational, 
or against nature. Treating "gold" as one or many natural kinds here 
would be two equally feasible options available to the culture. A 
change in the classification might aid some parts of the culture 
(amateur chemists, for example) but othem might find life more 
difficult (buyers and sellers would no longer be able to tell gold 
from non-gold on sight). The likely forecast here is that there would 
be no change of classification because this option preserves forms of 
social life around existing categories and values. But the fact that 
there is choice at all suggests that extension is not determined in 
all possible worlds by the discovery of same-essence relationships. 
Rather different classificatory strategies are possible without 
semantic deviance and these will differ from culture to culture. 
Putnam himself sometimes comes close to admitting that there 
is a goal-related choice available in the way people develop 
classifications. Thus we are told at one point (Putnam 1975: 157) 
that substances share the same-essence when they agree in important 
physical properties but that "importance is an interest-relative 
notion". However, at other points in his account this insight appears 
to be lost. Thus, in the conclusion to the same section of his essay 
Putnam (197.5: 160) argu.es that the 11H20-ness" of water determines what 
we can and cannot counterfactually suppose about the natural kind water. 
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If the definition of water as that which is H2o is a choice how can 
this be? 
This inconsistency emerges even more clearly in an earlier 
discussion of indexicality and rigidity. There Putnam (1975: 151) 
says that, "it is conceivable that water isn't H2o ... but it isn't 
logically possible!" But if it is conceivable that water isn't H
2
o 
then just what kind of "logic" is being invoked here? Is Putnam 
saying that although other cultures may not classify substances by 
microstructural properties they will be acting illogically in making 
such a choice? If so, he gives no grounds for substantiating such 
a claim. 
In order to drive home this last point and to summarize the 
general arguments presented in this section of the chapter, we shall 
consider one more hypothetical exemplar. This time, however, we 
shall move a little nearer home by considering, not a chemical natural 
kind, but a biological one. Imagine then that contrary to all 
expectations, the next Mariner probe on Mars discovers the hitherto 
unlmown existence on that planet of a race of Martian tigers. We 
shall suppose that these tigers have the same superficial characters 
as tigers on Earth, and the same internal structure as well. Thus, 
on their return to Earth cytological and genetical analysis will reveal 
cellular details and a genetic code (D.N.A.) identical in type to 
those of tigers on Earth. Also let it be the case that breeding tests 
between Earthian and Martian tigers prove successful, so that crosses 
between the two groups produce fertile offspring identical in form 
and variation with their parents. However, let us finally suppose 
that the situation pertains whereby there is very good evidence (e.g. 
in the fossil record on Mars) for the hypothesis that Earthian and 
Martian tigers have a completely different ancestry and that they 
evolved in total isolation from one another. What is happening here, 
apart from a truly remarkable case of parallel evolution? How many 
natural kinds are we dealing within this instance : one or two? 
It is difficult to state in advance how professional taxonomists 
back on Earth would deal with a case of this nature. However, to judge 
from writings in contemporary systematics there would be considerable 
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controversy on the issue. Phenetic taxonomists (which as we saw in 
Chapter one would include numerical taxonomists and some orthodox 
taxonomists) would presumably class Martian tigers and their Earthian 
counterparts into the same taxa, for in terms of a classification based 
on overall resemblance there would seem to be no good reason not to 
take this step. Strong adherents of a "biological" species concept 
would also, though for different reasons, approach the problem in 
this manner as well because they would point to the fact that 
Earthian and Martian tigers were capable (potentially at least) of 
gene-exchange. And if Putnam is correct we must, as a matter of 
logical necessity, talk in terms of only one natural kind being 
apparent, because the same hidden (and for that matter superficial) 
structure has been postulated to exist in both groups. Yet many 
(and indeed probably the majority) of modern taxonomists would resist 
this view. Most taxonomists would be likely to argue that biological 
classification should reflect phylogenetic relationship and, as we 
have already postulated, there is good evidence in this instance that 
Martian and Earthian tigers haye arisen from completely independent 
phyletic lines. 
Again, it is not the argument here that events would necessarily 
have to develop in this way. In trying to judge what would happen on 
the basis of current debates within plant systematics we are making 
guesses about events where relevant causes do not yet exist. But 
suppose a controversy of the kind we have just envisaged did take 
place. In what sense would one side be right and one side wrong? 
Would an assymetric approach to understanding what had taken place be 
justified? Are phylogeneticists all holders of a theory of gospel 
truth and pheneticists deluded fools? Or vice-versa? If philosophers 
think that they can genuinely answer these questions then they are in 
the wrong profession. They ought to be taxonomists. 
This last example suggests that people invent and decide their 
classification in ways which are not layed down in advance. Moreover, 
there would appear to be no context-independent method of deciding in 
this case which classification of Martian tigers is the "correct" one. 
A naturalistic theory of classification must take these facts into 
account and for this reason the new essential.ism must be rejected as 
a starting point for our purposes. What is required is an account 
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which recognises that future usage of terms is not pre-determined in 
advance. That future usage exists only when people have developed 
it. That options arearailable in that development, means that we 
have to ask why one option rather than another is collectively 
selected. Does such a starting point exist? Fortunately, the 
answer to that question is that it does. It can be developed from 
the recent work of another philosopher of science, Mary Hesse. 
The Network Model of Classification 
The work which Mary Hesse has done on classification is derived 
from concerns of a somewhat different nature from the objectives of 
the New Essentialist school of Kripke, Putnam et al. As we saw, the 
new essentialists have been concerned primarily with the philosophical 
problems surrounding the notions of meaning and reference. Mary 
Hesse's work also has profound implications for this area of philosophy, 
but its initial development stems from Hesse's earlier writings both on 
metaphor and on the search for an independent observation language in 
science (Hesse 1958, 1963). Hesse's major contribution to the 
philosophy of science has been conclusively to demonstrate that no 
such independent observation language exists. The usage of all 
predicates in a language is potentially revisable and the distinction 
between "observational" and "theoretical" terms in science is purely 
a relative one. 
In what comes next we shall not be following in detail Hesse's 
elaboration of the network theory of classification (see Hesse 1974). 
Instead we shall develop those elements of her work of greatest 
utility to the formulation of a naturalistic perspective on this 
subject. The section which follows also relies heavily on an 
unpublished paper by Barry Barnes (1978). 
The different starting point of Hesse's work can best be 
illustrated by a consideration of what is common to both descriptive 
and essentialist theories of classification. Proponents of both 
description theory and the new essentialism assume that natural kinds 
have surface or hidden features and they assert that it is these 
features which determine a correct classification. Arguments occur 
between proponents of the two positions over the nature of these 
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features (in one case they are intensional properties or identifying 
descriptions, in the other hidden essences or same-essence identities). 
However, that a terms extension, and hence its meaning, is determined 
in some manner is an assumption of both theories. 
Let us for a moment set aside the question of how (if at all) 
extension is determined and consider two other problems which must 
be at the root of any naturalistic account of classification. Firstly, 
what is the nature of the information on which classifications are 
based? And secondly, how are classifications learned and transmitted? 
Any answer to the first question must recognise that learning 
takes place through the assimilation of information from the 
environment. Of the ultimate metaphysical make-up of this information 
nothing need be said. What is clear, however, is that the environment 
is ver:y rich in information. And, more specifically, every physical 
event and object is, in principle, unique. No two cats, for example, 
ever have exactly the same physical attributes, nor do they ever 
behave in exactly the same way. In all cases we can recognise both 
similarities and differences between any two objects or physical 
events. (The consequences of this for any naturalistic theor:y of 
classification ar.e profound as will be demonstrated below.) 
Having recognised the role of the environment, and the information 
it provides, we must also recognise that this is an insufficient basis 
for most forms of learning because learning normally requires a 
teacher. A cultures classifications of its environment are not 
learned (or produced) simply from a passive examination of that 
environment. They are learned in a three-way interaction involving 
both the world (or perceptual input), the learner and whoever is 
teaching the learner. Learning a language is a social process and 
cannot be carried out in the absence of social interaction. The 
question, as we shall see, is not whether learning a classification is 
a social process, but rather what kind of process (or processes) are 
involved? 
Let us consider what processes and procedures are available to 
a teacher when he tries to impart his cultures classifications to a 
neophyte. Developing an example used in a recent paper by Kuhn ( 1974), 
imagine a child's first visit to the Zoo. While in the zoo, this 
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child is taught the meaning of the terms "swan" and "duck". How 
are these terms usages transmitted to the child? BasicaJ.ly, two 
learning processes are involved. 
1. Ostension. The child is shown various examples of ducks and 
swans and told: "that is a swan!" or "that is a duck!" 
2. VerbaJ. description. The child may also be told certain 
generaJ. laws about swans and ducks to aid this identification. 
"Ducks are small birds which quack" and "swans are large white birds 
which honk" might be two such verbal descriptions which are given. 
However, of the two learning processes which are involved here 
it is ostension which is the more fundamental. Learning by verbal 
description aJ.ways involves new terms which have themselves to be 
understood. In the example above "largeness", "smaJ.lness", "white", 
"quack" and "honk" are aJ.l such terms. Perhaps some of these terms 
could be further described, e.g. "large birds are birds over one 
foot in length" but the neophyte must !mow what "one foot" and 
"length" are. There is an infinite regress, unless we accept that 
learning ultimately depends upon ostension and that ostension itself 
consists of pointing to instances of physical objects and events 
which are actually unique. 
a.. 
The network theory of classification, then, is predic~ed upon 
a theory of human perception which claims that our ability to 
classify depends upon our recognition in the environment of 
similarities and differences in objects. Also, it follows that 
these primary processes of recognition are, in the last anaJ.ysis, 
unverbaJ.ised. If they were verbaJ.isable then the act of verbaJ.ising 
them would require predicates which in tu.rn would have to be learnt 
by ostension, so unless we introduce at some point a non-linguistic 
component to perception we a.re trapped in an infinite regress. 
It is of some significance, therefore, that professional 
taxonomists whose day-to-day activities centre around classification 
hold to a similar position. According to such taxonomists, character 
recognition, on which species-making depends, relies upon unverbaJ.ised 
perception, at least in the first instance. It is only later, when 
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the taxonomist has "got to lmow" the group on which he is working 
and has a fair idea of the number of species involved and how he is 
going to separate them, that he "rationally reconstructs" his 
intuitions concerning the group and locates the characters which 
will serve as markers for his taxa. In writing a monograph on 
a new and little understood genus the keys are not written first, 
rather they are normally written last. 
Generalising the position outlined above and putting it into a 
formal framework, we get a model of the sort illustrated in Figure 
2.1. In this diagram c1, c2, c3 etc. represent concepts or terms 
in general use within a culture. For convenience, these can best 
be thought of as natural kind terms, "fish", "whale", "mammal" and 
the like. I 1c1, r2c2, I 3c3, etc. are particular instances or 
paradigm cases of such terms whose number is finite for any given 
culture. And finally in Figure 2. 1 • we have the law like connections 
which bind the system of classif.ication into a coherent whole: all 
swans are white, all ducks are small water-fowl etc. The p here 
stands for a probability function, for not all law-like connections 
have a p =1•00. Not all swans are white for example, although most 
are. Probabilities will rarely be stated explicitly, although of 
course they may be. It is also perhaps worth noting that p may be 
ta.ken to bel•OO even although the teacher of the law lmows that it is 
not. The father may tell the child all swans are white even although 
he lmows that some swans are black. As an ethnomethodologist like 
Garfinkel might say, swans are white for all practical purposes. 
Seen in this manner then, the network is a model of the verbal 
component of our culture. It provides a pictorial representation of 
how we both classify the natural kinds of entities which exist in the 
world about us and account for the law-like generalities which hold 
between these natural kinds - between the classes of things which we 
ourselves have made. The !mots of the net represent concepts "tied" 
as it were to reality by ostension. The linking strands of the net 
are the laws which bind together these concepts. To a first 
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culture. Note also that it is transmitted to neophytes through 
the usual culture channels - learning, demonstration, persuasion, 
threat etc. as deemed appropriate. In the first instance it is 
thus given for a:rry individual within the culture. 
A question of fundamental importance can now be addressed, 
namely, how does usage based on a network proceed? What determines 
which instances are subsumed under each concept or term in the net? 
As has already been indicated, similarity and difference relationships 
occur between all instances in the network. It follows from this 
that classification is always an act of judgement. Nothing 
guarantees that the next potential instance of a term may not 
prove problematical; no part of the net is of necessity never to 
be subjected to revision. Choice is always involved in the 
development of a classification. There is no natural or absolute 
basis for weighting similarities and differences. Actors choose 
to stress some similarity relationships over others or to play 
down some differences as compared to others. What dictates such 
choices? In the last analysis actors are always free to decide 
for themselves but what will clearly influence such choices are the 
goals or interests which the classification is designed to serve. 
Classifications are conventions designed to serve the objectives of 
those involved in the classifications construction. 
The second contingency which will affect but not determine how 
a classification is developed is the pre-existing state of knowledge. 
New knowledge after its construction has to be "fitted into" what 
has gone before. That fact is something which the human being 
creating the new knowledge has to take into account. The growth 
of culture is, in the last analysis, an evolution not a revolution; 
otherwise communication would break down and we would talk of a new 
culture replacing an old one, not of an old one growing. 
It is now possible to see that both descriptionist and essentialist 
theories of classification fail as naturalistic theories because they 
do not take account of the conventional nature of classification. 
Extension is not determined either by identifying descriptions or by 
the discovery of hidden essences, because stressing one or other of 
these factors is itself a choice. However, it remains true, as will 
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be shown in later chapters, that both description theory and 
essentialist theories do describe possible strategies for constructing 
classifications. And in the recent history of botanical systematics 
both strategies have been (and still are) deployed. 
This last point can be further illustrated by reconsidering an 
example discussed earlier. Consider again the case of Tigers on 
Mars. No less than four "essential" properties of "tigerhood" could 
be postulated on the basis of this example (see Figure 2.2); all can 
be thought of as possible strategies for the development of the usage 
of a network of terms. 
1. We could equate the concept of tiger with sufficient 
resemblance of an external appearance. 
2. We could equate the concept of tiger with sufficient 
resemblance of hidden structure. 
3. We could equate the concept of tiger with capacity to 
exchange genes. 
4. We could equate the notion of tiger with a concept like 
that of evolutionary or phyletic continuity. 
Any of these four strategies for concept application becomes 
"essential" if we collectively choose to make it so, Le. if we 
consistently deny apparent counter-examples by appropriate judgements 
of similarity/difference weightings. But~ of these approaches 
conflicts with what we have postulated that we know about Martian 
and Earthian tigers. Rather, all four strategies are equally 
compatible with the facts as they are known. Essences of a kind may 
be maintained in Hesse networks, but they are conventions like any 
other part of the net. 
Although the account of classification produced above has been 
constructed with different objectives in mind from those of most 
philosophers there is actually little in the assumptions that have 
been made that should be unacceptable to most current philosophers 
~ I 
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of science. That reality exists and that its nature is sufficiently 
complex to allow many human interests of different kinds to become 
developed in dealing with it from diverse angles, objectives, 
perspectives etc. are both fairly non-controversial claims. 13 The 
plausibility of both assumptions derives from the very diversity of 
beliefs about reality of which we lmow human beings to be capable. 
It is the proposition that classifications are conventions which is 
likely to arouse strongest passions. Most philosophers consider 
themselves to be realists and not conventionalists, even though there 
is no good reason why this should be the case. What are their 
objections to the label of conventionalism when applied to knowledge? 
We can do no better than examine the reasons given by the philosopher 
who was the source of inspiration for much of this section of the 
essay, Mary Hesse. 
Hesse describes herself as a realist philosopher, aJ.though she 
admits that the difference between the "conventionalists" and 
"reaJ.ists" is often one of different modes of expression rather than 
of issues of substantive disagreement (Hesse 1974: 56-61). Her own 
objections to "convential talk" as applied to language appear to 
rest on two foundations, one an argument over theory, one a moraJ. 
objection. 
The theoretical issue is really dealt with quite easily. Hesse 
denies that her account of classification is conventionalist because 
such a view, she maintains, does not take seriously the systematic 
character of laws. This is simply not the case. Conventions are 
not ~ conventions. Classifications and the system of laws which 
are associated with them are systematic because the human beings who 
make those laws have sustained interests and motives for taking the 
options they do in fact take and developing the lmowledge in the way 
in which it is developed. We cannot predict in advance what will 
happen in any one instance because human beings are far too inventive 
13. Although it is worth noting that the existence of reality appears 
to be denied by some extreme proponents of sociologicaJ. relativism. 
Interestingly such beliefs often appear to be linked to a radicaJ. 
disapproval of science (for example, see Roszak 1970). 
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and resourceful to make such gu.esswork plausible. However, this 
does not mean that systems of classification are entirely random 
ad hoe affairs either. There is a link between interests and the 
growth of systems of knowledge and belief, as we shall demonstrate 
in the following chapters. 
The moral argument also appears to be invalid and is indeed 
based upon theoretical argument already discussed. Thus Hesse 
appears to argu.e in one remarkable passage of her book that if 
we talk of language acquisition and usage in conventionalist terms 
then the world of "newspeak" is just around the corner: 
The differences between the models (i.e. of conventionalism 
and realism) are more verbal than substantial but the model 
using the notion of truth is less open to the currently 
dangerous misinterpretation of mistaking brainwashing for 
objectivity. 
(Hesse 1974: 61) 
But this is emphatically not the case. True the conventionalist 
account does take notice of the fact that people are continually 
developing language to manipulate it for their own ends. But it is 
people not language which does the manipulating. If "they" are 
trying to usurp our language then recognition of this fact may 
actually help to prevent the nightmare world of Orwell's 1984. 
With Hesse's claim that the issues between conventionalists 
and realists are more verbal than substantive, we can have much 
sympathy. Reading this controversy in philosophy it is an 
impression easily gained. Also we would be the last to argue that 
verbal quibbling should be allowed to stand in the way of genuine 
understanding. But the commitment to a realist metaphysics must 
be firmly resisted if it leads to a failure to take proper account 
of the role which interests play in the growth of knowledge. And 
we do not have to look far to see an example where this is the case, 
for Putnam's work illustrates beautifully how a realist-orientated 
commitment in metaphysics can lead to precisely this error. 
Indeed our own account of the role which interests play in the 
growth of systems of classification need further elaboration. How 
and what role do interests play? What different kinds of interests 
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are involved? These are questions to which we must return. But to 
do this a new line of attack is required, for in any given instance 
these are empirical questions. To answer them we must leave, for a 
while, the grand palace of philosophical theory and enter the more 
humble abode of historical, empirical research. 
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Chapter Three: Attempts to Introduce Experimental Methods 
Into Taxonomy prior to 1920 
Orthodox taxonomy is essentially Linnaean both in its aims and 
practice. Indeed the development and long survival of what may 
loosely and generically be termed Linnaean methods is in itself of 
great interest and importance. The philosophical presuppositions on 
which Linnaeus based his taxonomy were probably derived in part from 
an early training in Aristotelian scholasticism. Linnaeus was an 
essentialist in the Popperian sense of that term (Popper 1962: 31; 
Stafleu 1971: 25-31). Thus, for Linnaeus species were objective 
entities, existing in nature and separated from each other by 
sometimes hidden, but nonetheless real, essences or characters. 
The taxonomist's purpose was to uncover these real essences or 
characters, and so to express the hidden order of the natural world. 
The most serious consequence of adopting such a position was that 
variation within the species played a very minor role in Linnaean 
taxonomy. It is true that the Linnaean system does possess a single 
category, the variety, which is below the level of the species, but, 
for Linnaeus, intraspecific variation was a comparatively unimportant 
matter, a result of cultivation or accident rather than of nature, 
and he never altered his view that varieties were epiphenomena unworthy 
of the serious botanist's attention (Stafleu 1971: 90-91). 
However, in addition to conforming to these philosophical doctrines 
the Linnaean system was also designed to be eminently practical in its 
application. Apart from an early period in his life, Linnaeus 
travelled little and his observations of plants relied heavily on 
herbarium material (Stafleu 1971: 112-114). The Linnaean system, 
with its ordered hierarchy of class, order, genus, species and variety, 
allowed a systematic categorisation of plant species based upon a 
visual examination of the plant's gross external morphology such as is 
possible to perform easily on the dead plant material of the herbarium. 
In his reliance upon the external properties of organisms for 
constructing a classification Linnaeus was typical of naturalists of 
the classical period (cf. Foucault 1970); and in fact this reliance 
on external features for taxonomy shows not only in his writings on 
animals and plants but to a large extent in his writings on mineral 
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classification as well (Albury and Oldroyd 1977: 191-194). 
The Linnaean method was designed to allow rapid and easy 
identification and naming of new plant material. Indeed, Linnaeus 
himself defined botany as, "that part of the natural sciences by 
which one obtains happily and easily a knowledge of plants and by 
which one uses that knowledge" (quoted in Stafleu 1971: 33). Emphasis 
on the practical, instrumental aspects of classification is apparent 
in two of the most famous aspects of Linnaean taxonomy, the binary 
system of nomenclature and the sexual system. Binary nomenclature was, 
as Linnaeus quickly realised, an ideal system for easily applying a 
name to a group of plants. "As easily as one names a person", is how 
Linnaeus himself described its use (quoted in Stafleu 1971: 109). The 
sexual system, with its emphasis on such easily discernible features 
of plants as the numbers of stamens and pistils, allowed any new plant 
species to be rapidly incorporated within the categories of the system. 
As Stafleu (1971: 143-339) points out, in a valuable appraisal of 
the reception of Linnaean taxonomy, it was the practical utility of 
his methods which so attracted eighteenth-century botanists and which 
largely accounts for the enormous success of Linnaean taxonomy in the 
years which followed Linnaeus' death. Descriptions were standardised, 
names given according precise rules, a classification was made possible 
which allowed accurate storage and retrieval of large amounts of 
taxonomic information. The practical value of the system was especially 
evident in Britain, where it served the needs of an expanding empire in 
ordering a flood of exotic new plant materials which had scientific, 
medical and horticultural importance. In addition, its assumption 
that species were distinct entities held together by continuous 
generation and separated by essential differences, accorded well with 
the Biblical account of species and their origin, an account still 
prevalent when Linnaeus was writing, and a view to which he himself 
largely subscribed. 1 
In very broad and general terms, the developments which were to 
lead to the emergence of experimental taxonomy or biosystematics can be 
1. In his later life Linnaeus argued that it was the genera which were 
created in the beginning and that these.were subsequently blended 
to form the species. However, even here the overall framework of 
belief remains Creationist and there are no grounds for seeing 
Linnaeus as a forerunner of transformationist doctrines. 
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traced to a reaction against Linnaean taxonomy. This reaction was 
confined at first mainly to middle Europe and, more particularly, to 
eighteenth-century Germany and France. And it was a reaction led 
by men who were not, primarily at least, taxonomists but rather 
experimental biologists. 
Of the German botanists, Joseph Gottlieb KBlreuter (1733-1806) 
and Joseph Gaertner (1732-1791) are the two whose names have most often 
been linked with the emergence of experimental taxonomy. 2 Indeed, 
Kglreuter's experiments in plant hybridization have been described 
(Olby 1966: 21) as the starting point for the science of experimental 
" genetics. Kolreuter did not believe that hybridization could produce 
new species in nature, but later biosystematists (e.g. Clausen, Keck 
and Hiesey 1939: 103; Clausen 1962: 5) have seen in K8lreuter 1 s 
observations the first experimental evidence both for hybridization 
and for the existence in nature of interspecific barriers to gene-
exchange. Joseph Gaertner was a personal friend of KBlreuter and is 
best lal.own for his anatomical and morphological studies of seeds and 
fruits. He was the first botanist to recognise endosperm3 and among 
the first to use the term 'embryo' to describe the young plant within 
the seed (Stafleu 1971: 257-259). His son, Carl Friedrich von 
Gaertner (1722-1850) performed hybridization experiments and Olby 
(1966: 39) describes the latter's work as being in direct succession 
to KBlreuter's and a direct precursor of Mendel's experiments. 
The contributions made by the biologists of the French 
Enlightenment to later developments within taxonomy were more nebulous, 
but not necessarily of less importance. In very different ways this 
topic is considered by Stafleu (1971: 267-339), Foucault (1970: 217-249) 
and Schiller (1974). Schiller emphasises the increasing importance of 
experimentation to the late eighteenth-century biologists, a concern 
which he see~ in part as a reaction against the previously excessive 
2. Other eighteenth-century botanists could undoubtedly be added to 
this list. For example, Stafleu (1971: 247) also sees the Swiss 
botanist Albrecht von Haller as an early advocate of biosystematical 
doctrines. 
3. Endosperm is the nutritive tissue which surrounds and nourishes the 
embryo in seed plants. 
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concerns with classification. Both Foucault and Stafleu stress the 
increasing importance of time in an understanding of biological 
phenomena. This new awareness of time results in a strong temptation 
to see in the work of figures such as Buffon and Lama.rck anticipations 
of the later developments which were to occur during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. However, the dangers of overemphasising such 
parallels is well brought out by Bowler (1974). As he shows, late 
nineteenth-century evolutionary theories were remarkable in two 
respects: in their dynamic treatment of nature and natural phenomena, 
and in their abandonment of the idea that the universe was created or 
planned by an intelligent Creator. Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Buffon and Lamarck certainly held to a more dynamic view of nature than 
had their predecessors, but their thinking, even when "evolutionary" 
or "progressive", remained within an overall framework which was 
usually Creationist in at least some of its aspects.4 
Within taxonomy itself the period of some eight decades between 
the death of Linnaeus and the publication of Darwin 1s Origin of Species 
saw many developments and refinements of concept and practice, albeit 
within an essentially Linnaean framework. Linnaea.n nomenclature 
reforms eventually gained a nearly universal acceptance and those (e.g. 
Ada.neon) who chose not to use them found their work isolated and ignored 
as a consequence. There was a continuation of the search for a 'natural 
system' of classification and, towards this end, more and more 
characters, including some internal characters, came to be deployed by 
taxonomists. In zoological taxonomy larval forms became an 
increasingly important source of new information (Winsor 1976) and the 
development of new and better microscopes greatly facilitated this 
process. However, classifications continued to be based broadly upon 
resemblances of form and taxonomists still directed their attention 
primarily to the description of differences between species rather 
than to an analysis of variation within the species. 
By the second half of the nineteenth-century one of the two plan~s 
on which the success of Linnaea.n taxonomy was based appeared to have 
4. Interestingly, as Bowler shows, the enlightenment thinkers who came 
closest to anticipating later evolutionists were not atheists but 
deists. Any simple portrayal of evolutionism as a reaction against 
Christianity is therefore to be avoided. 
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been finally removed from biological thought. If gradual tra.nsf orm-
ation of species occurred, then species could not be the fixed, 
unchanging entities which they had previously been thought to be. 
Indeed, if the Darwinian account of gradual speciation was accepted, 
then the very existence of species as previously conceived was 
thrown into doubt. Darwin himself ascribed to a nominalistic 
species concept; for Darwin species were abstractions, fictions of the 
taxonomist's mind rather than objectively existing entities in nature: 
Hereafter we shall be compelled to acknowledge that the only 
distinction between species and well-marked varieties is, 
that the latter are known, or believed, to be connected at 
the present day by intermediate graduations, whereas species 
were formerly thus connected... It is quite possible that 
·forms now generally acknowledged to be merely varieties may 
hereafter be thought worthy of specific names ••• In short, 
we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those 
naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are merely 
artificial combinations made for convenience. This may not 
be a cheering prospect, but we shall at least be freed from 
the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable 
essence of the term species. 
(Darwin 1859: 460) 
In retrospect,especially if one views progress in science purely 
in terms of the history of ideas, it is hard to see why the acceptance 
of Darwinian evolution in the latter half of the nineteenth-century 
did not precipitate a crisis in taxonomy. In terms of its logic the 
threat posed by Darwinian natural selection to a Linnaean-based 
taxonomy is not difficult to grasp. If it is accepted that the only 
basis for a natural classification is evolutionary theory and that 
species develop gradually, and, if change from one species to another 
is too gradual to be able to delimit them, clearly species cannot be 
defined or delineated in the classical manner. As Heslop-Harrison 
(1953: 8-9) says, "the idea of organic evolution was in several 
ways in conflict with the practices of orthodox taxonomy from the 
beginning • • • Darwin' s doctrine was implacably opposed to such an 
interpretation of natural variation." 
However, as a number of later authors have pointed out (e.g. Davis 
and Heywood 1963: 31-33; Heslop-Harrison 1953: 11), the acceptance of 
the Darwinian thesis of evolution through natural selection had 
remarkably little effect on the actual practice of taxonomy during the 
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years which followed its acceptance by the majority of the biological 
community. The theory of evolution, while it provided a new framework 
within which the existence of classifications could be interpreted, 
did not actually provide any new techniques by which such classifications 
could be produced. The aims of herbarium taxonomy remained to find and 
describe new species and to provide a framework in which the diversity 
of living organisms could be described and ordered. The existence of 
such order could now be given an evolutionary or phylogenetic inter-
pretation; organisms were seen as related through descent, but the 
methods used for producing such classifications remained much as 
before. 
Thus, rather than overthrowing the structure of nineteenth-century 
taxonomy, evolutionary theory actually came to provide a source of 
support for the existing methods. The Linnaean system, with its 
ordered hierarchy of categories, was seen as a demonstrable proof of 
the affinities between organisms postulated by the evolutionary hypothesis. 
It is true that the acceptance.of evolutionary speciation cast doubt upon 
the real existence of species as the fixed unchanging entities which had 
been posited previously, but taxonomists were often quite willing to 
accept that there was a 'subjective' element to species-making. To make 
such an admission was not, in itself, a threat to traditional taxonomic 
practice. Species might indeed be nominalistic; they might indeed be 
creations of the taxonomist's mind, rather than objective realities, but, 
if they were a fiction, they were a convenient and indeed necessary one. 
The writings of the American taxonomist Lynn Bailey (1896) 
illustrate this point particularly well. Bailey admitted that, given 
evolution, the species of the early naturalists like Linnaeus were not 
objective entities but creations of the taxonomist's mind. However, 
he did not advocate either the abandonment of Linnaean methods or 
the Linnaean system. Indeed, he argued that it is precisely because 
species are only a convenient fiction that an approach to species-
making based on external morphology is to be desired. Species thus 
become defined in purely pragmatic terms as a "unit of classification, 
designating an assemblage of organisms which, in the judgement of the 
writer, is so marked and so homogenous that it can be conveniently 
spoken of as one thing" (Bailey 1896: 457). 
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Thus, the situation in 1900 was that orthodox taxonomy had seen 
little change either in its aims or methods since the time of Linnaeus. 
The aim of classification remained to describe new species on the basis 
of resemblance of morphology, or form, and thus to impose order on the 
immense variety of natural kinds. The herbarium remained the focal 
point of taxonomic enquiry. Linnaean categories, with additions 
where necessary, remained in use and indeed have continued to find 
employment up until the present day. The Linnaean method, by and 
large, continued to be perceived as appropriate for the job at hand. 
As Heslop-Harrison (1953: 10) comments: 
••• during the century-and-a-half after Linnaeus the taxonomic 
methods which he had so largely helped to establish were 
successfully employed with little or no modification to 
complete a major part of what might be termed the primary 
survey of the higher groups of the plant kingdom. Order 
was imposed where order had not been before, and to this 
extent the aims of classical taxonomy were achieved. 
And Simpson (1961: 63-64) has argued that zoological systematics at 
the turn of the century was in a similar position. 
The lack of any intellectual crises within taxonomy is borne out 
by the proceedings of a symposium on the species question initiated 
by Henry Bernard in 1900. Bernard was a zoological systematist who 
was working on a catalogue of corals then being prepared by the 
British Museum of Natural History in London.5 The evidence about 
this symposium's discussions comes from correspondence found in the 
papers of William Bateson. These letters were written to Bernard 
from the leading biologists and naturalists in Britain, including 
E. Ray-Lankester, W.C. Thiselton-Dyer, W.F.R. Weldon, D. Sharp, A.R. 
Wallace, and Bateson himself. The symposium's main concern was with 
the value of Linnaean nomenclature in groups, like the corals, where 
very little evidence on morphology and variation was available. 
Bernard had found great difficulty in his own work in applying Linnaean 
nomenclature and methods of such instances. However, the most striking 
feature of the symposium was the almost unanimous agreement that the 
5. This symposium and the general light it sheds on biology in Britain 
at the turn of the century is discussed in a recent paper by 
Cock ( 1977). 
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Linnaean species, based on morphological discontinuity of form, could 
be the basis for a permanent and adequate taxonomy, provided that 
sufficient material of the species was available and that the 
taxonomist was competent at his task. Of the contributors to the 
meeting only Bateson offered any dissension on this point. 6 
However, although there was little awareness from within the 
taxonomic community of any need to radically alter their objectives 
or techniques, there was, towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
increasing hostility towards traditional taxonomy from other branches 
of biology. This hostility was initially concerned as much with the 
methods employed by orthodox taxonomy as with the results that were 
being obtained. Within botany at least, this enmity of taxonomy 
can be traced back to the emergence of physiological botany during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 
As Coleman ( 1971) has shown, biology in the last half of the 
nineteenth century was beco~ an increasingly experimental science. 
Experimental methods had entered botany via the work of German 
physiologists of whom Julius Sachs (1832-1897) was the outstanding 
figure. Sachs became a leading advocate both of the new experimental 
methods and of the reductionist philosophy with which they were 
associated. For the new physiologists plants and animals were 
machines, whose functioning could be explained in terms of physical 
and chemical laws. Amongst Sachs' pupils at Wlirzburg was Hugo de 
Vries (1848-1935), who was later to become one of the co-discoverers 
of Mendel's work and an early advocate of an experimental approach 
to the species problem. 
In Britain the "New Botany" was chiefly associated with the work 
of T.H. Huxley, W.T. Thiselton-Dyer, S.H. Vines, H. Marshall Ward and 
F.O. :a;.er. 7 Of these, Huxley especially was a vigorous champion 
of the new physiology: more interested in form and function than in 
classification, he found little need for systematics in his work: 
6. Bateson argued that great changes would be made in systematics 
in the near future, although he did not elucidate the direction 
in which he believed that these changes would proceed. 
7. A discussion of the work of all these figures and their role in 
the emergence of the "new botany" in Britain is given in Bowyer's 
(1938) autobiography. 
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The only part of my professional course which really and 
deeply interested me was physiology ••• I am afraid there 
is very little of the genuine naturalist in me. I never 
collected anything and species work was always a burden 
to me. 
(Huxley, quoted in de Beer, 1974: 102) 
And Huxley was convinced that experimental methods were vital to 
biology: 
physiology is the experimental science par excellance 
of all sciences; that in which there is least to be learnt 
by mere observation, and that which affords the greatest 
field for the exercises of those faculties which characterise 
the experimental philosopher. 
(Huxley 1854, quoted in Bibby 1967: 54) 
However, in Britain at least, the "New Botany" made slow headway 
against the already established systematics. Bowyer (1938: 26) 
suggests that a reason for this resistance can be found in social and 
economic conditions prevalent in Britain in the 1870's and 80's. The 
expansion of Imperial interests in Victorian Britain had led botanists 
to concentrate on floristic and taxonomic studies of the British 
dependencies to the exclusion of laboratory botany: 
I remember about 1876 how I longed for a train of wagons to 
convey the Cambridge herbarium away to Kew, and so to 
vacate for the new botany the rooms that would have served 
its needs. A crude idea no doubt, but it reflected the 
inverted narrowness of outlook which the time had imposed 
upon us. 
(Bowyer 1938: 102) 
The tensions between the old established systematics and the 
"new botany" erupted in the so-called "war" between physiologists 
and taxonomists which took place in the 188o•s and 1890's. 8 It was 
a "war" which taxonomy was ultimately destined to lose. In 1884, 
Hooker, writing to a friend concerning an appointment of a vacant chair 
of botany in an English university, felt need to give the warning that: 
Botany is no longer a knowledge of plants, but how plants 
'come about' and what they do! ••• There is no question of 
the high scientific value and interest of all this, but the 
outcome of years of it may leave a man in utter ignorance 
of any plant bigger than the Torula or Mu.car he began with ••• 
8. Much more historical research is required to elucidate the reasons 
behind this controversy. A brief discussion of its consequences 
for amateur natural history in Britain is given in D.E. Allen 
(1976: 176-194). 
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Botany of this sort is the study of the laws of life, the 
highest of any: but to pursue it requires a special education; 
and to teach it a special practice; and I do not know if you 
have had either. I have not . • • Our careers are very 
different from this, and you are making your mark in yours, 
would 'it not be better to stick to it? Or only leave it for 
something in the same line? 
(Hooker 1884, quoted in Huxley 1918: 403-404) 
And Hooker was not alone in making such a gloomy prognosis; in the 
years which followed other established British taxonomists such as 
Charles Babington and Alfred Newton were to echo these sentiments. 
The comparatively modest status of taxonomy by the turn of the 
century is reflected accurately in Sir Joshua Reynold Green's 
A History of Botany (1909). Taxonomy is accorded merely 22 pages. 
Anatomy and physiology are given a 370-page treatment, much of it, 
as the author acknowledged, concerned with research of quite recent 
origin. 
However, the controversy between experimental botanists and 
systematists was not one which was entirely confined to matters 
of relative importance and status. Darwin's work had reemphasised 
the importance of the concept of "species" to all biologists, whether 
they were concerned with taxonomy, evolutionary theory or mechanisms 
of physiology and heredity. Also, Darwin's work initiated a long 
controversy concerning the mechanism of speciation. Darwin had 
suggested that evolution took place primarily through the action of 
natural selection on small, essentially continuous variation. Another 
possibility, and one not completely ruled out by Darwin, was that the 
environment could act directly to produce new species (a view which 
became attributed to Lamarck). Still another possibility, and one 
favoured by Huxley, was that new species could arise by sudden "leaps" 
or "saltations". Which of these mechanisms was correct and what 
exactly was a species anyway? Amongst experimental biologists at the 
turn of the century there were some who felt that the problems 
concerning the nature of the species and its origins were too important 
to be left to the hands of descriptive naturalists and systematists. 
It was at the hands of these figures that the first attempts to 
construct an "experimental taxonomy" were made. 
Attempts to solve· the species problem by experiment 
1. Transplant Studies Prior to 1920 A number of nineteenth-century 
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botanists used transplant studies in an attempt to obtain experimental. 
evidence about speciation. Three figures merit special attention 
because their work was taken up and developed by later experimental.ists: 
Alexis Jordan (1814-1897), Anton Kerner von Marilaun (1831-1898) and 
Gaston Bonnier (1853-1923). 9 
Alexis Jordan was a French botanist, born in Lyons and author of, 
inter alia, Observations sur plusiers plantes rares (1846); De l'origine 
des diverses varietes ou especes d'arbres cultives (1853) and the Icones 
ad floram Eu.ropae (1866). Jordan took plants belonging to different 
varieties of the same Linnaean species and demonstrated that, even 
when transplanted into the same standard garden at Lyons, these plants 
remained distinct and different in their morphological features. He 
concluded from this that these so-cal.led varieties must, in fact, be 
species. Clausen (1962: 5) credits Jordan with the discovery of local 
populations within the Linnaean species although, as Clausen admits, 
Jordan did not interpret his results in this way. Jordan's views were 
revived in modified form by some geneticists and ecologists in the 
period after the rediscovery of Mendel's work in 1900. Clausen, Keck 
and Hiesey (1939: 103) suggest that the very narrow interpretation of 
the species promoted by Jordan, and by later figures such as Lotsy 
and Cockayne, was a factor in the unfavourable reception of experimental 
taxonomy by orthodox taxonomists at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, al.though they produce no evidence to back this claim. 
Anton Ritter Kerner von Marilaun was born at Mautern, lower 
Austria, and became professor of botany at Innsbruck and Vienna. 
Kerner was an important figure for the later experimental. taxonomists 
because he carried out the first transplant experiments of the 
varied-environment type. He established two al.pine gardens in the 
Tyrolese Alps - one at 2195m and a second at 1215m. These, together 
with his two lowland gardens at Innsbruck (569m) and Vienna (180m), 
provided the location for a series of experimental transplantations 
of plant species from lowland to alpine habitats and vice versa. The 
9. Little historical work has been done on Jordan, Kerner or Bonnier. 
The account which follows is taken mainly from the writings of 
later experimentalists and especially Jens Clausen (see Clausen 
1962, Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1939, 1940). Jordan especially 
would repay closer attention by historians of twentieth-century 
biology because his species concept was important not only_ for 
later developments in biosystematics but in general genetics as 
well. 
- 64 -
results of these experiments were published in the monumental 
Pflanzenleben (1891, vol. 2, pp. 249-507). A major object of the 
research had been to determine whether environmentally induced 
variations in plant growth could become inherited. Kerner did not, 
himself, rule out such a possibility. However, his results, given 
a modern interpretation, can be seen as evidence against this 
hypothesis (cf. Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1940: 394-39~. 
The same interpretation cannot be placed on the work of the 
French botanist and plant physiologist Gaston Bonnier, who in the 
late 1880's and 1890's was professor of botany at the University 
in Paris. Bonnier's transplant experiments were carried out in 
the Pyrenees and Alps from 1886 to 1889, although the full account 
of the results obtained was not published until 1920 (cf. Bonnier 
1890, 1895, 1920). 
Bonnier concluded from his experiments that one species could 
be transformed into another by the action of external environmental 
influences such as changes in light, temperature and humidity. 
Amongst the examples he gives of such transformations are the 
evolution of lowland Helianthus vulgare into H. grandifloru.m; of 
lowland Silene nutans into alpine S. spathulaefolia and of Lotus 
corniculatus into L. alpinus. These conversions occurred over long 
periods of time, sometimes as long as 30 years, and Bonnier found 
that the opposite effect - the conversion of alpine into lowland 
species, was difficult to achieve. 
Bonnier's work became important for later experimental taxonomists 
who also held that environment could bring about species transformation. 
Clements, in particular, became an ardent supporter of Bonnier's work. 
However, supporters of selectionist theories of evolution found his 
results puzzling. Clausen, Keck and Hiesey (1940: 396-401) argue 
that Bonnier was led into error by inadequate methodology; and that 
he mistook weeds which had contaminated his experimental gardens for 
transformed species. This is an explanation which is plausible given 
that Bonnier found, as a general rule, that species transformations 
only took place where the lowland forms were transplanted to a region 
where the alpine species grew naturally. Bonnier kept no herbarium 
specimens and his only recorded observations were in the form of notes, 
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so that it is also possible that he made inexact comparisons between 
lowland and alpine specimens. Clausen et al. end their discussion 
of Bonnier's experiments with, "the hope that a repetition of his 
work, using the same species in the same region under carefully 
controlled conditions, may be stimulated" (1940: 401). However, 
this task has never been undertaken. 
2. Hugo de Vries and the mutation theory 
Studies of ecological transplants were not .the only techniques 
being used by experimental biologists at around the turn of the 
century to put the species "question" on an experimental base. After 
the rediscovery of Mendel's work in 1900 and the subsequent emergence 
of the new discipline of genetics, plant hybridization also came to 
be seen as an important technique for experimental investigations. 
This point is well illustrated in the work of one of the rediscoverers 
of Mendelism, Hugo de Vries. 
A physiologist by traini~, De Vries championed a new, and for 
a time, highly successful, theory of speciation. In his Die 
Mutationstheorie, published in English as The Mutation Theory, De Vries 
(1910-11) argued that species originated not through the action of 
selection on small, continuous or fluctuating variation, as had been 
maintained by Darwin, but by large scale mutations, saltations or 
leaps. The claim, moreover, was made that these mutations could be 
studied experimentally, and De Vries himself conducted experiments to 
test his theory, mainly on the plant genus Oenothera. 10 
For De Vries mutation itself was a process which took place in 
two steps (De Vries 1910-11, ii: 56-75). The first of these was the 
production within the genetic material (pangenes) of a new "unit of 
character". To this process, De Vries gave the name premutation. 
The second step which was a physiological process, involved the 
activation of the new genetic material to produce a new character in 
the phenotype of the plant. This latter process led to the actual 
mutation observed in the plant. From this basis, De Vries was able 
to conclude that mutations were of three types, viz.: 1. Progressive, 
10. In the passages which follow quotations are taken from the English 
edition of Die Mutationstheorie translated by J.B. Farmer and A.D. 
Darbishire. 
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2. retrogressive, 3. degressive. 
Progressive mutations were the only ones which involved the actual 
creation of new genetic material, i.e. premutation. Retrogressive 
mutations occurred when a genetic unit (pangene) present in the plant 
became, for reasons which were unknown, latent or inactive. 
Degressive mutations occurred when, again for reasons which were 
unknown, a pangene which had been inactive for a period of time became 
re-activated. Retrogressive and degressive mutations (and hybridization) 
involved, therefore, new permutations of active genetic material. But, 
progressive mutation involved the actual creation of new genetic material. 
As Garland Allen (1969) has shown, in a valuable account of the 
reception of the mutation theory, there were many factors responsible 
for its initial success. Important amongst these were the weaknesses 
in its great rival, the selectionist theory of the Darwinists. In 
1900, many biologists, while they could accept that selection acted as 
a sieve to "weed out" or eliminate unfavourable variation, could not 
understand how selection actually leads to the origin of new species. 
De Vries had used this argument and in the period just after the 
publication of The Mutationstheorie his views were given striking 
corroboration by the Danish plant geneticist Wilhelm Johannsen (1857-
1927).11 Johannsen was concerned with studying pure lines, i.e. all 
the individuals which are descended from a single individual by self-
fertilization. Using a plant species which can be self-fertilized 
Johannsen tried to select over seve:ralgenerations for characters such 
as overall length, breadth and weight. The object of these experiments 
was to determine if Darwin or De Vries was right, i.e. whether 
selection could act on continuous variation almost indefinitely or if 
selection of continuous variation was ineffective beyond certain 
limi ta. His conclusion was that, in pure lines at least, there was 
no experimental evidence that selection could lead to the appearance 
of new characters: 
11. Joha.nnsen's contributions to genetics are discussed in a recent 
paper by Nils Roll-Hansen (1978). As Roll-Hansen shows there was 
close liaison between Johannsen and Hugo de Vries. De Vries 
believed that pure lines were elementary species and Johannsen 
agreed that the two were equivalent, at least in theory (Roll-
Hansen 1978: 215). 
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the action of selection cannot be carried out beyond 
fixed limits - it must indeed cease when the purification, 
the isolation of the particular most strongly deviating 
line, practically speaking, is carried out to completion. 
(Johannsen 1903, quoted in Provine 1971: 94) 
The assumptions of Joha.nnsen's work were immediately challenged 
by neo-Darwinists such as Pearson, Weldon and Yule. However, 
experimentalists acclaimed the research; for them it was an 
exciting new theory, opening up new avenues of research and 
firmly based upon experimental evidence. 
There were other reasons for the success of the mutation theory. 
It appeared to be able to deal with the then widely-held doctrines of 
orthogenesis or progressive evolution in a way which was better than 
its rival theories. 12 Opponents of neo-Lamarckianism were attracted 
to the theory because De Vries included environmentally-induced 
variation under his category of those "fluctuating variations" which 
cannot lead to new species. Similarly, opponents of the biometricians, 
such as Bateson, saw in the work of De Vries a refutation of the 
doctrines of eugenics. 13 The theory solved (by denying its importance) 
the controversy surrounding the question of what role isolation played 
in speciation. Even Lord Kelvin's claim, based on thermodynamical 
calculations of the activity of the Sun, that the F.arth could not be 
old.enough for evolution to have taken place was partially solved by the 
mutation theory; mutation is a faster process than gradual speciation. 
12. Allen (1969: 77) puts this point in the following terms: 
To those biologists who held a belief in some sort of 
directionality to evolution, de Vries offered a handy 
explanation which did not resort to teleological implications 
of orthogenesis. In Darwinian terms, minute individual 
differences, occurring by chance, might never have become 
established because of swamping or because they were not 
initially useful. De Vriesian mutations, on the other 
hand, were definite, and directional from the start, 
providing a foundation on which further mutations could build. 
13. Indeed de Vries himself stated that if his view of speciation was 
correct then the question of the origin of species could be one 
which had no bearing on the solution of social problems (see 
de Vries 1910-11, i, 154-159 and 213). 
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However, as Allen (1969: 79-85) rightly emphasises, the major 
attraction of the theory for most biologists was that it appeared to 
set the whole problem of what a species was and how new species could 
be formed upon an experimental base. To see how this was the case 
we must examine further De Vries' conception of the species and how 
it related to his evolutionary doctrines discussed above. 
The starting point of De Vries' species concept was the denial 
that the so-called "species" of the systematist have any objective 
or real existence in nature. The only "species" which could even 
be considered as being real or objective entities were "elementary 
species". And by "elementary species" De Vries meant species in 
the Jordanian sense, that is, forms which bred true under cultivation: 
Whilst we may hope that the origin of new elementary species 
will one day become the subject of direct investigation, we 
must be perfectly clear as to the essential difference 
between these and the so-called Linnaean species which are 
(usually) groups of elementary species. An elementary 
species can be identified in any given case by the test of 
cultivation; how many such forms should be united to one 
Linnaean species is a matter for so-called taxonomic instinct, 
just as is the settlement of the limits of genera and families • 
••• Linnaean species are collective and artificial whilst 
Jordan's species are single and real. 
(De Vries 1910-11, i: 58, 171) 
However, De Vries did·not have a conception of the species which 
was the same as that of Jordan. The reason why he had a different 
view is linked to his theories about mutation and is discussed at 
length in volume two of The Mutation Theory (1910-11, ii: 567-598) 
Thus, for De Vries, mutations could be progressive, retrogressive or 
degressive. But, only progressive mutations are based on the 
addition of actual new genetic material and only progressive mutations 
lead to speciation. Retrogressive and degressive mutations lead to 
the origin of new varieties, but these varieties will also breed true 
under cultivation. Hence the question becomes: how do we recognise 
the real elementary species from retrogressive and degressive 
mutations which give the appearance of being new species, but which 
in fact are not based on premutation, and are only varieties? 
The answer is that we can do so by means of Mendelian genetics. 
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Forms which have arisen by retrogressive and degressive mutation, 
because their pangenes are still present (even if, as in the case of 
retrogressive mutations, inactive), will obey simple Mendelian laws 
when hybridized. But, where a genuine addition has been made to the 
genetic material, hybridization will result in non-Mendelian ratios 
in the F2 and subsequent generations. De Vries called a cross of 
this sort a unisexual cross: 14 
Mendelian hybrids correspond to retrogressive and degressive 
specific differentiation, and consequently to true varieties; 
unisexual hybridizations correspond to progressive specific 
differentiation and consequently to elementary species. 
(De Vries 1910-11, ii: 584) 
Thus, for De Vries, both tests of experimental cultivation and 
hybridization experiments were needed in order to tell what a 
species really was. The effort involved was worthwhile because, 
as De Vries constantly emphasised, if we do not know what a species 
is, how can we ever come to know anything about its origins? 
As Allen (1969: 68-69) has shown, the demise of the mutation 
theory was as spectacular as its initial success. Between 1910 and 
1912 Bradley-Davis showed that Oenothera, on which De Vries had 
based most of his research, had an unusual hereditary system but 
that, nonetheless, the hybrids which could be made obeyed Mendelian 
laws. In 1914 Renner showed that Oenothera was a permanent 
heterozygote; and in a long series of publications, starting in 1923, 
R.E. Cleland showed that the "mutations" in Oenothera were explicable 
as being due to a complex series of chromosomal translocations. 15 
Allen concludes that the mutation-theory of De Vries was already in 
serious trouble by 1915, and by the early 1930's the theory had been 
abandoned. 
However, the significance of the theory to our own concerns 
14. Why de Vries uses the term "unisexual" here is not made clear. 
Presumably it is because the new pangenes is only present in 
one of the plants (either the male or female) used in the 
crossing experiment. 
15. The details of this research are complex and will not be 
elaborated here. The best introductory account to modern 
research on Oenothera genetics is that contained in Stebbins (1971). 
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should be clear. It shows that experimental biologists in 1900 were 
profoundly dissatisfied with the species of traditional systematics, 
and that they were, moreover, actively seeking alternatives. De Vries 
was well aware of the practical problems which his notion of species 
raised for traditional taxonomy. However, in the long run at least, 
he believed that there were practical difficulties which would have 
to be overcome: 
Numerous experiments in hybridization are necessary before they 
can serve as a foundation for systematic distinctions. But 
the leading principle in these researches must always be the 
attempt to determine the elementary characters. 
(De Vries 1910-11, ii: 589) 
3. J.P. Lotsy and the H.ybridization Theory 
Jan Paulus Lotsy (1867-1931) has a strong claim to be regarded 
as the first taxonomist to explicitly advocate the formation of a 
new discipline of experimental taxonomy. He was born at Dordrecht 
and educated at the University of Gottingen. A physiologist and 
taxonomist by training Lotsy had become interested in the possibilities 
of linking taxonomic studies with the new field of genetics from as 
16 early as 1903. However, it was only in 1909, after his resignation 
from the University of Leiden, that Lotsy was able to set up the 
experimental gardens needed for such a project, at Haarlem and later 
at Velp. 
Lotsy's work encompassed similar concerns to those of De Vries, 
although they were elaborated within the context of a very different 
theory of evolution. The starting point of Lotsy's work is the 
claim that in order to understand evolution we must know what a 
species is: "he who ventures to write on the origin of species, 
ought to define what a species is" (Lotsy 1916: 13). 
Systematists have failed in this task. Their species, which 
Lotsy calls Linneons, are arbitrary units definable only on 
morphological grounds: 
16. For an obituary on Lotsy (in Dutch) and a complete list of his 
research publications see Goddijn (1931). 
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The Linnaean species is no species A Linneon (is) the 
total of individuals which resemble one another more than 
they do any other individuals. 
(Lotsy 1916: 22) 
Within these Linneons can be found forms which remain constant 
when cultivated under uniform conditions. These are the elementary 
species of Jordan. However, for Lotsy breeding true to type under 
conditions of cultivation is not a test of specific purity. He argues 
this because, like De Vries, Lotsy held (1916: 22-23) that only 
hybridization experiments could determine real species. Thus, the 
elementary species of Jordan are in fact not species but Jordanons 
and are defined as 
a group of externally alike individuals which all propagate 
their kind faithfully, under conditions excluding contamination 
by crossing with individuals belonging to other groups, as far 
as these external characters are concerned, with the only 
exception of non-inheritable modifications of these characters, 
caused by the influences of the surroundings in the widest 
sense, to which these individuals or those composing the 
progeny may be exposed. 
(Lotsy 1916: 27) 
To establish a genuine species, neither morphological comparison alone 
or experimental cultivation alone will suffice; hybrid analysis is 
required as well. And species for Lotsy (1916: 27) are defined in 
purely genetical terms as, "a group of individuals of identical 
constitution, unable to form more than one kind of gametes; all 
monoga.metic individuals of identical constitution consequently 
belong to one species". 
A consequence of this is that not all individuals belong to a 
species. Many individuals can produce more than one type of gamete. 
These heterozygotes are not species but hybrids. Thus hybrids are: 
• • • all individuals able to produce more than one kind of 
gametes, e.g. gametes of different constitutions ••• Hybrids 
consequently are polygametic. 
(Lotsy 1916: 28) 
The final category which Lotsy introduces is the modification. 
This term designates forms which have become different through the 
external effect of environment but these differences are not inherited. 
Thus a modification refers to "the non-transmittable effect of external 
circumstances". ( 1916: 28) 
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This hierarchy of categories is radically different from that 
used by traditional systematists. For traditional systematists 
there are: 1. Species (in the Linnaean sense); 2. Subspecies; 
3. Varieties all defined on morphological grounds. For Lotsy there 
are: 1. Linneons; 2. Jorda.none; 3. Species and hybrids; 4. Modifications 
and only one of these categories (the Linneon) is definable in terms of 
pure morphology alone. 17 To determine the other categories of the 
system require either hybrid analysis, or tests of cultivation, or both. 
Lotsy's evolutionary views stem from this system of classification 
and, .in particular, from his definition of the species. Species are 
gametically pure and hence do not possess any variability (Lotsy 1916: 
The apparent variability of species is caused by their 
frequent hybridization. An important question which follows is whether 
there is any other mechanism (i.e. other than crossing) by which pure 
species (which are homozygous) can become heterozygous. If such a 
mechanism did exist then this would be a mutation in Lotsy 9s use of 
that term. But, Lotsy argued, although this kind of process is a 
possibility, it has never been demonstrated experimentally, even in 
Oenothera. For the "species" which De Vries studied were not species 
but hybrids: 
De Vries has shown that O. lamarckiana is a heterozygote 
and he has shown nothing else; all the rest is mere 
hypothesis. 
(Lotsy 1916: 32; italics in original) 
Thus, both the Darwinists and De Vries are, according to Lotsy, wrong. 
The Darwinists are in error because true species are not variable; 
De Vries is wrong because mutation is not an experimentally proven 
fact but an unproven hypothesis. Neo-Lamarckians can be similarly 
dealt with. That environment may cause changes in the genetical 
material (i. e. mutations) is possible, but a5ain i·s an experimentally 
unproven hypothesis. And in all likelihood, therefore, inheritable 
variability does not exist. 
Having thus disposed of his rivals, Lotsy was able to construct 
17. Lotsy was aware that capacity to breed freely and produce fertile 
offspring was also a criterion by which members of the same Linneon 
might be recognised. However, Lotsy maintained that inter-Linneotic 
crossings cometimes took place. Indeed it was through such crosses 
in the past, Lotsy argued, that higher taxa such as classes and 
orders had been derived. 
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an alternative account of evolution (Lotsy 1916: 42-95). For Lotsy 
the primary problem of evolution was not how species arose, for pure 
species are now rarely found in nature, and may have arisen at some 
point in the long distant past from inorganic matter. Rather, the 
problem was how these pure species give rise to the subsequent 
bewildering variety of natural kinds. A chemical analogy is used 
to make this clear: 
The problem of the species and of its origin is consequently 
comparable to that of its pure chemical substance and its 
origin, the problem of the heterozygotes of different 
constitutions which we find in nature and of their origin 
is comparable to the problem of ores found in nature and 
their origin. Just as we donvt study the origin of pure 
chemical substances in nature, but investigate this origin 
in the laboratory, so the question of the origin of species 
cannot be tackled in the field, but must be studied in the 
experiment garden. 
(Lotsy 1916: 42, 53) 
For Lotsy, hybridization provided the only experimentally proven 
mechanism whereby new forms can arise in nature. Species, in the 
Lotsyan sense will, when crossed, produce polygametic forms. These 
polygametic hybrids are, in turn, able to produce new individuals, 
some of which are heterozyg-ous, but some of which are homozygous, 
i.e. new species. We can isolate such homozyg-otes experimentally 
and multiply them by self-fertilization, or by fertilization with 
individuals of identical genetical constitution. However, if 
random-mating occurs, then the proportion of species to hybrids will 
not change. The only role which selection played in this process 
was the extermination of some of the new species or hybrids which 
have been produced. Selection is only another name for extinction, 
the last forms to disappear being the "selected ones". 
The Vera Causa of the production of new types consequently 
is: crossing; the vera causa of their extinction: the 
struggle for life; the selection resulting from the latter, 
is by no means a revival, but is the sign of struggle of the 
doomed. 
(Lotsy 1916: 160) 
Lotsy never altered his evolutionary views, as his later writings 
demonstrate (Lotsy 1925, 1927). His experimental hierarchy of 
Linneons, Jordanons, species, hybrids and modifications did not 
become popular with subsequent experimental taxonomists. It was 
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based on a theory of evolution and speciation which was not accepted 
by later experimentalists, who were either neo-Lama.rckians or 
selectionists. However, the work of Lotsy, like that of De Vries, 
shows that geneticists at the turn of the century were actively 
trying to formulate an experimental conception of the species which 
would be of value in dealing with questions concerning heredity and 
evolution. And, inasmuch as this was the case, their objectives 
were shared by later biosystematists, even though the evolutionary 
conclusions which they drew from their work were refuted. 
Discussion: Essentialist Strategies of Classification in the Work of 
:Linnaeus, Jordan and Lotsy 
It will be pertinent here to review the basic tenets of Putnam's 
theory of classification. Those tenets are 
1. That the classification of natural kinds depends not upon 
identifying descriptions but upon the discovery of essential 
properties or relationships. 
2. That these essences are usually to be found in the hidden 
microstructure. 
J. That the extension of a term is derived not from an identifying 
description (intension) but from "paradigm" or "candidate" instances. 
Thus, the first instance of a term christens its usage. Subsequent 
instances bear a same-essence relation to the initial instance. As 
a result, natural kind terms are, like proper names, indexical . 
expressions: they are used as rigid designators. 
Because Linnaeus used morphological characters to define species 
his mode of classification appears to be superficially of a descriptive 
kind. However because Linnaeus held these external properties to be 
the essence of a species, there are also many parallels to be found 
with Putnam's theory of classification. 
These parallels are located partly at the level of general 
analogy. However the similarities are more specific than this. 
Linnaean taxonomy, in practice, assumed a form which is very close to 
Putnam's predictions of how scientific classification should be achieved. 
For Linnaeus all the members of a single species were indeed possessed 
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of an essential identity of same-essence. Once these essential 
features had been described for one member of a new species they were 
known for all members - hence the overwhelming importance of the type 
specimen in Linnaean taxonomy. What assumptions make this a g"Ood 
strategy for classification. Basically there are three crucial 
assumptions: 
1. That for a:ny species some morphological properties are 
essential, i.e. they will be found in all members of that species 
but not in members of other related species. 
2. That these characters are fixed, permanent and never change. 
In other words species retain these characters, they breed true 
within the limits of their own kind. 
3. That a:nything which does not breed true within the limits 
of its own kind is not, ipso facto, a true species. 
Assumption 3 is critical in understanding the distinction in 
Linnaean taxonomy between species and varieties. A variety of a 
species differs from the typical member in properties which are 
non-essential. Moreover, it was a tene~ of Linnaean systematics 
that varieties would not breed true but revert back to form in 
subsequent generations: 
Linnaeus drew the wrong conclusion from the phenomenon of 
variation: he considered it absolutely unimportant. In 
his opinions varieties are all what is now called phenotypic: 
"A variety is a plant changed by an accidental cause due to 
climate, soil, heat, winds, and it returns to its original 
state when the soil (etc.) is changed." - (Linnaeus, quoted in Stafleu 1971: 64, 
emphasis added) 
A consequence of this position is that, for Linnaeus, there was 
no conflict between a biological species concept (in terms of 
capacity to breed true) and a classification of species using 
morphological markers. Indeed it is because they breed true to 
form that all members of a species possess essential and unchanging 
morphological attributes. 
deviations from the type. 
Varieties occur as accidents or 
But such accidents are a superficial 
phenomena - in subsequent generations the variety will revert back 
to type and reveal, as it were, its true nature. 
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Jordan's work, with its emphasis on experimental cultivation of 
plants into a standard environment appears very "modern". Experimental 
taxonomists have often praised Jordan as one of the founders of their 
discipline. However, Jordan's work is not a radical departure from the 
Linnaean tradition. Jordan accepted the Linnaean distinction between 
species and varieties. What his work did reveal was that if breeding 
true to type is a criterion for designating species from varieties then 
many so-called Linnaean varieties must, in fact, be species. They 
breed true and are, therefore, good species in the Linnaean sense. 
Jordan's work was not a refutation of the Linnaean species concept, 
but rather a more correct application of those principles than Linnaeus 
himself ever managed to achieve. 
Lotsy goes one step further along this path. In modern terms what · 
Lotsy discovered was thattwo individuals of the same species, even two 
which look alike and "breed true", may not possess the same genetic 
constitution. In the parlance of modern genetics, individuals with the 
same phenotype may have a different genotype. However, it was an 
axiom of Lotsy's use of the term "species" that members of the same 
species always possess the same genetical constitution. A result of 
this axiom, when consistently applied, is that the concept of genetical 
variability within a species disappears altogether. Two individuals 
can vary but then they are not members of the same species. 
Lotsy's taxonomy also fits the Putnam model. Identical genetical 
constitution becomes the essence of a species. Identical genetical 
constitution becomes the same-essence relationship which determines 
extension from given paradigm cases of the species in question. 
Lotsy did not believe in morphological essences because he knew that 
two individuals could look identical but have a different genetical 
constitution as revealed by genetic analyses. As a result his search 
for essences became related to hidden genetic factors instead of 
superficial external properties (and in this he showed a similar 
preference to Putnam who also seems to like his essences to be hidden 
from sight). However, Lotsy, like Jordan, is still working within an 
overall framework which derives its inspiration from Linnaeus. For 
Lotsy breeding true to type remains a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for species membership. It is not sufficient because now 
an even more strict criteria has been introduced: species must not 
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only breed true to type, they must do so because they possess an 
identical genetical constitution. However in its aspects of 
essentialism and typological approach to classification, Lotsy's 
work is thoroughly Linnaean. Indeed it is almost "more so". 
Lotsy's work is an even more thorough-going version of essentialism 
and rigid designation than the Linnaean system it was designed to 
replace. 
The difference between "Linnaean", "Jordanian" and "Lotsyan" 
taxonomy can be concretely summarised by an example which Lotsy 
himself discusses (cf. Lotsy 1916: 22). Thus consider a population 
of many white mice and a few black individuals. For the Linnaean 
these would probably be considered to be one species. The abnormal 
black mice would be varieties of which it would be assumed, reversion 
back to the normal white condition would be attainable if the mice 
were grown in the same environment. 
Jordan's work shows that this assumption can be gratuitous. 
Black mice grown together with white mice but crossed only with 
black mice produce black offspring. For Jordan we have here two species. 
The Lotsyan taxonomists provisionally accepts this conclusion but 
tests it further by crossing the white mice and black mice together. 
When some white mice are crossed with black mice the resulting mice 
are white. But, in some cases different white mice are crossed with 
the same black mouse and the result is different viz. half the mice 
are white, half black. The Lotsyan conclusion is that there are indeed 
here two species but that not all white mice belong to that species. 
Some white mice are not gametically pure and must have resulted from 
hybrid crossing in the past between white and black mice species. Thus 
we have here, in addition to two species, hybrids. The resulting 
classification becomes a genuine reflection of the hidden genetic 
essences which are controlling the events which take place. These 
three positions are outlined diagrammatically in figure 3.1. 
In terms of its formal presentation Lotsy's argument is faultless. 
Linnaean taxonomy stands open to the criticism that it defines species 
in terms of morphological characters which are simply assumed to be 
essential in contrast to the non-essential characters which designate 
varieties. Even Jordan's work can be criticised on the grounds that 
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breeding true to type does not reveal a properly essential relationship 
of underlying form. But Lotsy, by carrying out crosses between 
Jordanons, eliminates, even this possibility. A taxonomy along these 
lines certainly can be claimed to reveal hidden essences in the true 
Putnam manner. Why was it so little advocated by later taxonomists? 
The reasons for this failure are complex, and cannot be more than 
sketched in what follows. In the case of De Vries, as we have already 
seen, he had the misfortune of basing most of his research on a plant 
genus which subsequent research showed to have an unusual and highly 
irregular genetic system. However, a still more important reason for 
the rejection of the work of Lotsy and De Vries was the increasing 
success of Darwinism in the period up to 1920. In 1900 the majority 
of experimental biologists did not believe that selection acting on 
small-scale, fluctuating variations could lead to speciation, by 1918 
most of them did believe that such selection was the only, or at least 
the major, mode of speciation. 
Why and how this change took place is a complex subject on which 
more historical research is needed (cf. Allen 1976). Provine's 
(1971: 90-192) account of these developments concentrates on the 
special importance of four figures: William Ernest Castle (1867-1962), 
Herman Nilsson-Ehle (1873-1949), En.ward Murray East (1879-1938) and 
T.H. Morgan (1866-1945). W.E. Castle, working at .Harvard, was a 
mutationist who later joined the selectionist camp. His research 
was concerned with the genetics of coat colour in rats and was 
important because it demonstrated that selection could bring about 
changes in characters of the phenotype beyond the limits of variation 
established in the original population. As Castle said (1911: 120), 
"I have observed characters at first feebly manifested gradually 
improve under selection until they become established racial traits". 
This work provided a refutation of the earlier claims made by those 
biologists, like De Vries and Johannsen, who had argued that selection 
was only the elimination of variability. 
Equally important to the Darwinists was the work being done by 
H. Nilsson-Ehle, who in 1900 was an assistant to the director of the 
Swedish Agricultural Ex:periment Station at Svalof. Nilsson-Ehle, in 
a detailed series of experiments on the genetics of cereals, was able 
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to show that many cases of continuous variation in a character, 
hitherto considered to be unexplainable in terms of Mendelian 
genetics, were in fact due to complex cases of Mendelian inheritance 
involving not one gene but several genes controlling the same 
phenotypic character. From this he was able to conclude firstly, 
that many "mutations" were in fact due only to rare combinations of 
genes in a multiple-factor system, and secondly, that the primary 
purpose of sexual reproduction was to increase genetic variability 
through recombination. Little of this work was published in English, 
but, in America similar results and conclusions were obtained by 
E.M. East at the Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station where 
research was being conducted on maize. 
The work of T.H. Morgan and the Columbia school of the "Drosophila 
fly room" has been considered in depth by severaJ. historians. (see 
especially Allen 1978). Morgan was also originally sceptical of the 
claim that small-scale variations could be inherited, but in the period 
after 1910 he and his co-workers published a mass of detailed knowledge 
in support of the view that "Mendelism" and "Darwinism" could be 
incorporated into a single account of evolution based on the 
selection of continuous variation. 
It would seem then, that the success of Darwinism in biology had 
little to do initially with systematics. However, the success of the 
movement had a profound effect upon taxonomy. In the period before 
1920 essentialist and typological approaches to the species problem 
were manifest. After 1920 with the acceptance not just that 
speciation took place, but that it was a gradual process, such 
strategies became much less attractive. 
By 1920 the selectionists had not gained universal acceptance 
for their position. In particular, the idea that the environment 
might directly influence heredity remained in common currency until 
the 1930's. However, most experimental taxonomists after 1920 were 
Darwinists, and, as such, they denied that species could or should 
be conceived of as constant homogenous units. For the selectionists 
the fact that there was variability within the species, both in the 
genotype and phenotype, was not a source of embarrassment or 
inexactitude; rather it was a demonstrable proof that speciation took 
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place by selection of variation within the species. And aJ.though 
such a view did not lead to the removaJ. of essentialist strategies 
of classification from systematics, in the period after 1920 these 
strategies took new forms. 
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Chapter Four: Experimental Taxonomy in the Period 1920-1930 
Ex:perime~tal taxonomy in the period before 1920 had been the 
province of geneticists: in the decade after it was ecologists who 
became most concerned with the development of experimental taxonomy. 
To see why this was the case it will be necessary briefly to examine 
certain developments in ecology at the turn of the century. 
The term "oecologie" was first used by Ernst Haeckel in 1866 and 
in its broadest sense was ta.ken to imply the study of living organisms 
in relation to their environment. However, the modern period of 
ecological research can be traced to two sources: the publication in 
1895 of Eugen Warming's Plantesamfund: Grundtra.k of den Okologiske 
Plantegeografi and the subsequent publication in 1898 of A.F.W. 
Schimper's Pflanzengeographie auf physiologischer Grundlage. 1 Tansley 
(1947: 130), in a discussion of the development of plant ecology in 
Britain, describes these two textbooks as providing "the foundations of 
mode~ ecology" and Mcintosh ( 1.976: 353) has similarly stressed their 
importance in the emergence of ecological thought in the United States. 
As the title of both books suggests, ecology itself was a 
development of the older science of plant geography. However, the 
aims of the new science were seen as being quite different from those 
of its parent. Plant geographers had been concerned with floristic 
studies of vegetation, i.e. with recording the taxonomic species 
growing in any given area or locality. The new ecologists were less 
concerned with description and more with studying causes. The 
emphasis was on plants as social beings formlhj integrated societies. 
Ecologists wanted to know the factors in the environment which were 
responsible for causing the vegetation in any area to be what it was. 
Naturally, knowing what species grew in any locality was still important, 
but ecologists also wanted to construct classifications which were 
ecological rather than taxonomic. 
All four concerns are well-evidenced in Warming's work. Johannes 
" Eugenius Bulow Warming (1841-1924) was a Danish botanist, who from 1873 
1 • Both books were published in English: Warming's in a revised edition 
in 1909 and Schimper's in 1903. In the text which follows 
quotations are from these English editions. 
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to 1881 was professor of botany at Copenhagen and later (1886-1911) 
director of the city's botanic gardens. In the revised English 
edition of Plantesamfund, published in 1909, he defined the 
objectives of the new science of ecology as being to study: 
1. The external factors affecting the plant's economy; 
the effects of those factors upon the external and 
internal structure of the plant, and upon the 
topographical distribution of the species •.• 
2. The grouping and diagnosis of the plant-communities 
occurring on the Earth. In connection with each 
class the endeavour must be made to discover the 
determinant factors, the modes in which they are 
combined, and in which they possibly may replace 
one another ••• 
3. The struggle between plant-communities. 
(Warming 1909: 14) 
A major feature of Warming's work was the demonstration of what 
we today would call adaptation. The form of every plant species is 
intricately related to the habitat in which it lives. Plants in 
deserts have succulent stems, leathery cuticles, spines and sunken 
stomata to prevent water loss; plants in aquatic environments have 
reduced xylem and root-systems and large air-spaces in the tissue; 
parasitic plants have special organs which adapt them to their 
specialised mode of nutrition, etc. Warming (1909: 2) called this 
phenomenon "epharmony" and defined it as the law that "every species 
must be in harmony, as regards both its external and internal 
construction with the natural conditions under which it lives; and 
when these undergoo a change to which it cannot adapt itself, it will 
be expelled by other species or exterminated."2 
How does such epharmony arise in nature? For Warming (1909: 
369-373) this question was synonymous with the question of the 
origin of species. One possibility was that minor, fluctuating, 
or continuous variation arose spontaneously in the plant and was then 
selected for by the habitat. Warming was sceptical, however, that 
selection could explain adaptation. He noted that, "this explanation 
2. The concept of adaptation or epharmony was not, of course, a new 
one. The adaptation of organisms to their environment had been 
stressed both by Darwin and by natural theologians in the 
nineteenth century. 
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has recently been assailed on many sides, and does not now find so many 
supporters as it had when first promulgated by Darwin" (1909: 369). 
A second, and for Warming more likely possibility, was that 
mutations were responsible for adaptation or epharmony. That 
mutations occur, Warming claimed, was an experimentally proven fact. 
However, although mutations may explain the presence in plants of 
useless or non-adaptive characters, Warming did not believe that 
mutations could account for epharmony; the vast majority of mutations 
will be maladaptive and disappear within a few generations. 
For Warming the most likely hypothesis was that new forms arise 
in nature by the direct interaction of the environment on the plant 
body and the transmission of these alterations into the hereditary 
material of the plant. This was only a hypothesis and required more 
proof to become experimentally verified, but nonetheless Warming was 
still able to conclude that: 
It seems beyond doubt that characters peculiar to growth forms 
have arisen through direct adaptation to the environment of 
natural self-regulation operating through countless generations, 
and that at the same time the acquired characters have been 
fixed to a greater or lesser extent by heredity (which is 
antagonistic to new adaptations). In this matter Lamarck had 
a keener eye for the truth than many investigators appear to 
suggest ••• Direct adaptation is beyond doubt one of the most 
potent evolutionary factors in the organic world, and appears 
to play the leading role in the adaptation of growth-forms and 
formulations. (Warming 1909: 373) 
Schimper's work leaned heavily on Warmingvs, more so than he ever 
admitted (of. Goodland: 1975). Like Warming, Schimper was a neo-
Lamarckian. Changes in plant form due to purely hereditary factors 
might, he conceded, play a role in the acquisition of non-adaptive 
features, but the adaptive features of the plants form arise through 
the direct action of the environment (Schimper 1903: v). 
By 1910 Warming's "infant science" of ecology was becoming a 
sturdy adolescent. As Lowe (1976) has documented, the period 
from 1900 to 1920 saw, in Britain, the emergence of ecology as a 
professional scientific discipline along the lines laid down in the 
nineteenth century for physics ?Uld chemistry. A key date in this 
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process was the founding in 1913 of the British Ecological Society. 
A.G. Tansley was the first president and the vice-presidents were 
W.G. Smith and F.W. Oliver. The society's Journal of Ecology also 
first published in 1913 and, from 1917 onwards, edited by Tansley 
has continued to be the major publication source for ecologists in 
Britain. 
Experimental techniques and methods developed rapidly in ecology 
and Lowe ( 1976) has argued that this research strategy can be linked 
to the developing social relations between amateurs and professionals 
in British ecology throughout this period. The new professional 
ecologists such as Tansley and·Oliver were in an ambiguous position 
regarding the strong amateur traditions of vegetation surveying and 
mapping which had been the centre of "ecological" concerns in Britain 
in the period prior to the emergence of ecology per se. On the one 
hand the army of amateurs in the local natural history societies were 
a resource which ought to be utilised; on the other, the new 
professionals were keen to demonstrate the need for a discipline of 
ecology which was not based in amateur natural history. The conflict 
is well brought out in R.L. Praeger's presidential address to the 
British Ecological Society in 1922: 
• • • from the beginning of our field work the question why 
kept intruding itself, becoming more insistent and more 
clamorous as time went on... So it came about that the 
glorious days of the primary survey, when we ranged free 
over moor and mountain, to a great extent were superseded. 
Our campaign took on a new phase, and weapons of greater 
accuracy were required. Six-inch map, binocular and pencil 
were replaced or at best reinforced by instruments for 
measuring the a.mount and variation of light, heat, moisture 
and by the whole battery of the chemical laboratory. 
(Praeger, quoted in Lowe 1976: 529) 
In their desire for experimental methods and rigorous techniques 
and theory many of the new ecologists saw a strong link between ecology 
and physiology. Isaac Bayley Balfour in the introduction to the 
English edition of Warming's textbook described ecology as the meeting 
ground of morphology, physiology and systematics, but the new 
ecologists were often critical of traditional taxonomic methods and 
practice. Lowe (1976: 522) claims that, "a widespread disillusionment 
with traditional systematics" was prevalent even in the 1880's. However, 
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the most vitriolic attack on traditional systematics was that launched 
by F.W. Oliver at a meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science in 1906. In the context of a general review 
of the state of botany in England, Oliver praised the physiological 
work being done by figures like Thiselton-Dyer and Vines but was 
scathing in his remarks concerning traditional systematics. Of 
herbaria he argued that "the effort involved in their upkeep is 
altogether disproportionate to any service to which they are put" 
(Oliver 1906: 735). He suggested a merger of the Kew and British 
Museum herbaria, and he ended his review by arguing that taxonomists 
must cease their concern with general floras and large scale monographs 
and concentrate on more detailed systematic, physiological.and 
ecological studies of two or three species. Only in this way would 
they "contribute essentially to the science" (Oliver 1906: 737). 
Similar developments were taking place in American ecology 
during this period. The Ecological Society of America was founded 
only two years after its British counterpart, in 1915, with its first 
president the zoological ecologist V.E. Shelford. By the end of its 
first year it had 307 members. Mcintosh (1976: 353-356) has described 
the period in American biology from 1900 to 1920 as one which saw 
"the rise of a self conscious ecology." Amongst the major figures 
in American plant ecology during this period Mcintosh lists J.M. 
Coulter and H.C. Cowles at Chicago, and C.E. Bessey and F.E. Clements 
at Nebraska. It was the last of these figures, F.E. Clements, who 
also founded the first American school of experimental systematics. 
F.E. Clements, H.M. Hall and the First American School of Experimental 
Taxonomy-
Frederick Edward Clements (1874-1945) was born in Lincoln, 
Nebraska and graduated with a B.Sc. from the University of Nebraska 
in 1894. An M.A. in 1896 was followed by a Ph.D. in 1898 on the 
phytogeography of Nebraska, both obtained while Clements was employed 
as an assistant of botany in the Universityo After the award of the 
Ph.D. Clements became associate professor of botany at Nebraska, a 
post he held for nine years. In 1906 he was appointed professor of 
plant physiology, but a year later he moved to the University of 
Minnesota as head of the department of botany, where he remained until 
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1917. The remainder of his academic life (1917-1941) was spent 
as a full-time research associate for the Carnegie Institute of 
Washington. Under the patronage of the Carnegie, Clements was able 
to set up an alpine laboratory at Pikes peak near Manitou Springs, 
Colorado, and in this way the Carnegie's resources were made available 
to doctoral students at Nebraska, which became "the top institution 
for studying grassland ecology" (Tobey 1977: 31). Although primarily 
concerned with pure science, Clements was also interested in applied 
aspects of plant ecology and especially with the application of 
ecological principles to the management of the American prairie 
grasslands. Clements was married in 1899, to one of his research 
students, :Edith S. Clements. He died at Santa Barbara, California 
in 1945. 3 
Clements developed an early interest in cryptogams4 and, while a 
student at Nebraska he had studied under the great American mycologist 
C.E. Bessey. Several of his earliest published papers were concerned 
with the taxonomy of cryptogams (e.g. Clements 1897a, 1897b; Pound 
and Clements 1896) and this w~s a subject to which he devoted some 
attention even in his later life (e.g. Clements and Shear 1926, 1931). 
One of the most interesting of these early papers dealt with the 
classification of lichens (Clements 1897b). Lichens are a difficult 
group of plants to deal with taxonomically because they consist of a 
symbiotic association of two plants - an alga and a fungus. They are 
normally treated as a separate class of plants, even though in 
evolutionary terms lichens have almost certainly arisen . more than 
once from different fungal stocks. Clements argued that the separate 
systematic treatment of lichens was wrong, that lichens were basically 
fungi, and that the two classes of "lichen" and "fungi" should be 
merged into a single class. The paper is worthy of note because it 
shows that, even at this early stage, Clements was committed to the 
idea that scientific classifications should be phylogenetic, i.e. that 
3. These details of Clements' biography are taken from an obituary by 
Tansley ( 1946) • 
4. Cryptogams are plants which reproduce without seeds. They include 
algae, fungi, lichens, bryophytes (mosses and liverworts) and 
pteriodophytes (fern.sand their allies). 
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they should reflect evolutionary lines of descent. 
However, it was in the newly developing field of ecology that 
Clements made his major mark on American botany. The ecological aspects 
of his research have been examined by a number of recent historians (e.g. 
Worster 1977: 205-220; Du.ff 1975) and will only be briefly treated here. 
According to Worster (i977: 209), "no individual had a more profound 
impact on the course of American as well as British ecological thought." 
Clements' principal ecological concern was with plant succession 
and the dynamical aspects of successional change (of. Clements 1905, 
1916, 1929a, 1936; Clements and Weaver 1924; Clements and Shelford 1939). 
Natural communities of plants change and develop in an orderly way; as 
a lake becomes gradually silted up it will develop into a reed-marsh, 
then into scrub, then into birch and finally into an oak forest. 
Clements' research was concerned to locate the causes and dynamics of 
succession. Indeed, he called his new discipline "dynamic ecology". 
A major, although not novel, aspect of Clements' theories about succession 
was his belief that the final vegetation which develops in any locality 
(the climax) is determined solely by climate. A second vital aspect 
of his work was the claim that the climax vegetation is a"complex 
organism" and that it develops in a manner analogous to the development 
of the individual plant or animal. In the development of vegetation 
the individual plant and animal species are "coactors in a complex of 
effects proceeding from the habitat as the cause" (Clements and 
Shelford 1939: 21). 
The methodological concerns of the new dynamic ecology were 
quantitative and experimental. The cause-and-effect relationship 
between plant and habitat represented the key to understanding vegetation 
and this relationship could only be studied by means of experiment: 
It is not yet generally recognised that the term ecology 
connotes a study of the relation between organism and 
habitat, which demands the use of exact methods. For 
this reason it appears fortunate that the floristic study 
of vegetation, so much in vogue on the continent of Europe 
is rapidly coming to be known as plant sociology. To the 
ecologist, however, the cause-and-effect relation between 
plant and habitat is more than ever the central and vital 
part of botany, in the investigation of which quantitative 
methods alone can yield results of fundamental value. 
(Clements and Goldsmith 1924: 3) 
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Clements' concern was that studies of vegetation should be 
experimental and his beliefs about the casual effects of habitat upon 
vegitation development were reflected in his writings on speciation 
and evolution. For Clements, like De Vries and Lotsy, the question of 
speciation was an experimental question. But, where for the 
geneticists it was expe~iments in the laboratory which would determine 
the nature of the process, for Clements it was a matter for ecological 
concern: 
Experimental evolution will solve a taxonomic problem as yet 
untouched, namely the effect of recent environment upon the 
production of species ••• Indeed the whole question of the 
ability or inability of environmental variation to produce 
constant species is one that must be referred to repeated 
and long-continued experiment in the field. 
(Clements 1905: 13) 
In some of his early writings on evolution Clements tried to 
abandon the term "species" altogether, which he felt had become "so 
vague that it no longer has definite meaning from the standpoint of 
evolution" (Clements 1907: 185). The chapter of his textbook Plant 
Physiology and Ecology (1907: 185-201) devoted to evolution is entitled 
"the origin of new forms" rather than the origin of species. In it 
Clements began his account with a discussion of Darwin's work. Following 
Darwin~ he recognised the existence in nature of two types of variation: 
definite variations caused by the direct influence of environment on 
the plant and indefinite variations or variations due to chance. 
Darwin had held that new species arose through the action of natural 
selection on indefinite variation. Clements disagreed with this. Of 
the four possible mechanisms of speciation considered by Clements (the 
other three being mutation, hybridization and adaptation) natural 
selection is, "the only one not experimentally proven" (Clements 1907: 
189). Darwin's failure to recognise this, Clements blamed partly upon 
the fact that Darwin founded his theory of evolution on observation 
rather than experiment. 
Of mutation, Clements accepted that, "a careful examination of De 
Vries' results leaves no doubt that mutation is proved to be one of 
the methods by which new forms originate" (Clements 1907: 190). However, 
he denied that it followed from this that mutation is the major process 
by which new forms originate, as De Vries had maintained. A third 
- 89 -
possibility is that new forms arise by hybridization. Of hybridization 
Clements (1907: 198) argued that it seemed to be a common mode of 
evolution in nature, although he went on to state that only a few cases 
have been examined where hybridization has been experimentally verified. 
Clements claimed that it was by adaptation that most new forms 
arise in nature. A new form which had arisen in this manner Clements 
called an ecad. Whether such ecads were formed depends upon the 
plasticity of the parent species from which they evolve. A very plastic 
species will give rise to a new ecad wherever it migrates to a new 
habitat or its old habitat changes. An ecad placed back into its 
parents' habitat will revert to its parental type, although, if it has 
been in its new environment for a long period, this process of 
reversion may take years or even centuries: 
In amount of difference they (ecads) are as discinct as many 
new species and have often been described as such. Whether 
they are species or not depends entirely upon the meaning 
given to this term. 
(Clements 1907: 193-194) 
Stability is merely stability of habitat. The longer a plant grows in 
a given habitat, the longer it carries on its functions and growth in 
a certain way, and the more difficult evolution of new forms becomes. 
Thus for Clements the "forms", "varieties" and "species" of the 
traditional systematists disappear and are replaced by four terms, 
which relate the nature of a given plant form to its mode of origin: 
1 • There are new forms which arise by adaptation and which 
Clements termed ecads. 
2. There are new forms which arise by the action of natural 
selection on indefinite variation; Clements termed these variants, 
although the existence of such variants is not an experimentally 
demonstrated fact. 
3. There are new forms which arise by mutation, as in Oenothera 
lamarckiana; these Clements termed mutants. 
4. There are new forms which arise by the hybridization of two 
previously existing forms; these Clements termed hybrids. 
The four basic processes of evolution: adaptation, mutation, 
hybridization and (possibly) natural selection act more-or-less 
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independently to produce new forms. Isolation plays no role in 
adaptation or mutation and is a positive hindrance in hybridization. 
Mu.tants, hybrids and ecads probably often arise at more than one place 
and time, but migration makes this a difficult point to prove except 
by experiment. The origin of new forms, for Clements, was a complex 
issue and its study "must be left to the specialist" (Clements 1907: 
201). 
As he made clear in a later publication, Clements (1925: 309-312) 
conceived of adaptation or ecogenesis5 as a process which took place 
in two steps. The first of these, adaptation in the strict sense, is 
the production of new forms by change in the environment. The comple-
ment of adaptation is fixation. By fixation was meant, "the 
accumulation of a new habit or response until it becomes hereditary" 
(Clements 1925: 311; and see also Clements 1926: 335-339). Fixation 
does not account for the origin of new forms but it does account for 
their constancy o~ stability when transplanted. And fixation is only 
relative. No form will remain constant forever under the impact of a 
new environment (Clements 1929b: 378). 
Clements' interests in taxonomy stemmed directly from this commitment 
to a neo-Lamarckian theory of evolution. He was aware of the transplant 
experiments which had been carried out by Bonnier in France and he began 
his own series of transplant experiments in order to test the results 
which Bonnier had obtained (cf. Clements 1929b: 357-259). However, an 
interest in the mode of origin of new "species" or forms was not the only 
reason that ecologists at the turn of the century had for castigating the 
treatment of species by traditional systematists. Another potent source 
of dissatisfaction were the disagreements going on within taxonomy 
between "lumpers" and "splitters". Before looking at Clements' 
taxonomical work it will be necessary to deal briefly with this issue. 
The differences between lumpers and splitters had its origins in 
the work of Jordan discussed in Chapter 3. Jordan had shown that many 
so-called "varieties" within the Linnaean species bred true under 
cultivation, and by the turn of the century this fact was well known to 
5. In his later writings Clements often gave preference toihis second 
term. It is derived from Latin, meaning literally genesis by the 
environment or "ece-". 
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taxonomists. Some systematists, following Jordan's lead, began to give 
species names to all forms previously regarded as having only varietal 
or sub-specific taxonomic status. These were the "splitters". 
"Lumpers", on the other hand, kept to the broad species concept of 
Linnaeus and gave units within the species only varietal recognition, 
regardless of whether the forms so described would probably breed 
true if grown in cultivation. 
The attractions of species-splitting to the taxonomists were 
obvious. Within the taxonomic community prestige was and still is 
attached to the naming of new species. Species-splitters did not have 
to travel to exotic new lands in order to find new species to name and 
describe: they could find hundreds of new species even in well-known 
floras. However, ecologists like Clements were incensed at the use 
of Latin binomials in this fashion, because it made the task of 
vegetation analysis and description almost impossible: 
• • • there can be no real taxonomy as long as the sole. 
criterion of a species is the difference which any observer 
thinks he sees between one plant and another. The so-called 
species of today range in value from mere variations to true 
species which are groups of great constancy and definiteness. 
The reasons for this are obvious when one recalls that 
'species' are still the product of the herbarium, not of the 
field, and that the more intensive the study, the greater the 
output of 'species' ••• The existing practice of re-
splitting hairs must come to an end sooner or later. The 
remedy will come from without through the application of 
experimental methods in the hands of the ecologist and the 
cataloguing of slight and unrelated differences will yield 
an ordered taxonomy. 
(Clements 1905: 12) 
The passion which could be aroused on this subject is shown by 
the meeting in Chicago in 1908 of the Botanical Society of America 
on "aspects of the species problem." Bessey, Cowles and Clements 
were all invited to attend and all three used the occasion to deliver 
attacks on traditional systematics. The substance of Bessey's (1908: 
218-224) argument was that species are conventional collections of 
individuals and that, therefore, they should be made with practical 
ends in mind. He complained bitterly that "much of the species-
ma.king in recent years has rendered it vastly more difficult than 
formerly for us to grasp the flora of a region • • • We are in danger 
of destroying the usefulness of taxonomy in our zeal for describing 
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every differing form as a separate species" (Bessey 1908: 219). 
Taxonomists, he concluded, needed reminding that taxonomy was not 
just for them but for all botanists. 
Cowles agreed. What a species was still required experimental and 
ecological investigation, but he was sure that "one of the noblest aims 
of ecology.is the destruction of many of the 'species' of our manuals" 
(Cowles 1908: 266). Cowles concluded his polemic with the dire 
warning that: 
The recent ebulitions of the taxonomic radicals have evoked 
in botanists in general successively, dissatisfaction, 
contempt and rage. These things will not be endured much 
longer; a little more and the sinning taxonomist will be 
cast into the outer depths where there will be much wailing 
and gnashing of teeth. 
(Cowles 1908: 271) 
Clements (1908) also produced an account which was highly critical 
of orthodox taxonomy, but unlike his counterparts, he suggested a 
nomenclatural solution to the problem of the new "varietal species". 
This is that these "species" should be given, not binomial, but 
trinomial names. And the form of the trinomial used should be a 
reflection of the putative mode of origin of the form being described. 
Thus for an ecad the third name used should reflect the habitat factor 
which led to the ecad's production, e.g. scias in the case of a shade 
form. For mutants the trinomial should have attached to it the 
prefix per. For postulated variants (Clements repeated his claim 
that this is not an experimentally verified mode of evolution) any 
prefix may be used provided it does not conflict with the trinomials 
used for ecads. For hybrids the already established X-nomenclature 
could be used. 
6 
In this way, the new "species" of the herbarium 
taxonomist disappear and are replaced by categories which tell the 
mode of origin of the form concerned. Clements (1908: 264) ended 
his paper by giving four examples of "species" which he intended to 
"sink" in this manner: 
1. Cerastium oriophilum = Cerestium strictum scias (ECAD: shade form 
of C. strictum). 
6. Using this nomenclature a hybrid is named from its 
to parental species together with an X to signify that hybridization 
has taken place. 
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2. Aguilegia jamesis = A. coerula peralba (MUTANT: mutation from the 
parental species, A. coerula). 
3. Verbena intermedia = V. stricta x hastata (HYBRID: the parental 
species being V. stricta and V. hastata). 
4. Machaerathera aspera = M. viscosa aspera (M. viscosa aspera was 
believed to be a VARIANT of the parental form, M. viscosa). 
The ecad, mutant, hybrid and variant are experimental categories. 
To use them field and laboratory methods are required; herbarium studies 
alone are inadequate. The experiments on which these categories were 
based were transplant experiments. Clements had begun this research in 
1901, after reading Bonnier's work, but the experiments were interrupted 
by his move to Minnesota and not resumed until 1917 when he joined the 
Carnegie. In the period after 1917, these experiments were organised 
not by Clements alone but in conjunction with the taxonomist and 
phytogeographer H.M. Hall. 
Harvey Monroe Hall (1874-1932) was a graduate of the University of 
California at Berkeley where he was a student from 1898 to 1901. Hall's 
original interests in biology stemmed from a concern with natural 
history and his earliest publications were on the life-history and 
behavioural habits of birds. His M.Sc. at Berkeley (Hall 1902) was 
a phytogeographical survey of the San Jacinto mountains in Southern 
California. After its completion Hall remained at Berkeley and in 1906, 
completed his doctoral research on the systematics of the Compositae, 
a group in which Hall maintained an active taxonomic interest throughout 
his research career. During this period Hall was in charge of the 
University Herbarium at Berkeley and later (after 1903) an instructor 
of botany in charge of the botanic garden. In 1908 he was appointed 
assistant professor and in 1916 associate professor, a post that he 
held until joining the Carnegie in 1919. He remained with the 
Carnegie for 13 years, this being the period of his active research 
in experimental plant taxonomy. He died suddenly in 1932 at a period 
when his work was just beginning to receive its greatest recognition. 7 
Even in the early years Hall's taxonomic research employed a very 
7. These biographical details of Hall's life are ta.ken from an obituary 
by Babcock (1934). 
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broad species concept; Hall was a "lumper" and not a "splitter". His 
Ph.D. thesis described only three new species, an unusually low number 
for a taxonomic monograph .in this period (cf. J.M. Coulter's 1908 review 
of the published version of the thesis). Hall was not against the 
recognition of intraspecific variation, but he argued that such forms 
should not be given binomial names: 
The systematist who is more concerned with problems of genetics 
than he is with the naming of new forms will ultimately be able, 
as the result of extended field observations and cultural 
experiments, to reduce these "species" properly to subordinate 
rank, indicating their relationship by the ordinary methods. 
(Hall 1912: 195) 
Hall's close association with Clements began with his move to the 
Carnegie in 1919 and for the next three years they were active co-workers 
at the Pikes Peak alpine laboratory in the Colorado Rocky Mountains. The 
result of their joint labours was the publication in 1923 of The 
Phylogenetic Method in Taxonomy, a work which represented the first 
attempt to construct an experimental taxonomy and apply it to a 
substantial portion of the flo~a of a particular geographical region. 8 
The central theme of the PP.ylogenetic Method was that all class-
ifications of plants should reflect evolutionary relationship, i.e. 
phylogenetic lines of descent. To demonstrate these relationships 
phylogenetic charts were constructed for all of the groups studied (an 
example of one of these charts is shown in figure 4.1). The authors 
were extremely critical of orthodox, herbarium taxonomy which, in their 
opinion, failed to arrive at classifications which were phylogenetic 
and not artificial·: 
••• the mere recognition of supposed new species in the herbarium 
hardly merits the term descriptive botany and it can in no wise 
be regarded as adequate taxonomic investigation. It has its value, 
and hence its excuse, in the biological exploration of new and 
distant countries, but, here as elsewhere, permanent taxonomic 
results must await the application of statistical and experimental 
methods in the field. 
(Hall and Clements 1923: 1) 
The experimental methods used were of five kinds:9 
8. In the text which follows this work is referred to by the abbreviated 
title of "Ph.ylogenetic Method". 
9. The methods used by Clements and Hall in their experimental taxonomy 
are described both in the lo enetic Method (pp. 19-23) and elsewhere 
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1 • The transplanting of similar but unlike forms of perennial 
species into a uniform environment. This was the most obvious method 
for testing the effects of habitat on plant growth and had been the 
method adopted by Jordan and by Clements in his earlier work. 
2. The growth of seedlings of related annual forms under uniform 
conditions. 
3. The transplanting of a single perennial form into diverse 
environments. (This was the varied-environment method of transplanting 
which had been used by Bonnier and again by Clements in his earlier 
research.) 
4. Reciprocal transplanting, which was a method devised to deal 
with cases where two closely related forms or species occupied similar 
habitats. Plants of each type were transferred, not just to the other 
habitat but to the actual hole left by the removal of the first plant. 
The object of this method was to ensure exact reversal of conditions 
and thus ensure a clear-cut demonstration of the extent to which 
different species of plants can be changed from one kind to another. 
5. Habitat inversion, that is, the altering of the environment 
around a plant in order to assess the effect on its growth (e.g. the 
removal of shade cover in order to study the effect of direct sunlight 
upon the plant's growth). 
Concerning the evolutionary implications of their research the 
authors repeated the claim made by Clements two decades earlier, that 
adaptation is the key evolutionary process: 
Further studies of origin at the Alpine Laboratory have 
confirmed the hypothesis that direct adaptation to the 
habitat has there produced the largest number of new forms 
of plastic species. Mutation now seems less important 
than it did 15 years ago, but this is partly due to the 
increasing difficulty of distinguishing mutants from 
variants, and sometimes even from ecads. Much variation 
is undoubtedly a response to the gradual change of an 
efficient factor, or to minute habitats of varying intensity. 
Further search has not increased the small number of probable 
hybrids; and it has become necessary to attempt the direct 
production of hybrids in nature. In spite of the changing 
importance of the methods of origin, it still appears 
certain that adaptation, mutation, variation and hybridization 
compromise four basic processes of evolution, though it now 
seems evident that adaptation and hybridization constitute the 
two basic modes. 
( . )10 Hall and Clements 1923~ 23 
10. This passage is noteworthy because in it Clements does seem to allow 
that natural selection can play a role in speciation. However 
Clements is inconsistent on this point and in later works he 
returned to his original position viz. that there existed no 
experimental proof for the origin of new forms by selection. 
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In their taxonomic treatment of the plants on which these experiments 
had been conducted Hall and Clements employed a very broad species concept. 
This was in agreement with their own views concerning the use of binomials 
but at variance with recent trends in floras of the Rocky Mountain 
vegetation. 11 Species-splitting was severely criticised: "it is 
imperative to establish species on the basis of the theoretical concepts 
as exemplified by Gray and those who have worked in a similar manner 
since" (Hall and Clements 1923: 15). 12 
Intraspecific categories are recognised but given trinomial names. 
Where possible these trinomial forms were ref erred to by their means of 
origin, i. e. as "ecads", "mutants", "variants" etc. Where the mode of 
origin is unlmown or unclear the neutral term "variad" was employed 
(Hall and Clements 1923: 23). The underlying purpose of this scheme 
of nomenclature was to create, in effect, two systems of classification: 
the first was a series of broadly-conceived species of value to the 
amateur botanist and floristic ecologist; the second was a series of 
minor forms or variads of value to the specialist in genetics, 
experimental ecology and evolutionary theory. However, as the 
authors made clear, both these "systems" must be based primarily upon 
evolutionary relationship rather than convenience. As for the species 
itself, this was defined as "a definite phylogenetic stock, sprung 
from and related to similar stocks, and itself undergoing modification 
into a number of variads" (Hall and Clements 1923: 11). 
In the Phylogenetic Method Hall and Clements were only able to 
apply their experimental taxonomy to three genera of the Rocky Mountain 
flora - .Artemisia, Chrysothamu.s and Atriplex. These groups were 
chosen partly because they had many species undergoing active evolution 
and partly because many of their species have medical, agricultural or 
horticultural importance. However, in their introduction the authors 
promised that more monographs, dealing with all the major genera of 
North America would eventually be prepared. 
11. The most notable difference is with Rydbergs (1917) flora. Rydberg 
had described 5, 100 species. In Clements flora (Clements and Cl'2..h\~ts 
1914) the~ geographical area is covered but only 1,878 species 
are considered to be present. 
12. The reference here is to the great nineteenth century American 
taxonomist Asa Gray, who was noted for his use of a broad species 
concept. 
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A direct opportunity to assess the impact of the new experimental 
taxonomy presented itself at the International Congress of Botanical 
Science held at Ithaca, New York in August 1926. Hall presented two 
papers to the congress (Hall 1929a, 1929b), the first dealing with the 
taxonomic treatment of intraspecific variation and the second with the 
natural basis of taxonomic categories. Both papers stressed the need 
for experimental methods in taxonomy and the necessity of synthesising 
traditional taxonomic methods with the new fields of cytology, genetics 
and ecology. The second of these two papers particularly emphasised 
the importance of genetics and cytology and was delivered before a joint 
session of the sections of the Congress dealing with taxonomy, cytology 
and genetics. Many prominent geneticists and cytologists were at the 
meeting including Otto Heilbron, Bradley M. Davis and George S. Shull. 13 
The taxonomists present included Karl M. Wiegand and Paul Rydberg (see 
table 4.1). 
Hall's paper received a generally enthusiastic response from the 
geneticists and cytologists. However, the taxonomists present were 
sceptical. Wiegand (1929b), in his reply to Hall's paper, made an 
argument which was to become standard in later clashes between 
experimental and orthodox systematists. He admitted the value of 
experimental methods, but he denied their general applicability to 
taxonomy on grounds of practicality: 
With regard to the question of experimental taxonomy I stand 
in the belief that while data obtained in this way are very 
desirable and are often capable of throwing great light on 
the significance of morphological differences, they are not 
usually of practical value to the general taxonomist. Such 
data are often impossible to obtain, sometimes because of the 
unavailability of the living material, sometimes because, as 
in the case of woody species, the time required to grow the 
plants is too great, but often als·o because of the large 
number of plants concerned. 
(Wiegand 1929b: 1575) 
However, the most vitriolic attack on Hall and Clements' work was 
made by Rydberg, a taxonomist at the New York Botanical Garden. He had 
special reason to dislike their work, because his own Rocky Mountain 
flora (Rydberg 1917) had been severely criticised in the Phylogenetic 
Method and many of the new species which he had described for the area 
had been treated by Hall and Clements as variants. His paper to the 
13. The work of Bradley M. Davis on Oenothera was discussed briefly in 
Chapter 3. Otto Heilbron was a Swedish cytologist and George Shull 
a geneticist whose work was later cited by Clausen's group. 
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conference (Rydberg 1929) took the form of a critical review of the 
Phylogenetic Method. These criticisms fell into three categories. 
He objected to the broad species concept employed by Hall and Clements 
and the consequent use of trinomials. He objected to the use of 
experimental methods, which he argued had been ~f less importance to 
Hall and Clements' methodology than they themselves had made out. 
And, he objected to the tone in which the criticisms of traditional 
taxonomy had been made: 
The objections (of ecologists about taxonomy) might have been 
warranted but they should not have been presented in an over-
bearing and sarcastic way. I felt strongly tempted to give 
them some of their own medicine. How can ecologists teach 
taxonomists the way to do their work? 
(Rydberg 1929: 1540) 
Rydberg defended a narrow species concept based on morphological 
criteria by a kind of Baconian inductivism: "until the flora of a 
country is perfectly known all forms existing should be described 
I leave it to others to find out whether the characters, prominent 
or trifling as they may seem to be, ••• are constant enough to place 
them as distinct species" (Rydberg 1929: 1544). 
As several other papers delivered to the conference show, this 
was not a position with which many taxonomists were in agreement. 
They were too well aware of the disrepute which was following in the 
wake of species-splitting (cf. Wiegand 1929a; Skottsberg 1929). 
However, they did not see the return to a broad species concept as 
entailing, of necessity, the use of experimental methods. 
In the years which followed the publication of the Phylogenetic 
Method the links between the research of Clements and Hall became more 
tenuous. From 1922 onwards Hall, although still on the staff of the 
Carnegie Institute, returned to California to resume his studies of 
the flora of the Sierra Nevada mountains. The original objectives of 
this research were to repeat the same kind of transplant experiments 
already being done by Clements in Colorado ( cf. Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey 1940: 4). Al though this work was initially under Clements' 
direction, in later reports to the Carnegie Institute it was given a 
separate account, within the general division for plant biology. 14 
14. This change takes place in Carnegie Institution year books published 
after 1927. 
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Hall never lost contact with the CaJ.iforn.ian biologists and 
especiaJ.ly with E~B. Babcock. A paper written with Babcock (Babcock 
and Hall 1924) shows that the two authors were aware of the work.of 
T.H. Morgan and his associates on the genetics of Drosophilia. Of 
special interest in this paper is the authors support for Morgan's 
claim that mutation and naturaJ. selection are the major processes of 
evolution and that these two processes act not separately but in 
conjunction. A neo-Lamarckian mode of speciation is not ruled out 
because concerning mutation itself the authors note that, "the cause 
of these changes is not known ••• the environment may have something 
••• to do with it (Babcock and Hall 1924: 81). However, Heiser calls 
this paper, with its emphasis on the study of chromosome numbers and 
artificial hybridization, "One of the first truly biosystematic 
papers to emerge in the United States" (Heiser 1969: 111). 
Towards the end of his life HaJ.l clearly became dissatisfied with 
Clements' theories concerning adaptation and ecogenesis. In their 
report to the Carnegie Institute in 1927 Hall and his co-workers (Hall, 
Keck and Hiesey 1927: 312) sugg~sted that their results were compatible 
either with the view that environment was selecting biotypes .Q!: with 
the theory that ecological factors act directly to bring about changes 
in the plants' growth. A similar position was adopted by Hall in the 
discussion of speciation in his 1928 monograph on Haplopappus: 
Whether or not a somatic modification may in time effect the 
ge:rminaJ. constitution, and also the role of environment in 
direct induction of genetic change, are problems of 
fundamentaJ. biologicaJ. significance; but they are not 
primarily taxonomic • • • Such discovery must await attack 
by combined analytic and synthetic methods of research on 
the respective roles in evolution played by mutation, 
hybridization, somatic modification, isolation and naturaJ. 
selection. 
(Hall 1928: 7-8) 
Although he lived 13 years longer than Hall, Clements never 
adjusted his views on speciation to what, by the late thirties and early 
forties, had become the prevailing orthodoxy in evolutionary biology. 
In his finaJ. book, Adaptation and Origin in the Plant World, which was 
not published until 5 years after his death. Clements repeated the 
claims of his earlier research, viz. that adaptation is the major 
mechanism of evolution and that there is no direct experimentaJ. evidence 
to verify Darwin's theory of evolution through naturaJ. selection: 
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Adaptation is a universal process, brought about by response 
to direct physical factors and expressed both in function and 
in form. For all the species employed, there is no evidence 
that it arises through the selection of genetic strains or 
variations ••• Natural selection does not operate upon the 
forms produced by adaptation, since they are immediately in 
harmony with the environment that produces them. 
(Clements, Martin and Long 1950: 260-261) 
In this work there is little discussion of Clemente' neo-Darwinian 
opponents. In a brief mention of Turesson's transplant experiments, 
Clements acknowledged that many of his ecads had been described as 
ecotypes by Turesson and found to be fi~ed and stable genetical strains. 
Commenting on this the authors add that "it is possible, though hardly 
likely, that they are of different character on the two continents, 
and the more probable explanation is that they are neither completely 
fixed, nor wholly unstable" (Clements, Martin and Long 1950: 257). 
The treatment of Clausen's work was even more perfunctory; the authors 
simply note that "a thorough exploration of the part that genetics 
play in the nature of species has been made by Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey" (Clements, Martin and Long 1950: 170). 
Although Clements' evolutionary views were later discredited and 
the work of Hall and Clements ignored by later generations of bio-
systematists, their research presents the first major attempt to 
introduce experimental methods into taxonomy. The objectives of their 
research.were two-fold: to discover the mode of speciation in plants 
and to use that knowledge to produce an experimental classification 
along evolutionary lines. These twin aims: to study evolution at 
work and to construct a taxonomy based on that study, were to remain 
the central objectives of most experimental taxonomists until after 
1950. 
Leonary Cockayne and Experimental :Ecology in New Zealand 
America was not the only country where an experimental taxonomy 
founded upon ecology was being advocated in the period from 1910 to 
1930. A similar g"Oal was evident in the work of the New Zealand 
ecologist Leonard Cockayne (1855-1934). 
Cockayne was British by birth and had originally trained in medicine 
but moved, for health reasons, to Australia in 1879 and then to New 
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Zealand in 1881. An amateur and of independent means he has, neverthe-
less, been described as New Zealand's "greatest botanist" (Laing 1936: 
457). 15 
From his very earliest papers Cockayne's major interest in botany 
was in the ecological study of vegetation and its relation to the 
problems of evolution. Cockayne was aware of the mutation theory of 
De Vries and he applauded its experimental approach to speciation 
(Cockayne 1912: 5). However, although he accepted that mutations 
sometimes occur, it was adaptation that he considered the major source 
of the variation upon which speciation could act: 
It is when we come to epharmonic adaptations that ecology 
presents its most important contribution to the evolutionary 
question • • • I am of the opinion that in the hereditary 
epharmonic variations cited below there is much greater 
likelihood of their having been brought about by the direct 
action of· various ecological factors than by the continuous 
accumulative selection of fluctuating varieties. 
(Cockayne 1912: 13) 
Cockayne never rejected this position, but in his later writings 
(Cockayne 1923; Cockayne and Allan 1927b) he increasingly stressed the 
evolutionary importance of hybridization. He had read Lotsy's Theory 
of Evolution by Means of Rybridization and believed that it could not 
be "lightly dismissed" (Cockayne 1923: 105). In addition, he held that 
traditional taxonomists had underrated the significance of hybrids. 
To distinguish a hybrid morphological examination alone was not 
sufficient; the alleged hybrid's geographical locality should be 
traced and related to the geographical and ecological location of its 
parental species. Also, where possible, the alleged hybrid's offspring 
should be grown and studied, for these, if they were genuine hybrids, 
will be polymorphic (Cockayne 1923: 107). Both the stress on the 
importance of hybridization and the very critical approach to orthodox 
taxonomy are evident in the 1927 paper titled "The Bearing of Ecological 
Studies in New Zealand on Botanical Taxonomic conceptions and Procedures" 
(Cockayne and Allan 1927a). Although Cockayne and Allan, unlike Hall 
and Clements, did not make a significant contribution to the development 
15. This article by Laing is an obituary. For another obituary of 
Cockayne see Allan (1935) and for a more recent assessment of 
Oockayne's work see Moore (1967). 
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of experimental taxonomy, their work clearly shows the faith with which 
the new 'dynamic' ecologists approached the old problems of plant 
classification. Beginning their article with some praise for those, 
including Hooker, who had preceeded them in their study of the New 
Zealand flora, the authors added that: 
Without doubt, the accumulated results of their devoted labours 
represent all that could possibly be done by the herbarium 
method. But to recognise our indebtedness is not to deny that 
future work must proceed on other lines that lead to much more 
exact knowledge of the facts as they present themselves in the 
field and in the experimental garden. 
(Cockayne and Allan 1927a: 235) 
And the authors were highly critical of herbarium taxonomy, 
representing it as "mere _guesswork" based upon grossly insufficient 
material supported by "scrappi' and casually prepared notes" (p. 235). 
They ar:gu.ed that, in New Zealand at least, progress in classification 
had been made by ecologists rather than taxonomists. The reason 
for this was seen as being the taxonomists' adherence to the methods and 
techniques of the herbarium, or, as the authors themselves put it, 
"the herbarium or artificial method". The latter is a method which 
has "served its day and outlived its usefulness" (Cockayne and Allan 
1927a: 250). Progress in taxonomy would only be made by new workers 
who were "free from the thraldom of the dangerous herbarium artificial 
method" (pp. 275-276). 
The alternative to this methodology was the development of a 
"natural" or "field" taxonomy. The object of field taxonomy was to 
classify plants in the light of the new knowledge gained by ecological 
research. Its methods were those of field study, herbarium collecting 
and experimental studies under cultivation (Cockayne and Allan 1927a: 
251-257). The value of such methods was that they "will prove of 
service to those collectors who have passed the stage of looking for 
'new' species, or ransacking herbaria for scraps of 'puzzling plants' 
and who desire to do really useful work" (Cockayne and Allan 1927a: 
251). 
The terminology which Cockayne and Allan used in their work was 
derived mainly from the writings of Lotsy. Thus the basic working 
unit of field taxonomy was the .jordanon and the major feature of such 
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groups is that they will breed true under cultivation. The simplest 
type of species found in nature are those composed of a single jordanon, 
these are simple species in Cockayne and Allan's terminology. More 
complex is the case where a group of jordanons occur "so closely allied 
that to treat them as a separate species would too much obscure this 
closeness of relationship." (p. 248). These are compound species, and 
within such taxa the individual jordanons should receive separate 
nomenclatural recognition as varieties. Where, as is frequently the 
case, jordanons have crossed to produce a very polymorphic species 
consisting of jordanons and hybrids, these species are Linneons in 
Cockayne and Allan's use of that term. Finally, in all these groups 
there may be epharmones, i.e. fo:t'UlS displaying variation due to 
environmental influences which are unstable and which will revert back 
to the "normal" mode of growth when planted in a different environment. 
The authors profess agnosticism about whether such variation can become 
inherited: 
The taxonomist is not required to analyse in detail the various 
factors which by their co~bination produce the "epharmone" ••• 
Into the vexed question whether an epharmone ever becomes so 
fixed as to result in the formation of a jordanon (heredity of 
an acquired character), we need not enter here. It is 
sufficient for the taxonomist and descriptive ecologist to know 
the status of his forms as they exist at the present time. 
(Cockayne and Allan 1927a: 249) 
To distinguish between jordanons, hybrids and epharmones requires 
ecological and genetic methods; for the herbarium taxonomist they are 
all entities of the same status, viz. "varieties" within the artificial 
species of the herbarium (Cockayne and Allan 1927a: 244). 
This terminology, like the mutant-variant-hybrid-ecad system of 
Hall and Clements, was little used by later biosystematists. In 
part this was probably due to the reaction against Lotsy 1s views on 
evolution and speciation which took place in experimental taxonomy 
after the rise of nee-Darwinism in the 1930 1 s and 40's. However, 
the major reason for its failure was the prominence by the 1930's of 
a rival system of nomenclature for experimental taxonomy - the 
genecological system formulated by the Swedish botanist G8te Turesson. 
• 
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GBte Turesson and the Beginnings of Genecology 
The ecologists we have dealt with so far had little detailed knowledge 
of plant cytology and genetics. Cockayne "took little interest in the 
minute microscope investigations of recent geneticists" (Laing 1936: 
463). And, similarly, Clements "never seemed to give proper weight to 
the results of modern genetical research" (Tansley 1946: 196). However, 
a synthesis of the ecological and genetical approaches to the species 
problem is found in the work of the great Swedish pioneer of genecology, 
" Gote Turesson (1892-1971). 
Turesson was born at MaJ.mo in Southern Sweden and completed a 
secondary education at Malmo and Lund before leaving to study in the 
United States in 1912. Turesson spent three years in America where he 
obtained a B.Sc. (1914) and an M.Sc. (1915) at the University of 
Washington in Seattle. Turesson's early botanical interests were in 
ecology and mycology, and the papers written during this period 
reflect this dual involvement; two deal with ecological themes 
(Turesson 1914, 1916a), and two are on mycology (Turesson 1915, 1916b). 
The last of these includes the.description of a new species of Penicillum. 
His final year in America was spent working as a laboratory assistant to 
J.W. Hotson, a mycologist at the University of Washington. 
When Turesson returned to Sweden he was, for three years, an 
assistant teacher in botany at the University of Lund. However, in 1918 
he moved to the genetics department where he became a student of Herman 
Nilsson-Ehle. 16 Nilsson-Ehle had been one of the first experimentalists 
to attempt to synthesise Mendelian genetics with Darwin's views on 
natural selection and had applied both perspectives in his own work 
on the genetics of breeding of cereal crops. He was also one of the 
earliest scientists to stress the enormous importance of recombination 
as a source of variation in sexually outbreeding species. Turesson's 
early papers owed a great deal to Nilsson-Ehle's influences, as he 
himself acknowledged (Turesson 1922b: 213). It was during his period 
in Nilsson-Ehle's department that Turesson obtained a B.Phil. (1920), 
M.Phil. (1921) and finally a Ph.D. (submitted in 1922, awarded in 1923). 
His doctoral thesis, "The Genotypical Response of the Plant Species to 
16. The importance of Nilsson-Ehle's work has already been mentioned 
in Chapter 3. 
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Habitat", was con~erned with the ecotype concept and was part of a 
series of papers on the nature of ecological variation within species, 
a subject that was to concern Tu.reason for the whole of his working 
life. The post at the genetics· department was followed by a brief 
period as an assistant teacher of plant physiology and then by a post 
as a reader in botany at Lund, a position which Turesson held for 12 
years until 1935. It was at this time that the most famous of his 
papers on genecology and experimental taxonomy were written. In 
addition to his association with the University of Lund, Turesson was 
also a director of the Weibullsholm plant breeding station at Landskrona 
(1928-1931). Turesson left Lund to take up a professorship of 
systematic botany and genetics at the Agricultural College in Uppsala, 
a post he retained until his retirement in 1959. He died in 1971, at 
the age of 81. 17 
The work which led Turesson to the discovery of ecological races 
within the Linnaean species, and thus to an involvement with experimental 
taxonomy, was concerned with the study of the causes of plagiotropy in 
maritime, shore plants (Tu.resson 1971, 1919). Plagiotropy is the 
tendency for some plants to take on a prostrate or horizontal growth 
form when grown in certain environments. Plagiotropy had been observed 
by other ecologists and was known to be especially common amongst 
plants growing on sand-dunes or near the coast. Tures son, then workipg 
for the summer at the ecological station at Hallands on the Island of 
V[der8, undertook some laboratory experiments to determine the cause 
of this growth habit. Warming (1909: 26-27) had argued that the 
probable cause of plagiotropy was the difference in temperature of the 
air and soil at the time when the shoots were developing, i.e. that it 
results from the execution of thermotropic movements .by the plant. 
However, by growing plants in laboratory-controlled conditions, 
Tu.reason was able to show that the plagiotropic growth habit was a 
response to high light intensity and was thus a phototropic movement 
on the part of the plant (Turesson 1919: 13-24). 
This early research exhibits the combination of field and 
laboratory analysis which were the hallmark of Turesson's later work. 
17. These details of Turesson's biography were ta.ken from an obituary 
by Jtilntzing (1971). 
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Also, and more importantly, Turesson made clear his own beliefs concerning 
the relationship between environmental and hereditary variations and 
between hereditary characters and habitat response. Thus, according to 
Tu.reason, plagiotropic plants are of two different kinds, viz. 
"modificatory prostrate forms, and hereditary prostrate forms" 
(Turesson 1919: 27). Both forms are sometimes found within the same 
systematic species. For example, Atriplex latifolium is usually an 
erect plant but will take on a prostrate growth habit under conditions 
of high light intensity. However, Turesson discovered a form of this 
plant, which he called A. latifolium prostratum, which was always 
prostrate in its growth habit regardless of light intensity. When 
Tu.reason planted this prostrate form in his own garden at Malino it 
retained its prostrate growth habit through several generations, in 
spite of conditions of low light intensity. Tu.reason took this to be 
a proof of the hereditary nature of the growth response in this plant 
and was able to conclude that there exist in Atriplex "physiologically 
and genetically widely different races within the 'species' of the 
genus" (Turesson 1919: 29). 
Many of these dominant themes concerning the nature of plagiotropy 
are manifest in the papers in which Tu.resson (1922a, 1922b) formally 
introduced the ecotype concept. A major aim of both these papers was 
to develop a method whereby environmental responses could be 
distinguished from hereditary variation: 
An attempt has been made to show to what extent the behaviour 
of plant species in different habitats is the result of a 
direct response to the environment on the part of the individual 
plant, and to what extent it is due .to the presence in the 
different habitats of different hereditary variation. While 
in some cases the observed characteristics were found to be 
purely modificatory, the differentiation of the species-
population into different hereditary variations was found to 
be the rule in the majority of cases. 
(Turesson 1922b: 331) 
The method which Tu.reason used to distinguish between these two 
sorts of variation was transplantation into a uniform environment, i.e. 
the same method which had been used by Jordan. If the ecological 
varieties maintained their characteristic features and appearance over 
several generations, Tu.resson took this as proof, not that they were 
different species, but that they were fixed hereditary varieties within 
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the species. Varieties of this kind Tu.reason termed ecotypes. If, 
on the other hand, the ecological variety lost its special characterist-
ics when grown in an experimental garden, then this was taken as proof 
that the variety arose in the wild through the action of the environment 
on the phenotype only. These varieties Tu.reason termed ecophenes. The 
transplant experiments on which this research was conducted were 
initially carried out in Tu.reason's own garden at MaJ.mo. Later, when 
the number of transplants became too large for this, Turesson set up 
a permanent "ecotype garden" in the grounds of the Institute of Genetics 
. Ak 18 
in arp. 
The larger of the two 1922 papers (Tu.reason 1922b) presents the 
results of such transplant studies on 17 species in 13 widely distributed 
genera of flowering plants. Amongst the hereditary races discovered 
were shade forms of Lysimachia Vulgaris and Dactylis glomerata; coastal 
dwarf forms of Succisa pratensis and.Centaurea jacea; and coastal 
succulents in Solanum dulcamara, Matricaria indora, Leontodon autumnalis 
and Melandricum rubrum. In one of the most closely studied species, 
Hieracium umbellatum, no less ·than five ecotypes were demarcated. All 
these ecotypes were distinguishable on the basis of external morphology, 
although the differences between them usually concerned features such 
as length of stem or leaves etc. , which could only be expressed as ~ 
differences between two populations rather than as discrete morphological 
markers. However, external characters were not the only means of 
distinguishing ecotypes; many were found to differ from each other in 
leaf and stem anatomy as well. Some of the ecotypes Tu.reason described 
had received prior taxonomic recognition as subspecies or varieties, but 
the majority had no official taxonomic status. 
The ecotype was itself only one unit in a hierarchy of categ-ories 
(see figure 4.2). For Tu.reason, "the species problem is ••• in a 
large measure an ecological problem" (1922b: 344). New species arise 
as the "complicated products of recombined Mendelian factors, or 
genotype compounds" (Tu.resson 1922b: 342). However, the cause of such 
18. In his attempts to get money for this venture Tu.resson enlisted the 
help of some powerful biologists. Amongst those who sent letters 
of support were J.B.S. HaJ.dane and Nilsson-Ehle. 
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changes is selection in response to changes in the habitat: 
A change in the non-living world brings about a corresponding 
change in the living, inducing a recombination of Mendelian 
factors now distributed in organisms, and resulting in the 
formation of new genotype compounds or species (= evolution). 
(Tu.reason 1922b: 343) 
In place of the traditional units of systematics (species and 
varieties) we get a system of classification which reflects this 
process of evolution through selection of inherited variation. The 
levels of this hierarchy were originally defined as follows: 
Coenospecies: "The total sum of possible combinations in a 
genotype compound'' 
:Ecospecies: "The Linnaean species or genotype compounds as 
they are realised in nature" 
:Ecotypes: "The product arising as a result of the genotypical 
response of an ecospecies to a particular habitat" 
:Ecophenes: "The reaction-types of the ecotypes called forth by 
the modificatory influences of extreme habitat factors" 
(Tu.reason 1922b: 344-346) 
:Ecophenes possess the same hereditary constitution (genotype), 
even though they are morphologically distinct, and thus correspond 
to Johannsen's "phenotypes" (cf. Tu.reason 1922a: 111). Selection 
operates at the level of genotypical differentiation (i.e. on ecotypes). 
It does not operate at the level of the ecophene because variation of 
this type is not inherited. Adaptation takes place through the action 
of selection; it is not a phenomenon sui generis as had been claimed 
by the neo-Lamarckians (Tu.rreson 1922a: 110-111). 
Turesson's views on speciation conflicted with the mutationist 
theories of De Vries and Johannsen and with the hybridization theory 
of Lotsy (cf. Tu.reason 1922b, 1929). Turesson accepted that hereditary 
types existed within the species, but to call these types themselves 
species is "to strip the ordinary species, as found in nature of one 
of its most characteristic properties viz. the ability to respond 
genotypically to a wide range of different habitats with such units 
or habitat types, representing various combinations of Mendelian 
factors" (Turesson 1922b: 342). 
It was also a theory of speciation at variance with the neo-
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Lamarckian position advocated by Hall and Clements. In a discussion 
of the latter's work Turesson (1925: 230-231) welcomed their use of 
experimental methods in taxonomy but he criticised the claim that 
environmental variation could become directly fixed into the genotype 
of the plant. Hall, after he had begun his own series of transect 
experiments in California, visited Turesson at Lund. The possibility 
of joint research projects was considered, but difficulties involved 
in connection with the shipping of plant materials led to a postpone-
ment of this venture and no joint research was ever undertaken. 19 
For the study of ecospecies and ecotypes Turesson coined the term 
genecology. This was defined as "the study of species and their 
hereditary types as related to environment" (Turesson 1923: 171). As 
such genecology was a branch of ecology, comparable to synecology 
20 and autecology. However, from the very start, Turesson also saw 
genecology as a discipline which would replace orthodox systematics. 
Turesson argued that an ecological understan~ing of speciation 
involved a different conception of the species from that employed 
in traditional systematics: 
That the genecological units do not necessarily - and probably 
quite often do not - coincide with the Units of the traditional 
systematics is quite clear. The divergences are due to a large 
extent to different conceptions of the species. The point of 
view of the genecologist - that the species represent an 
intercrossing community, the members of which have secondarily 
become clustered into groups (viz. ecotypes) on account of the 
differentiating effect of environmental factors upon the geno-
typically heterogenous population - is very different from the 
systematists view of species. From the point of view of 
traditional systematism a species is composed of forma genuina 
and deviations are subordinated under this type as varieties 
and forms of "less systematic" value. Apart from the 
untenability of this view, the supposed type may include a 
number of ecotypes, and several varieties may conversely be 
found as normal constituents forming parts in one and the same 
ecotype, as has been shown in my previous work. 
(Turesson 1925: 173) 
The clearest statement of Turesson's views on traditional systematics 
was put forward in a paper entitled "Genecological Units and their 
19. The correspondence between Hall and Turesson has been preserved in 
the Turesson archives at Lund. 
20. Autecology is the study of individual species, synecology the study 
of the plant community. 
- 110 -
Classificatory Value", ( 1930). From this paper it is clear that 
Tu.reason viewed genecological units as a rival to the categories 
employed by orthodox taxonomists. Orthodox taxonomy is at best a 
kind of necessary preliminary to experimental investigation. The 
classifications it produces are artificial and thus of little service 
to most biologists. Genecological categories, in contrast, are seen 
as being based upon the naturally occurring phenomena of ecological 
differentiation and are thus real: 
Systematics of the purely descriptive kind do not provide 
the instrument by which the cause and nature of group 
phenomena in organisms may be investigated, nor do 
systematics of this kind furnish the adequate means of 
determining the natural boundaries of the groups. While 
it is true that classification might be made without any 
such means it is equally true that a classification of this 
kind must be considered as mere preliminary and be of limited 
scientific value. 
(Tu.resson 1930: 511) 
In his early research Turesson applied his ecotype concept solely 
to plant species which reproduced wholly, or partly, by means of 
sexual reproduction, i.e. amphimictic species. However, later research 
with groups that were asexual or apomictic in their breeding convinced 
Tu.reason that the ecotype concept could also be applied in these 
cases (Tu.resson 1926, 1943). The result of this new line of research 
was that Tu.resson twice redefined and substantially modified his 
definitions of the ecospecies and the coenospecies (Tu.reason 1929), 
1943). Thus, in the 1929 paper, a distinction was made between 
sexually reproducing ecospecies which can be defined in genetical 
terms and apomictic agamospecies which cannot. Ecospecies, thus 
redefined, become "an amphimict-population the constituents of which 
in nature reproduce vital and fertile descendants with each other giving 
rise to less vital, or more or less sterile descendants in nature, 
however when crossed with constituents of any other population" 
(Tu.reason 1929: 333). Apart from widening the scope of populations 
to which the genecological terminology could be applied, this 
redefinition of the term "ecospecies" had important implications for 
later developments in biosystematics. Ecospecies and ecotypes had 
originally been used as ecological terms but after 1930 most workers, 
including Tu.resson himself, came to regard these units in genetical 
terms. For many later workers ecological species were "ecological" 
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only insofar as partial or total genetic isolation is often accompanied 
by ecological separation. The desirability of using Turesson's 
genecological hierarchy in this manner is still a matter for dispute 
amongst both taxonomists and biosystematists (cf. Heywood 1959 and 
Valentine and LBve 1958). 
Not all ecologists were willing to accept either that species had 
to be defined in genetical terms or that recombination and natural 
selection were the methods by which new species arise in nature. In 
Sweden the strongest opponent of Turesson's new genecology was not a 
taxonomist but a fellow ecologist, Gustaf Einar Du Rietz. Du Rietz 
was a phytosociologist and his major research concerned descriptive 
studies of the Swedish and Norwegian mountain and moorland vegetation. 
However, he also contributed one major paper on "The Fundamental 
Units of Biological Taxonomy" (Du Rietz 1930) which was widely cited 
by later biosystematists. In effect this article was an attempt to 
reconcile the terms and methods of traditional taxonomy with the more 
modern experimental approach. Du Rietz was critical of traditional 
taxonomy and stated that "the pure abstraction method of species-making 
by sorting specimens into groups merely after their morphological 
resemblance as still practised by many taxonomists (and still supposed 
by Lotsy and many other geneticists to be the method of all taxonomy), 
must be firmly rejected" (Du Rietz 1930: 387). Du Rietz, like 
Tu.resson, was convinced that taxonomists must change their methods, 
but in a way very different from that recommended by Turesson. For 
Du Rietz the salvation of taxonomy lay in what he called the 
"morphological-geographical method", a combination of the methods of 
herbarium taxonomy and descriptive field ecology. Species were 
defined by Du Rietz in morpho-geographical rather than in genetic 
terms, as "the smallest natural populations permanently separated from 
each other by a distinct discontinuity in the series of biotypes" 
(Du Rietz 1930: 357). Old orthodox taxonomical units such as 
"subspecies" and "variety" were retained, and Du Rietz was critical 
of the use of new terminologies like the genecological system, which 
he deemed to be unnecessary (Du Rietz 1930: 361). Du Rietz did not 
deny the importance of data from transplant experiments, but he saw 
the results thus obtained as subordinate to the study of wild 
populations 
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If we take home a single specimen or a few specimens of each 
species, of each subspecies or even of each variety of a 
genus, plant them in our gardens, cross them with each other 
and play with them in various ways, they will still tell us 
nothing about the variability of polymorphy in the wild 
populatiori.s concerned, i.e. nothing of what is most essentiaJ. 
for grasping the species and their subordinate units. The 
field study of the variability of polymorphy of wild populations 
can be replaced as little by the study of a few living 
individuaJ.s brought home to a garden as by a few dry individuaJ.s 
in a museum, and it is often more use to get a number of dry 
individuaJ.s, sufficient for getting at least some idea of the 
variability of polymorphy in the wild population than it is to 
get an insufficient number of living individuaJ.s to a garden. 
The claim of Turesson and other geneticists to have replaced 
the old "descriptive taxonomy" with a new "experimentaJ. taxonomy" 
must therefore be firmly disputed. 
(Du. Rietz 1930: 388) 
In fact, the disagreements between Du. Rietz and Turesson extended 
beyond the realms of species definitions, terminology and methodology. 
Du. Rietz was unconvinced that selection could be the sole agent in 
evolution and felt that Turesson's genecology overemphasised its 
importance (Du. Rietz 1930: 399-400, 410 and see aJ.so Goddijn 1934: 84). 
Turesson's reply to Du. Rietz was written in conjunction with two 
other Lund geneticists, Arne MU.ntzing and Karl Olaf Tedin. Mlintzing 
(1930) had aJ.ready published a monograph employing Turesson's 
terminology and methods to the genus GaJ.eopsis. The Lund authors 
criticised the work of Du. Rietz on a number of issues. His species 
concept was attacked as being subjective and no advance on the 
morphological species definitions aJ.ready employed in traditionaJ. 
systematics. The authors aJ.so defended the use of genecologicaJ. 
terms: "ecospecies" and "coenospecies" which Du. Rietz had claimed were 
practicaJ.ly synonymous with the term species if the latter was properly 
defined. And, finaJ.ly, there was a cri tiqu.e of Du. Rietz' s comments 
concerning the role of selection in speciation. The Lund authors 
ended their paper by quoting a passage from Du. Rietz in which he 
argued that "the role of selection has been much overrated ••• It 
mainly consists in the elimination of biotypes absolutely unviable 
" in a certain habitat (Du. Rietz 1930: 399), and they commented that 
opinions such as these appear to demonstrate that 
••• for the solution of the problems (of evolution) here 
discussed experimentaJ. playing in the garden with plants 
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has proved its superiority over field studies, be the 
latter combined with an ever so skilful playing with 
words. 
(MUntzing, Tedin and Tu.reason 1931: 16) 
This controversy was not the first time that Turesson and Du Rietz 
had clashed. In an earlier paper Tu.reason had already criticised 
Du Rietz's assertion that species found in a large number of variable 
plant associations do not respond to the different ecological factors 
in each association by the production of ecotypes (cf. Du Rietz 1923; 
Tu.resson 1925: 232-233). The personal animosity between the two men 
was also increased by the fact that both had applied for the 
professorship of botany at Lund University. 21 · However, the work of 
Du Rietz is worthy of note for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that 
even by 1930 the issue of what role selection plays in evolution was 
still a matter of contention between ecologists and geneticists. And, 
secondly, it shows that taxonomists were not alone in their distrust 
of experimental methods; at least some ecologists also felt that 
classification should not rely on experimental and genetic criteria. 
Although Turesson's views ·on taxonomy received a mixed reception 
from taxonomists and some ecologists, the ecotype-terminology quickly 
became established as the major classification system of experimental 
taxonomy. The way in which Tu.resson's research was taken up and 
modified by subsequent workers forms a dominant theme of Chapter 5. 
Discussion: The Species Concepts of Clements and Tu.resson 
Clementsian taxonomy had two major objectives: 
1. to get back to the broad morphological species of Linnaeus. 
2. to show that variation exists within the Linnaean species as 
a result of the action of external forces in the environment on the 
plant's growth and heredity. 
It was to demonstrate the latter claim that Clements performed 
transect experiments. Clements believed, following Bonnier, that 
species transformation from one kind to another would take place under 
the action of such environmental change. Indeed, Clements maintained 
this belief in the power of speciation by direct adaptation throughout 
21. Neither, in fact, obtained the post. 
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all his working life. 
The use of broad morphological resemblances meant that the species 
of Hall and Clements often overlapped in practice with the species of 
the older "Linnaean" taxonomists of the herbarium. However, this 
overlap is, in many ways, coincidental. The principles behind which 
the Clementsian approach to speciation is based is radically anti-
Linnaean. For Clements there are no special features of a species 
which defines its essence; indeed species will transform from one kind 
to another given the right environmental circumstance. Instead the 
emphasis is on species as changeable, malleable entities. This emphasis 
on the dynamical and historical is evident in Clements' writings in 
ecology as well as taxonomy. Indeed the parallel is one to which he 
himself ref erred: 
It would be entirely superfluous to state that the major 
difficulty in the analysis of vegetation is its complexity, 
were it not for the fact that it is too often taken as the 
warrant for the static viewpoint. This was embodied in the 
original idea of the formation as a unit in which communities 
were assembled on a physiognomic basis, quite irrespective 
of generic composition and phyletic relationship. It is 
not strange that this view and its corollaries should have 
persisted long past its period of usef'ulness, since this is 
exactly what happened with the artificial system of Linnaeus, 
but the time has come to recognise fully that a natural 
system of communities must be built just as certainly upon 
development and consequent relationship as must that of 
plant families. 
(Clements 1936: 282) 
Clementsian species are not classified on the basis of permanent 
features or essential characters, either in the genotype or phenotype. 
Indeed for Clements such permanent features of a species do not exist: 
ultimately any apparent stability of species in nature is only a 
feature of the relative stability of the habitat in which the plant 
is growing. As a result Clementsian taxonomy works in a way which is 
completely at variance with Putnam's account of scientists as seeking 
out essences of natural kind terms and using these as rigid designators. 
For Clements the cluster of morphological properties on which, as 
a matter of necessity, species-making has to depend are more like 
identifying descriptions or stereotypes. These properties are a 
guide to classification of species but they cannot be used to locate 
the essence of a natural kind because for Clements there quite simply 
- 115 -
are no such essences. 
The problems inherent in Putnam's account of naturaJ. kind terms and 
their usage is also well illustrated by the fate of De Vries work on 
Oenothera during this period. According to Putnam a words usage is 
fixed by its "christening", which then provides the paradigm instance 
of its use. De Vries clearly expected his use of the concept of 
mutation to be taken in this way: it was presented as a detailed account 
of the nature of speciation in one group ( Oenothera) but as a theory 
which later research would show to be of general applicability. In fact 
however two things happened: 
1. ExperimentaJ. taxonomists who were opp~sed to mutation as a 
generaJ. theory of speciation (e.g. Clements) accepted his work as 
proven for Oenothera but denied its generaJ. applicability. 
2. Ultimately research by B.M. Davis, R.E. Cleland and others 
showed that "mutation" in oenothera was not in fact mutation but 
rather that the variation observed could be explained as a complex form 
of permanent heterozygozity. .The usage of the terms "mutant" and 
"mutation" still conformed to De Vries' description of mutation as 
change in genetic substance, but the paradigm case of mutation was 
rejected on the grounds that it did not match this verbal description. 
In this instance at least the terms later usage does not appear to 
have depended on the initial referent. A fully elaborated casuaJ. 
theory of reference might be able to overcome a counter-instance of 
this nature. But, at the moment, it would appear to be a case which, 
if anything, fits the Fregean model of reference as achieved by 
description rather than causal usage. 
Turesson's employment of the te:r:m species shows discrepancies with 
both description theorists and essentialists views on naturaJ. kinds. 
For Turesson there are 3 kinds of species viz. ecospecies, coenospecies 
and agamospecies. Ecospecies are defined in genetical terms. 
Members of an ecospecies are variable in both their phenotype and 
genotype but are bound together by a same-essence relationship which 
refers to breeding behaviour. All members of an ecospecies are 
potentiaJ.ly capable of crossing and producing fertile offspring. 
But, defining species in this manner raises two problems. The 
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first of these is that a limited amount of gene-exchange may occur 
between members of different ecospecies. This, for example, may occur 
when two ecospecies which are normally separated by ecological and 
geographical barriers occasionally meet in areas and habitats where 
their ecological preferences overlap. Such rare crossing of this 
·sort which does not indicate complete fertility of the two species 
involved can even take place on occasion between different genera: 
By definition a coenospecies includes all types which are 
united directly or indirectly by crossability and which 
may exchange genes. In extreme cases such as coenospecies 
may comprise ecospecies from different genera. 
(Mllntzing 1935: 57, emphasis added) 
The coenospecies then, overcomes the first problem. 
The second problem of defining species by means of genetical. 
behaviour is that such a definition is only applicable in groups 
where sexual reproduction takes place. Apomictic plant species 
are not species if this definition is adhered to. To cover cases 
of this sort Turesson introduced the term "agamospecies", the 
latter being defined as: 
An apomict - population the constituents of which for 
morphological, cytological and other reasons, are to be 
considered as having a common origin. 
(Turesson 1929: 333) 
These three terms are illustrated diagrammatically in figure 4.3. 
As is evident from that figure, ecospecies in principle, at least, 
have an extension which is favourable in terms of a samee relationship 
of reproductive behaviour. If A is the first known instance of an 
ecospecies X then all subsequent members will be able to cross with A 
and produce more-or-less fertile offspring. However, no such same e 
relationship binds together the members of a coenospecies. Two plants 
may be unable to exchange genes directly but still be members of the 
same coenospecies. And in practice Turesson recognises coenos~ecies 
on the basis of a series of identifying descriptions. Coenospecies 
have "a common origin so far as morphological, cytological or 
experimental facts indicate such as origin" (Turesson 1929: 333). 
Agamospecies are also defined in this way. There is no essence which 
decides membership of an agamospecies. Rather, a cluster of morphological 
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and cytological properties are used to decide membership. 
Clearly, essentialist and descriptivist accounts of classification 
show not how scientific classifications must be made but rather, two 
different strategies by which they might be made. Not only are both 
possibilities concurrent with~ science, both strategies may be 
incorporated into the work of a single scientist. Tu.reason's work 
indicates superbly the limitations of both models as general accounts 
of the classification process in science. 
Genettc criteria have often been employed since either to delimit 
species or to demarcate different kinds of species. However, there 
remains no universal agreement concerning their use. For example, 
Heywood in a recent paper has strongly criticised the way in which 
genecological units have become "the property of geneticists" (Heywood 
1959: 91). And, more generally, Rollins has argued that genetical 
criteria are inadequate as a definition of the species: 
To insist on infertility (incompatibility) as the sole 
criterion of species ignores the aims and methods of 
taxonomy and seeks to make taxonomy subservient to a 
condition - sterility in genetics, by raising it to the 
importance of a universal principle. 
(Rollins 1953: 181) 
These controversies suggest that Tu.resson was only partly successful 
in forging a synthesis between ecology and genetics, with respect to 
the experimental classification of plants. In the period after 1930 
most biosystematists were cytologists ·and geneticists, and their 
treatment of the genecological system naturally reflected cytological 
and genetical concerns. 
The connection between experimental taxonomy and ecology means 
that the early history of the discipline cannot be considered in 
isolation from the events which were taking place in ecology itself 
during this period. Stress on the need for experimentation and 
quantification of data were common in the writings of plant ecologists 
during the first three decades of the century and reflected, in part 
at least, the newly emerging status of ecology as a profession. 
Ecological studies were no longer to be the province of the amateur 
natural historian but the professional scientist. For these ecologists, 
- 118 -
by analogy, the way forward in taxonomy was also seen as linked to the 
adoption of experimental and quantative techniques. 
The early experimental taxonomists were highly critical of 
traditional systematics and saw their own discipline as one which 
would eventually replace orthodox taxonomy. They believed that the 
classifications of experimental taxonomy were superior to those which 
could be produced by orthodox taxonomists and that the latter was, 
at best, a mere preliminary to proper experimental investigation. 
By the early 1930's ~te Turesson's genecological terminology 
had become the most important of the systems of classification available 
to experimental taxonomists. Much of the work which took place in 
experimental taxonomy after this period can be seen as an extension, 
elaboration and refinement of the genecological classifications and 
techniques first expounded by G8te Tu.resson. 
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Chapter Five : Experimental Taxonomy and Genecology 1930-1950 
The period around 1930 saw the initiation of several crucial changes 
in the scope, aims and direction of experimental taxonomic research. One 
of the most important of these changes was the increasing use of cyto-
genetical methods and concepts. From 1920 to 1930 most of the major 
research in experimental taxonomy had been carried out by men whose 
backgrounds were in ecology. In the period after 1930 geneticists and 
cytologists became more prominent in the advocacy of an experimental 
approach to classification. The interest of geneticists and cytologists 
in the species concept can be seen from the discussion of that topic held 
at the fifth International Botanical Congress in Cambridge (England) in 
August 1930. That discussion was dominated by cytologists and geneticists: 
figures present included E. Anderson, E.B. Babcock, J.P. Lotsy, C. 
Darlington, E. von Tschermak (one of the rediscoverers of Mendel's work) 
and the Russian plant breeder N. I. Vavilov (see Table 5. 1). Tures son 
and Du Rietz also were present at the conference but they gave their 
papers to a separate symposium which discussed geographical distribution 
and its relationship to the species concept. 
A second change apparent after 1930 was a shift in theoretical interest. 
From 1900 to 1930 the major theoretical concern of experimental taxonomists 
had been to test out different theories of speciation by using transplant 
techniques. In the post-1930 period the controversy over the mechanism of 
speciation was seen as resolved, in favour of the selectionist viewpoint 
advocated by G8te Turesson. 1 The major theoretical issue in research after 
1930 focused on the question of what kind or pattern of variation resulted 
from the action of selection on intraspecific variation. Turesson, and 
later Clausen, held that such variation was discontinuous in nature, a 
reflection of the discontinuous nature of the habitat itself. For Turesson 
and Clausen ecological variation within the species was a mosaic 
describable in terms of ecological types. However, in the 1930's several 
important schools of genecological thought developed which challenged this 
interpretation and argued that ecological variation within the species was 
1. Although the possibility that environment directly acted to produce 
new species was re-opened by the developments in Russian biology under 
Michurin and Lysenko (see Mather 1942). 
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continuous or clinal in nature. 
which is still unresolved. 
This interpretation initiated a debate 
Thirdly, the period after 1930 also witnessed a change in the way 
experimental. taxonomists came to perceive the relationship between their 
discipline and that of orthodox taxonomy. In the period from 1920 to 
1930 experimentalists had seen their discipline as one which embodied 
techniques and results which would come to replace the existing practices 
of the orthodox school. However, in the period after 1930 many 
experimentalists came increasingly to stress that experimental. taxonomy 
was an addition to, rather than a replacement of, orthodox systematics. 
Indeed, some even went further than this and maintained that experimental. 
"taxonomists" should give up their pretensions to being engaged in a 
classificatory activity at all and concentrate instead solely on 
elucidating the mechanisms and pathways of microspeciation. This debate 
too has remained unsolved. 
In this chapter these changes will be considered in more depth. 
However, it will be pertinent to begin by examining briefly the wider 
context of changes in biological research that were manifest in the 
1930's and 40's. For it was a response to these wider developments 
that many changes in genecological thinking can be in part related. 
Biological. Research in the 1930 1 s and 40's: The Emergence of the 
Synthetic Model of Evolution 
Biological. theory in the 1930's and 40's was dominated by the 
emergence of the so-called 'synthetic' model of evolution. The 
approximate dates for the emergence of this view can be obtained by 
listing the major publications of this school: Dobzhansky 1937; 
Huxley 1940, 1942; Mayr 1942; Simpson, 1944, 1953; Stebbins 1950. 
The new interest in evolutionary matters can also be discerned in the 
emergency in 1947 of the journal. Evolution. 
The adherents of the synthetic model of evolution sought to use 
evolutionary theory as the corner-stone of integrating the diverse 
disciplines of twentieth-century biology. The foundation and starting 
point for such an enterprise was undoubtedly the realisation of the 
mutual compatibility of Darwin's theory of natural selection through 
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the inheritance of small continuous variations with Mendelian particulate 
genetics. The basis for this synthesis had been forged in the decade 
between 1910 and 1920 through the work of geneticists such as Castle, 
East, Nilsson-Ehle and Morgan. However, the later research of Dobzha.nsky, 
Mayr, Simpson, and others was concerned with more than demonstrating the 
mere compatibility of Darwinism and Mendelism; it was an attempt to place 
all the disciplines of biology, including genetics, cytology, biogeography, 
paleontology and taxonomy within an evolutionary framework. 
The question arises of why this 'grand synthesis' (as Mayr termed 
it) did not take place until the late 1930's and 40's. If Provine is 
correct in his claim that "in 1918 ••• many geneticists accepted Mendelism 
and Darwinism as complementary" (Provine 1971: 129), why was there no 
synthesis during the decade from 1920 to 1930? 
Part of the answer to this problem lies in recognising that the 
synthetic model of evolution proceeded not in one but in two steps. The 
first of these was the combining of the research programmes being carried 
out in experimental Mendelian genetics and the mathematically orientated 
biometry of such figures as Pearson. This took place in the period 
after 1918. The second phase of the synthesis was the merging of the 
experimental disciplines of genetics and cytology with the 'naturalist' 
tradition in biology evident in the disciplines of taxonomy, biogeography 
and ecology. It was this second phase which was not begun until the 
late 30's and which was not fully completed until after 1950. 2 
The attempt to provide Mendelian genetics with a mathematically based 
model which would account for the flow of genes through a population had 
a long history. In retrospect, the origins of this endeavour can be 
traced to the work of G.U. Ytlle (1871-1951) which was begun as early as 
1902. But, at the time Yule was writing, his views were very much an 
exception to the general trend. Most mathematically orientated biologists 
prior to 1910 had, following the path of the leading British biometrician 
Karl Pearson (1857-1936), rejected particulate theories of inheritance in 
2. The rise of nee-Darwinism and the emergence of population genetics has 
been the subject of a recent study by Provine (see especially Provine 
1971) and it is from this source that much of the following account 
has been derived. 
- 122 -
favour of the non-particulate theories of Francis Galton. The experimental 
work of Morgan, Castle and Nilsson-Ehle brought about a change in this 
position and most mathematical biologists after 1918 began to set about 
the task of demonstrating a quantitative proof of the operation of 
selective processes on units of Mendelian heredity in animal and plant 
populations. 
The leading exponent of this synthesis of biometry and Mendelism, 
was R.A. Fisher (1890-1962). Fisher had come to the opinion that 
biometrical results could be explained in terms of Mendelian inheritance 
as early as 1918, although the full presentation of his arguments was 
not made until 1930 (Fisher 1918, 1930). Other prominent figures in the 
mathematical investigation of Mendelian heredity and selection were 
Sewall Wright (1899- ) and J.B.S. Haldane (1892-1964). The result of 
this research was that by 1930 there was little doubt that the findings 
of experimental geneticists working on Drosophila and other laboratory 
organisms could be accounted for by a mathematical model of population 
genetics centred on the key notion of selection. However, the details 
of this model were still a matter of controversy and have continued to 
remain so.3 
The analyses of Fisher, Haldane and Wright were largely of a 
theoretical nature and based on laboratory experiments rather than on 
studies of the genetical and cytological characteristics of wild 
populations. And, as a result, their studies underemphasised the 
importance of factors like the high variability of natural populations, 
gene interaction and recombination (Mayr 1973: 126). The second phase 
of the grand synthesis was concerned with assimilating the quantitative 
and experimental data of theoretical population genetics with data on 
natural populations. But this step was not ta.ken until after 1935. 
However, in retrospect, this second phase in the emergence of the 
synthetic model of evolution can be seen to have had.its intellectual 
roots in the work of Russian biologists which was done prior to 1930. 
3. These difficulties stem from the different evolutionary interpretations 
of Haldane, Fisher and Wright. Fisher emphasised the effect of small 
selection pressures acting over long periods of time. Wright and 
later workers such as Mather emphasised the importance of genie inter-
action. For a discussion of the writings of Fisher, HaJ.dane and 
Wright, see Provine (1971: 130-178). 
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The most important of these Russian biologists was S.S. Chetverikov 
(1880-1959) who, with his students N.P. Dubinin, N.V. Timofeev-Resovsky 
and T. Dobzhansky, was employed in the genetics section of the Institute 
of Experimental Biology in Moscow.4 Chetverikov was an entomological 
taxonomist by training, who only turned later in his life to an interest 
in biometry, genetics and the theory of evolution. From 1922 to 1929 he 
and his co-workers began a series of experiments on the genetics of wild 
populations of Drosophila. These workers stressed, as Nilsson-Ehle had 
done with his research on maize, the enormous importance of genetic or 
"hidden" variability in wild populations due to the presence of recessive 
alleles. Chetverikov correctly concluded that this must be an important 
source of variability on which selection could operate. The Chetverikov 
school also stressed the importance of gene-interaction in producing 
phenotypic variation and the phenomena of the "genotypic milieu". 
Underlying this research on the biometry and genetics of Drosophila were 
a number of crucial assumptions drawn from the writings of "naturalist" 
orientated zoologists such as Karl Jordan and John T. Gulick.5 In 
particular Chetverikov assumed. that zoological species were real entities 
which could be defined in terms of capacity to interbreed successfully 
and produce fertile offspring, and he stressed also the role of isolation 
in speciation. 
The evolutionary thinking of Chetverikov, Dubinin and Dobzhansky 
achieved the basis for an integration of experimentalist and naturalist-
orientated studies focused on wild populations of animals and plants. 
In the West the work of Dobzhansky, who had emigrated to the U.S. in 1927, 
became particularly closely associated with this synthetic approach. It 
was a view which at first was more closely allied with zoology than botany: 
Mayr, Simpson and Huxley were all zoological systematists by training. 
4. The contributions of Chetverikov and the Russian school to population 
genetics is discussed at length in Adams (1968, 1970). It is from this 
source that the present account is taken. 
5. This is most evident in Chetverikov's concept of speciation. He held 
that the creation of new species was independent of adaptation. 
Speciation was to be explained in terms of isolation; subsequent 
adaptations in terms of natural selection. This theory of speciation, 
which entails the formation of new species without selection, Adams 
(1970: 110-112) attributes to the influence of Gulick. 
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However, in the long run, as Stebbins work showed, it was a perspective 
applicable to both animal and plant populations. The picture which 
finally emerged was an evolutionary model of speciation which emphasised 
the role of mutation, recombination, isolation and natural selection 
acting together to produce new species. And the task of assessing the 
importance of each of these forces in any one instance was seen as 
involving, of necessity, a combination of approaches centred on the 
techniques of systematics, bio-geography, genetics, cytology and 
mathematics. 
The significance of the synthetic model of evolution for systematists 
was that it provided a new and expanded role for taxonomic enquiry. 
Taxonomy of the new experimental kind was a central pillar in the new 
synthesis of genetics, evolution and ecology. The proponents of the 
"new systematics" were anxious to dispel the negative image of taxonomy 
held by most laboratory investigators. Mayr (1942: 3) spoke with regret 
of the contempt of the laboratory worker for the museum man who spends 
his time counting hairs or drawing bristles. But the systematist in 
turn would have to see his work in a new light: 
(T)he new systematist tends to approach his material more as a 
biologist and less as a museum cataloguer. He shows a deeper 
interest in the formulation of generalizations, he attempts to 
synthesize and to consider the describing and naming of a 
species only as a preliminary step in a far-reaching investigation. 
(Mayr 1942: 7). 
For Mayr concern should be focused on classification of sub-
divisions within the species. The population is the basic unit of 
taxonomy. The purely morphological species concept is replaced by a 
biological definition; "species are groups of actually or potentially 
interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated 
from other such groups" (Mayr 1942: 120). Nomenclature is no longer 
to be a central concern for the taxonomist and the material the systematist 
studies will have to be sufficient to take account of individual variation 
within the species (Ma~r 1942: 7). The new sys.tematist wants to know 
how species originate and how they are related; for him systematics 
is more than the 'lnere pigeonholing of specimens" (Mayr 1942: 9). 
And this course of action was recommended as the obvious way to save 
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taxonomy from the status of neglect, obscurity and disrepute into 
which it had fallen compared with the new, more experimental, disciplines 
of biology. 
These writings supported many of the criticisms which experimental 
taxonomists had been making about orthodox taxonomy during the previous 
two decades. Experimental taxonomists in the 1930's and 40's were quick 
to take up the challenge offered by the "new systematics" which they 
themselves had in part helped to formulate. Also, the success of the 
neo-Darwinists such as Dobzhansky, Mayr and others was a triumph for 
the evolutionary views pioneered by Turesson in the 1920 1s. The 
influence of Turesson's work was nowhere more apparent that in the 
large-scale transplant experiments carried out by Jens Clausen and his 
colleagues in California. Indeed, Clausen's work represents the most 
thorough and complete research on genecological differentiation which has 
ever been undertaken. It is therefore necessary that any account of 
experimental taxonomy during the 1930's and 40's should begin with an 
account of this research. 
Jens Clausen and the Second American School of Experimental Taxonom.y 
Jens Clausen was born at Eskilstrup, Denmark in 1891. EElucated at 
the University of Copenhagen from which he obtained a Ph.D. in 1926, 
Clausen was for ten years (1921-1931) an assistant to the Danish 
cytologist and geneticist tljvind Winge at the Department of Genetics 
of the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural High School in Copenhagen. 
In 1931 he emigrated to the U.S., where he joined Harvey Monroe Hall's 
team at Stanford, working under the patronage of the Carnegie Institute 
of Washington. After Hall's death in 1932 Clausen was put in charge of 
a special section for experimental taxonomy and in 1951 he was appointed 
professor biology at Stanford University. Clausen became a naturalized 
U.S. citizen in 1943. He died in 1969, at the age of 78. 6 
The discussion of Clausen's work which follows is divided into two 
parts. Part one considers the work which Clausen did prior to his 
emigration to the U.S. in 1931. This is followed by a discussion of 
the research, mostly done in conjunction with David Keck and William 
6. These biographical details of Clausen's life are taken from an obituary 
by :s8cher (1970). 
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Hiesey, undertaken in California. 
Clausen's contribution to experimental taxonomy prior to 1931 
consisted of a series of papers concerned with the cytology, genetics, 
ecology and taxonomy of Viola tricolor and its related species. The 
cytogenetics of this group is complicated, chiefly because populations 
of Viola tricolor and Viola arvensis tend to hybridize where their 
respective geographical ranges overlap. An indication of the diverse 
interests which Clausen was concerned with in his research can be seen 
from the first of the papers on Viola in which Clausen defined the 
principle objectives of his research as comprising: 
1. Decomposition of the species into elementary species; 
2. The relationship to other species of the Melanium section 
of the genus Viola; 
3. Cytological investigations, and 
4. The problem of heredity. 
(Clausen 1921: 205). 
Clausen's early work had affinities with the early work of Tu.resson. 
Clausen was convinced that genetical data must be employed in taxonomy; 
he referred in the 1921 paper to "the chaotic state, that would be the 
result, if we persisted in applying the old Linnaean definition of the 
species in this Mendelian age of ours" (Clausen 1921: 213). Like 
Tu.resson, Clausen made a strong distinction between variation which was 
due to heredity and that which was due solely to the action of the 
environment, although he employed a different terminology to mark the 
distinction.7 .And Clausen, like Tu.resson, specifically rejected 
Lamarckian explanations of the relationship between environment and 
speciation; new types are selected and not created by the environment 
(Clausen 1922: 407-410). 
Like other experimental biologists writing during the 1920's on 
matters of concern to systematics, Clausen was highly critical of what 
could be achieved by the traditional methods of orthodox taxonomy. In 
a 1922 paper on Viola Clausen concluded that: 
7. In the 1921 paper Clausen refers to genetic strains within a species 
as "micro-species". 
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The splitting up of the Linnaean species ••• has frequently been 
based upon accidental observations of deviating individuals which 
are described, instead of trying to make a perspicuous classification 
of the ty:pes within the species based upon studies in the extent 
and the cause of the variation and other questions in connection 
herewith. In many cases this result is due to the fact that these 
systematists either do not accept the consequences of, or are not 
fully familiar with all the results of modern biology-. The 
systematist's investigations are so difficult that it is needful 
that he uses all the resources at his disposal. At the investigation 
of the small systematic units within the single Linnaean species he 
cannot be content with employing the old methods alone, which suited 
the classification of the Linnaean species themselves long ag;o. 
(Clausen 1922: 397) 
And Cbmsen was especially contemptuous of results in groups like Viola 
and Hieracium where hybridization is a common phenomena. 
Clausen's early views on traditional methods of taxonomy are also 
reflected in his writings on the species problem during this period (see 
Clausen 1927). Clausen was not a firm advocate of the biological or 
genetic species concept. His research on Viola had shown that species 
could produce fertile offspring but still have different chromosome 
numbers and remain distinctive over most of their geographical range. 
Indeed, he conceded that the delimitation of species was, partly at 
least, a matter of convenience rather than of biological necessity. 
But, he argued, it was precisely because there was room for personal 
judgment in critical cases that the taxonomist must rely on investigations 
drawn from as many different fields of enquiry and research as possible: 
The frequent establishment of species of doubtful value is very 
largely due to their being based principally upon herbarium 
studies. The specimens of the herbaria represent but a small 
selection from the abundance of nature. It is very easy to keep 
a few so-called species or varieties separate as long as one is 
working only with herbarium specimens; but the units of 
classification thus established are of no use whatever in the 
field, as has already been pointed out by Hall and Clements. 
Nature is infinitely richer than the herbarium would seem to show. 
(Clausen 1927: 706). 
One question which Clausen tried to answer concerning the Viola 
tricolor-arvensis complex was whether there existed in this group 
intraspecific variation which could be explained as a genetical response 
to different ecological habitats. Clausen's conclusion, based upon both 
morphological data and on transplantation of plants into a standard 
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habitat, was that such genecological variation could be found in this 
group (Clausen 1922: 407). However, most of Clausen's research on 
ecological races within the Linnaean species was undertaken after his 
move to California in 1931. 
As was shown in Chapter 4 the experiments in California had been 
started by Hall and his co-workers, Keck and Hiesey, in 1922, in an 
attempt to study elements of the Californian flora by the same methods 
that Hall and Clements had used previously during studies at Pikes Peak 
in Colorado between 1918 and 1921. However, by 1931 Hall had become 
convinced that Clements' theories of adaptation and ecogenesis could not 
account for the results which were being obtained in California and 
that the environment was selecting types rather than directly influencing 
changes in the populations of plants under study. Clausen' s work 
confirmed this view and showed that non-inheritable modifications to the 
plant's phenotype due to environmental transplanting were usually of a 
minor order, and of a temporary nature, being reversible if the plant 
was returned to its old habitat. No evidence was found of environmental 
factors inducing yearly cumulative effects upon the growth of perennial 
transplants (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1935: 201). 
The objectives of this research remained two-fold (Clausen, Keck 
and Hiesey 1932: 201): to make a contribution towards "a rational and 
complete classification" of the plant taxa studied and to further an 
understanding of the processes operative in the development of these 
taxa. There is no evidence that Clausen or his colleagues saw any 
incompatibility in these two aims; they were complementary aspects of 
the new discipline of experimental taxonomy. 
The methods used to achieve these two ends were diverse. In the 
first of their classic series of papers Clausen and his co-workers 
(Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1932: 202) listed their methods under six 
headings: 1. Field studies (of geographical distribution, habitat 
preferences etc.); 2. Experimental transplants; 3. Comparative 
morphological studies using herbarium and living material; 4. Cytological 
and anatomical studies; 5. Genetical analysis, i.e. artificial 
hybridization and breeding tests; 6. Synthesis of these results. 
The Californian team was in a good position to carry out such.studies 
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because there was a division of labour within the group: Clausen's 
background was in cytology and genetics; Keck was a taxonomist; Hiesey 
an ecologist and physiologist. This diversity of approaches was 
reflected in the principle, enunciated many times by Clausen and his 
co-workers, that problems of plant evolution and systematics required 
understanding from a plurality of perspectives if success was to be 
achieved in their solution: 
Genetics and cytology are not the ends but auxiliary 
disciplines, being subordinated to the study of relationships 
and evolution of the systematic units of plants. Likewise 
morphology, plant goegraphy and ecology are brought into 
harmony with the present day cytogeneticaJ. principles, based 
upon them and correlated one to the other. It was felt that 
the key to an understanding of relationship and evolution 
was to be found not in any single one of these principles but 
in all of them together. 
( Cla..ctsen, Keck and Hiesey 1936: 209). 
The major type of transplantation technique used by Clausen and 
his group was of the kind known as "clone transplanting" (Clausen, 
Keck and Hiesey 1940: 16-18). In this method the plant chosen for 
experiment was dug up, given an experimentaJ. number, and a sample of 
it taken as an herbarium specimen. The plant was then propagated 
vegetatively and each propagu.le, when ready, used in the actuaJ. trans-
plant gardens. Although Clausen and his co-workers sometimes cultivated 
population samples side-by-side in a standard garden as well, this was 
not the major method employed (cf. Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1940: 4). 
The use of clone transplants had severaJ. advantages over the standard 
cultivation technique which Turesson had employed. The most important 
deficiency in the latter method is that in eliminating environmentaJ.ly 
imposed variation it may obscure geneticaJ.ly determined differences in 
the capacity to react adaptatively to speciaJ. environments. Also, the 
test environment, while suppressing some environmentaJ.ly induced 
characteristics, may evoke others never expressed in the naturaJ. habitat. 
Clone transplanting overcomes these deficiencies in the standard garden 
transplant technique. 
The transplant experiments of Clausen's group were undertaken on a 
scale which has ne~er been repeated. The· basic transect line used 
stretched across nearly 200 miles of centraJ. .CaJ.ifornia. Along this 
transect line three major gardens were established at 100 ft. (Stanford), 
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4,600 ft. (Mather) and 10,000 ft. (Timberline). A relief map showing 
these locations and the transect on which they were situated is shown 
in figure 5.1. These three transplant stations covered a wide range 
of climatic conditions. At Stanford near the Pacific coast the weather 
is mild and conditions are favourable for plant growth over most of the 
year. At Timberline there are normally only three to six weeks of 
frost-free weather in the summer during which plant growth is possible. 
At Mather conditions are intermediate between these two extremes. In 
addition to the wide range of climatic differences at these three 
locations Clausen and his team also set up gardens to test the effects 
of moisture, shade and slope exposure. The details of these garden 
plans are shown in figure 5.2. In studying the reaction of plants to 
transplantation into one or other of these habitats three measurements 
were deemed to be especially critical (cf. Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 
1940: 57). These were: measurement of the longest stem (which gave 
a rough measurement of the plants vigour), the number of flowering stems 
(which gave a rough indicator of the plant's reproductive vigour) and 
the date of appearance of the ~irst flower (which indicated how quickly 
the plant had been able to come into season and hence its physiological 
tempo). 
The results of these studies were broadly to confirm the insights 
which had been made in Turesson's work of the 1920's. The species which 
extended across considerable portions of the transect were found to 
consist of a series of climatic "races" or "ecoty:pes" each restricted 
to certain ecological zones on the transect, resulting in a series of 
more-or-less discontinuous ecoty:pes with (normally) characteristic 
morphology. And, in accounting for this variation, Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey used the genecological terminology that had been developed by 
Tu.reason, applying this terminology in only a slightly modified way (see 
later). However, the cytological and genetical data which Clausen and 
his co-workers also gathered on each of the plant groups which they 
studied allowed a much fuller interpretation of the evolution and 
phylogeny in these groups to be built up than had been possible for 
the plants which Tu.reason studied. The nature of these results and 
the manner in which they were colla.ted with the data gained from transplant 
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Example 1. Potentilla glandulasa and its allies (Clausen, Keck 
and Hiesey 1940: 25-124). 
In Rydberg's (1908) analysis of this complex he had assigned the 
North American material into no less than 28 species. Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey treated the North American material as composed of three species: 
P. arguta Pursh, P. fissa Nutt. and P. glandulosa Lindl. Transplant 
experiments showed that P. glandulosa in California could be subdivided 
into four regional ecotypes. One of these was a coastal race, previously 
recognised as P. glandulosa ssp. typica. Another, previously recognised 
as subspecies reflexa, was a mid-altitude ecotype found growing in the 
foothills of the Sierra Nevada mountains. The last two ecotypes, one 
sub-alpine and the other alpine had been lumped together in previous 
taxonomic treatments as P. glandulosa ssp. nevadensis. These four 
ecotypes were all distinguishable on the basis of external morphology, 
although the morphological differences were not sufficient, in Clausen's 
opinion, to warrant taxonomic recognition as separate species. 
Cytological examinations revealed that all of these taxa were 
nearly identical in their chromosome morphology and that they all shared 
the same chromosome number (n = 7). Studies of hybrid populations where 
the geographical ranges of arguta, fissa and glandulosa overlapped showed 
that these groups could successfully exchange genes, although hybrid 
populations were, in fact, only rarely encountered. On the basis of 
this evidence Clausen, Keck and Hiesey were able to conclude that 
Potentilla glandulosa and its allies consisted of three ecospecies 
(glandulosa, fissa and arguta) which were themselves members of a single 
coenospecies (arguta) and which in turn could be divided into an 
indefinite number of ecotypes, of which at least four occurred in the 
Californian flora. 
Example 2. The genus Zauschneria (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1940: 
213-259). 
North American species of Zauschneria had long been a problem group 
for taxonomists because of the apparent intergrading in certain areas 
of forms morphologically distinct elsewhere. Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 
recognised four species in this group: Z. cana Greene, Z. garrettii A. 
Nels., Z. septentrionalis Keck and Z. californica Presl. One of these~ --
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Z. septentrionalis, was a previously underscribed species. 
Transplant experiments revealed Z. cana, Z. ga.rrettii and 
Z. septentrionalis to be monotypic, i.e. composed of a single ecotype. 
However, Z. californica, the most widespread and variable of the four 
species, was found to contain three ecotypes - all given subspecific 
status as Z. californica ssp. angustifolia, Z. californica ssp. latifolia, 
and Z. californica ssp. typica respectively. 
Cytological data showed that Z. cana, Z. septentrionalis and 
Z. garrettii were all diploid (2x = 30). Z. californica, however, was 
tetraploid (4x = 60). 
By means of crossing experiments Clausen and his group were able 
to demonstrate that exchange of genes between diploids and tetraploids 
was a rare but possible event (see figure 5.3). Crossing between the 
three subspecies of californica was relatively unproblematic, confirming 
their status as ecotypes of a single ecospecies. 
The morphological, ecological, cytological and genetical data, 
when combined, also suggested a probable phylogenetic history of the 
group. Thus Z. californica angu.stifolia appeared to be an autotetraploid 
of Z. cana. Similarly, Z. californica latifolia appeared to be an 
autotetraploid derived by a doubling of the chromosome number of Z. septen-
trionalis. It also seemed likely that these two autotentraploids then 
hybridized to form the third tetraploid, z. californica typica, which is 
intermediate between angu.stifolia and latifolia both with regards to its 
ecological habitat and morphology. This probable phylogenetic history 
of the group is shown in figure 5.4. · 
Clausen and his co-workers treated this group as comprised of a 
single coenospecies composed of four ecospecies and six ecotypes. This 
treatment, they felt, accorded best with the cytological and genetical 
data they had gathered, although from a phylogenetic point of view, it 
meant that Z. californica is a "polytypic" species, that is, it had 
originated from two separate tetraploid populations (themselves derived 
from separate diploid ancestors) which later became united by hybridization. 
Example 3. Madia nutans (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1945: 4-6; 
Keck 1935). 
Madia and Layia are two genera in the Compositae. M. nuta.ns was 
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a species which all previous taxonomists had referred to the genus Layia. 
However, Clausen's group showed that nuta.ns had nine pairs of chromosomes, 
a number not shared with the Layias which have n = 7, 8 or 16, but a 
number which was found in one species of Madia (M. haJ.lii). More 
importantly, crossing data showed nutans to be unable to exchange genes 
with any species of Layia, but that it could be crossed with at least 
five species of Madia. On the basis of this evidence Clausen and his 
colleagues decided that nutans was a member of the genus Madia, not, 
as had been the previous treatment based only on morphological 
considerations, a member of the genus Layia. 8 
With these examples in mind we can now reconsider the significance 
to experimental taxonomy and evolutionary theory of the work which 
Clausen and his co-workers were producing in the 1930's and 40's. 
Three points deserve special attention. To begin with, as is 
evident from these examples, and indeed from the rest of Clausen 1 s work, 
micro-evolutionary processes of speciation in angiosperms are exceedingly 
complex. Indeed, Clausen maintained that their complexity was far 
greater than could ever be discovered from simple laboratory experiments 
in genetics (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1942: 187). Hybridization, 
polyploidy, recombination, linkage, isolation, selection and mutation all 
operate in complex ways to bring about the existence of new species. The 
discovery of the role which polyploidy could play in plant speciation was 
an especially important element in the writings of Clausen's school, for, 
although the basic nature of polyploidy in plants had already been 
investigated some two decades earlier by Winge (see Winge 1917 and also 
Sturtevant 1966: 112-113), Clausen 9 s group was the first to assimilate 
such data into the framework of experimental taxonomy. A second 
complexity revealed in Clausen's work was that most characters expressed 
in natural populations were not controlled by a single gene obeying strict 
Mendelian ratios. Rather, most characters investigated were clearly 
controlled by many genes at different loci and hence "polygenic". 
Thirdly, Clausen's work well illustrated the vast reserves of variation 
hidden in any local population of plants and manifested only in special 
habitats. Ecotypes, Clausen once maintained, are "nature's big banking 
8. The main morphological character used to separate the genera Layia and 
Madia concerns the ray akenes which are of an intermediate shape in 
Madia nutans, providing further evidence for its questionable status. 
- 134 -
account, its reservoir against possible disasters" (Clausen 1968: 423). 
The second aspect of Clausen's work which emerges from the Potentilla, 
Zauschneria and Madia examples is their dependence on Turesson's concepts 
of the ecotype, ecospecies and coenospecies. With regard to the higher 
units of this hierarchy, Clausen, following the lead given in Turesson's 
later work, defined units in genetical terms (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 
1945: 62-69). Thus for Clausen two populations of plants which are only 
capable of a limited exchange of genes are members of different ecospecies. 
Populations entirely unable to exchange genes and produce fertile offspring 
with one another are members of different coenospecies. However, such 
groups may still be able to cross and produce sterile hybrids. Where 
even this is not possible the populations are members of a different 
comparium. Of ecotypes Clausen, again following Turesson, held that 
ecotypes within a given ecospecies are potentially capable of gene-
exchange, although for physiological and ecological reasons they will 
often rarely do so in natural populations. Thus, Clausen, like 
Turesson, saw ecological variation within the species as discontinuous 
in nature; it is only at relatively rare points of contact between 
ecotypes that this discontinuity of form will be masked. And Clausen 
believed that the concept of linkage could provide a further explanation 
of why this discontinuous pattern of intraspecific variation was found 
in so many groups. In addition to physiological, geographical and 
ecological barriers, ecotypes differ so diversely genetically that hybrids 
between ecotypes will be often ill matched. This emphasis on the 
distinctiveness of intraspecific ecological groupings was to come under 
increasing attack after 1935. 
Thirdly, although Clausen's group used Turesson's genecological 
system to describe their results, they did not see genecological 
categories as a replacement of the orthodox Linnaean system. Indeed, 
even although Clausen and his colleagues sometimes discovered cases 
where genetical and cytological data suggested a taxonomic revision, 
e.g. as in the case of ''Layia" nutans, they were actually prone to 
defend where possible the value of a purely morphological classification: 
It might be convenient and also correct to maintain a merely 
theoretical conception of species together with one for the 
practical taxonomy based upon easily observable and safe 
morphological characters. 
(Clausen 1931: 303) 
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(F)or practical reasons two or more ecospecies that have no 
morphological characters to distinguish them may be treated 
as one taxonomic species. 
(Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1939: 106) 
-
Further, Clausen and his co-workers also held to the view that the 
experimental classifications of plant taxa would be "usually found 
to correspond fairly closely to taxonomic units based on careful 
morphological anddistributional studies" (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 
1945: 66-67). 
Thus in their later writings Clausen's school expressed a view of 
experimental taxonomy and its relations to orthodox taxonomy which was 
wholly different to the views found in the earlier writings of Hall, 
Clements, Tu.resson and Cockayne. Experimental techniques and results 
were no longer seen as replacing those of orthodox taxonomy; instead 
the emphasis is on the need for mutual cooperation and synthesis. 
Cooperation and synthesis, rather than competition and replacement, 
are stressed in this new approach. The need to maintain a plurality 
of methods was linked to this research strategy: 
Evidence of relationship should, therefore, not be sought 
along either morphological, ecological, genetical or cytological 
lines alone, but through the employment of all four criteria 
considered together. (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1941: 167) 
(A) system built one-sidedly on either genetics or cytology is 
just as unbalanced as one founded on morphology alone. 
(Clausen 1949: 195) 
A feature of this new approach based upon mutual cooperation between 
the two disciplines was that it required a rhetoric which did not devalue 
the skills and aims of traditional taxonomists. That Clausen was less 
critical of orthodox taxonomy than most other experimental taxonomists 
is clear from his own writings. The point also emerges in the writings 
of other members of Clausen's team, particularly the group's senior 
taxonomist, D.D. Keck. In 1959 Keck was asked to write a review article 
on the future of plant taxonomy for the journal Zoological Systematist. 
As one might expect of a man who for many years had been a colleague and 
co-author of Jens Clausen, Keck was enthusiastic about ~he future of 
experimental methods in taxonomy: 
- 136 -
I have the feeling that the experimental methods will have 
a much greater impact on plant taxonomy in the next 50 years 
than they have had in the last 200. 
(Keck 1959: 76) 
But Keck was also careful not to devalue the need for non-experimental 
studies in plant taxonomy as well. The older herbariu.m taxonomy will 
continue to exist side-by-side with the new approach: 
Biologically ••• old mother earth has quite a few of her 
secrets left ••• (W)e have not half finished our inventory 
of the kinds of life growing on her ••• Just straight 
inventory work here, without the frills of a fancy 
methodology, is going to keep a lot of biologists busy 
for a long time. 
(Keck 1959: 76-77) 
The diverse methods employed by Clausen and Keck in their work 
resulted in a way of classifying species which is diametrically opposed 
to the way in which Putnam claims that scientists should (or do?) employ 
natural kind terms. According to Putnam the scientists seeks out hidden 
relationships, or essences, which then serve as the criteria for 
demarcating natural kinds, ·i. e. they act as "cross-world relationships". 
However, Clausen denied that any single property of a plant population, 
either in its morphology, chromosome number or genetic behaviour, could 
be employed in this fashion. In practice Clausen and Keck, wherever 
possible, used morphological features to demarcate plant species. But 
they did not do this because they believed that external morphology 
provided the most "essential" or "basic" properties of a species. 
Rather, their concerns were purely pragmatic and practical ones. In 
cases where phylogenetic, genetical and morphological markers lead to 
different "species" being found in nature then "the classification 
should preferably be practical" (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey: 1945: 43). 
The use of many diverse properties of plants, cytological, genetical 
and morphological in demarcating species suggests that a model of 
classification like Searle's "cluster theory model" might be applicable 
in this instance. However, again it can be seen that this is not the 
case. Clausen and Keck did not give equal weighting to cytological, 
genetical and morphological data in producing their classifications. 
Rather they weighted some properties more than others. Whenever possible 
genetical data was given the greatest weighting, e.g. as in the Madia 
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nutans example discussed above. However, where genetical evidence 
conflicted very strongly with morphological treatment, i.e. where a 
genetical demarcation of the group would make the two "species" 
concerned impossible to identify in the herbariu.m by means of morphological 
markers alone, then it was morphological characters which determined 
the final classification adopted. But, and this is the important point, 
in both cases the decisions which were made reflected practical concerns 
and instrumental interests. Concerns of this nature have to be under-
stood by examining the usage of predicate terms in the practical contexts 
in which such predicates are used and developed. Logic alone, either of 
the Putnam "hidden essence" kind or the Searlian "descriptive association" 
kind is not a reliable guide to predicate usage. Language (and, by 
implication, knowledge) is a social phenomenon and its development 
cannot be captured in the abstract principles of symbolic logic or in 
the all pervading influences of some mysterious "hidden reality" which 
lies somehow beyond and outside the boundaries of human interests and 
cognition. Any model of classification which does not take into account 
the conventional and pragmatic nature of systems of classification is 
doomed to failure, if it is claimed to be naturalistic account of the 
actual nature of classification. 
Other American Schools of Biosystematics, 1930-1950 
Although not engaged directly in transplanting experiments or 
genecology, there were a number of other research schools in the U.S. in 
the 1930's and 40's which were actively involved in research that could 
be termed "biosystematic". Most of these researches were concerned with 
studies in genetics and cytology in their own right, but also yielded data 
which was of significance for the taxonomy of the groups being studied. 
A good illustration of this kind of work was the detailed 
investigations, carried out over a number of years, on the genus 
Crepis (Compositae) by E.B. Babcock and his associates at Berkeley. 
Ernest Brown Babcock was, from 1913 to 1947 a professor of genetics at 
the University of California at Berkeley and a leading figure in the 
American genetics community. His associates included a number of 
prominent cytologists and geneticists, of whom the most notable was 
George Ledyard Stebbins (1906- ), who succeeded Babcock as professor 
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of genetics when he retired in 1947. 
The work on Crepis was begun in 1919 with the intention of carrying 
out an "investigation of fundamental genetical principles through breed-
ing experiments, cytological work and taxonomic studies on various species 
of the genus" (Babcock, R.E. Clausen, Collins and Mann 1922: 3). In 
fact, it was hoped at this stage to use these plants to repeat the 
insights which had been gained into genetic mechanisms in Drosophila by 
T.H. Morgan and his Columbia school (Babcock 1920: 270). Crepis was 
considered an ideal genus for this kind of study. It is a large taxon 
(there are about 196 species in the U.S.), with a short life-cycle and, 
most importantly of all, few and large chromosomes which can be easily 
stained, counted and studied. The results of over twenty years of 
research on this genus was published in a number of separate papers 
(Babcock and Nava.shin 1930; Babcock and Stebbins 1937; Babcock and 
Stebbins 1937; Babcock 1942, 1944), and in a two-part monograph 
(Babcock 1947). Two aspects of this research may be considered 
separately: its significance from the standpoint of genetics and 
evolution, and its significance for experimental taxonomy.or biosystematics. 
The evolutionary picture which emerged of the genus Crepis was one 
which confirmed in its broad outlines the research being done both by 
Morgan's school at Columbia and Clausen's researchers at Stanford. 
Adapatation through gene mutation and the action of natural selection 
was found to be the major process of evolution at work in this group 
(Babcock 1944). Polyploidy was rare in this genus but, from a combination 
of cytological and taxonomical studies, Babcock and his associates were 
able to show that evolution in Crepis was linked with a progressive 
decrease in chromosome numbers. The most primitive members of the genus 
have a chromosome number of n = 12, the most advanced n = 6, with n = 8 
and n = 10 as intermediate numbers. Further, the relatively small 
number of chromosomes involved and their large size allowed changes in 
chromosome number and morphology to be studied in detail. 
There was considerable contact between the Stanford and Berkeley 
groups. Clausen, while still in Copenhagen, had spent a summer in 
Berkeley working on Crepis cytogentics. The product of that research 
was a joint paper with Babcock (Babcock and Clausen 1929) concerned with 
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irregularities of meiotic division in hybrids and species of the genus. 
" In addition, Babcock, in a letter to Gote Turesson written in 1935, 
mentioned monthly meetings between the Stanford and Berkeley groups.9 
When the monograph on Crepis was finally published in 1947, it was Jens 
Clausen who provided a generally enthusiastic review of the work in the 
newly established journal Evolution (Clausen 1949). 
In their taxonomic treatment of the genus Babcock and his co-workers 
made an attempt to synthesise the old and new taxonomy. For Babcock (1947: 
i, 31) a "truly scientific taxonomy" must rest upon the "broadest possible 
foundation". In their work on Crepis Babcock's group made some drastic 
revisions to the then current taxonomic conceptions about the genus, 
including the expulsion of some of the species to a separate genus Youngia 
(see Babcock and Stebbins1937). However, following orthodox taxonomic 
practice, Babcock and his co-workers insisted that comparative morphology 
must continue to provide the bulk of the evidence used for systematic 
treatment and revision. Experimental evidence could suggest where 
morphological discontinuity might be looked for, and, wherever possible, 
the taxonomic treatment of the group was made to coincide with genetical 
and evolutionary knowledge about the species concerned. But, where 
experimental and morphological data were contradictory, then it was the 
latter which were used to provide the evidence on which the group's 
classification was made. Clausen felt that Babcock went too far in this 
direction and undervalued the significance for classification of 
experimental data. In his review of the monograph on Crepis he argued 
that Babcock's experimental work had influenced his treatment of the 
group's taxonomy to a greater extent than had been claimed (Clausen 
1949: 186). 
A second important figure in American genetical taxonomic research 
during the 1930's was Edgar Anderson (1896- ), a botanist at the 
Missouri Botanical Garden, St. Louis. During the late 20's and 30's 
Anderson published a number of short monographs on Tradescantia 
(Anderson and Sax 1936; Anderson 1936a), Apocynum (Anderson 1936b), and 
Iris (Anderson 1928, 1936c). The aim of these studies was to examine 
the genera concerned "from the diverse viewpoints of genetics, taxonomy 
9. E.B. Babcock M.S., letter (9 December 1935, Turesson archives, 
Lund University library. 
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cytology and biometry", and in this way to shed light on the general 
problem of what constitutes a species and its manner of evolution 
(Anderson 1936c: 457). A distinctive feature of Anderson's work was 
his interest in mathematical and statistical studies of variation. He 
was responsible, with the English botanist W.B. Turrill, for efforts to 
persuade herbarium workers to collect specimens in such a way as to 
permit biometrical studies on the samples. 10 However, Anderson's 
major contribution to biosystematical studies and techniques was his 
work on hybrid indexes and his discovery of the phenomenon if intro-
gression (Anderson and Hubrich 1938; Anderson 1949, 1953). 
Introgressive hybridization (or introgression) is the gradual 
infiltration of genes from one species into another. It occurs when 
hybrids of two different species back-cross over a number of generations 
into one or other of the parental species populations. This process is 
illustrated in figure 5.5. Its significance in evolutionary terms is 
that it .increases the variability of populations and leads to the 
formation of new gene combinations upon which selection can operate. 
The result is a hybrid swarm, i. e. a population of plants with high 
variability ranging from, on one extreme, plants which are typical or 
nearly typical of pure populations of one of the parental species to 
plants, on the other extreme, which are typical or nearly typical of 
the second parent. In between will be all shades of intermediate 
forms whose nature will be determined by the degree of introgression 
which has taken place. 
The hybrid index was an analytic~l tool devised to deal with such 
hybrid swarms. By this technique characters typical of one parent 
were scored as O, characters typical of the other parent scored as 2, 
and intermediate characters scored as 1. The result when a hybrid 
swarm is analysed in this fashion is a frequency distribution on which 
the hybrids given low scores represent pure or nearly pure members of 
one parental species and hybrids with high scores represent comparatively 
pure individuals of the second parent (see figure 5.6). · Such hybrid 
10e1 The idea put forward was that herbarium taxonomists should collect 
sizeable numbers of parts of a plant, all specimens being taken 
from a single local population. This would allow biometrical 
studies of the material (Anderson and Turrill 1935; Anderson 1941). 
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indexes, together with pictorial scatter diagrams, were the major 
techniques Anderson employed to study introgression. 11 
The whole question of hybridization in evolution had great 
significance for taxonomists because it re-opened the problematic 
question of how hybrids should be treated for taxonomic purposes. The 
passion with which this topic was debated is well shown by the fierce 
controversy which raged in the journal Chronica Botanica between 1939 
and 1941. 12 
The starting point of this controversy was an article by the Dutch 
taxonomist H. Uittien (1939) entitled "Reflections on the Nomenclature 
of so-called Hybrids". Uittien's proposals were two-fold; firstly, 
that hybrids should not receive taxonomic recognition and secondly, 
that it was undesirable that genetical and cytological data should be 
introduced into taxonomy. Uittien's view was that taxonomy should be 
concerned not with evolution but with the products of evolution, and 
that it should be based upon morphology and not parentage. The taxonomist 
is concerned with the characters of plants, not with their origin. 
Uittien's position was strongly criticised by the American taxonomist 
F.R. Fosberg (1939). In his reply to Uittien, Fosberg claimed that 
hybrids must receive taxonomic recognition and that to exclude phylogenetic 
considerations from taxonomy is to render impossible the achievement of 
a genuinely natural system of classification. Fosberg ended his 
critique of Uittien's paper by comparing the latter's position to that 
of "a well-known American taxonomist of the last century" who had 
not accepted the doctrine of evolution and who, when confronted with 
intermediate forms, consigned them to the dustbin on the grounds that 
they represented the work of the devil (Fosberg 1939: 398). 
11 • For an account of pictorial scatter diagrams and their role in 
detecting hybrid swarms see Davis and Heywood ( 1963: 476-479) 
12. It is interesting that the major protagonists in this debate were 
all taxonomists by profession rather than geneticists or cytologists. 
H. Uittien and C.E.B. Bremekamp were both herbarium taxonomists at 
Utrecht; F.R. Fosberg was a taxonomist at the University of 
Pennsylvania; W.B. Turrill and J.S.L. Gilmour were both at Kew 
Gardens, Richmond, Surrey. 
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However, Uittien's remarks received enthusiastic support from 
another Dutch botanist, C.E.B. Bremekamp (1939). Bremekamp argu.ed 
that hybrids should only be named if they are morphologically distinct 
from their parents and if they breed tru.e to form in subsequent 
generations. Also, if this is the case, Bremekamp maintained that 
these "hybrids" should be given normal binomial names just as would 
any other species. Like Uittien, Bremekamp was sceptical of the role 
which genetics could or should play in taxonomy: 
For the moment the attitude of the taxonomist towards the 
progress of genetic investigations should be that of an 
interested spectator, not more. If he engages himself 
in hybridization experiments, he should know that he leaves 
the domain of taxonomy. 
(Bremekamp 1939: 403) 
Fosberg's reply (1941) to Bremekamp was even more polemical than his 
original article attacking Uittien. In it he accused Bremekamp of 
trying to "seal off" taxonomy from the new approaches of genetics, 
evolution and phylogeny, and he described such an exercise (p. 396) 
as both "futile" and a "folly". He also claimed, on the basis of 
a personal survey conducted amongst American taxonomists, that the 
majority of them (about 75"/o) did not agree with the opinions of Uittien 
and Bremekamp. He ended his article with the conclusion that: 
My conception of taxonomy is that of a growing, dynamic 
science, making use of new information and methods as fast 
as they appear, not that of a hide-bound unprogressive, 
static discipline such as is usually referred to as 'closet' 
botany. (Fosberg 1941: 370) 
By 1941 the two British botanists J.S.L. Gilmour and W.B. Turrill 
had joined the debate. In an apparent attempt to pour oil on troubled 
waters Gilmour and Turrill (1941) suggested that, while Bremekamp was 
right in rejecting phylogeny as the basis for taxonomy, a classification 
based upon overall resemblances must use information drawn from as many 
sources as possible, including genetics and cytology. This position 
conflicted with the views expressed by both major protagonists in the 
controversy. In his reply to Gilmour and Turrill, Bremekamp (1942) 
repeated Uittien's earlier clciim that taxonomy must deal with the products 
of evolution and not with data concerning the hypothetical origin of 
such units. Fosberg, in his comments on Gilmour and Turrill's paper, 
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repeated his claim that for a classification to be worthwhile it mu.at 
reflect evolutionary descent. Thus, when the controversy ended in 
1942, no position of agreement had been reached. 
The final American taxonomist whose work will be discussed in this 
section is W.H. Camp. During the 1940's Camp was a botanist at the New 
York Botanical Garden. Originally trained as an orthodox taxonomist, 
Camp became an enthusiastic advocate of the new taxonomy and was the first 
biosystematist to become a President of the American Association of Plant 
Taxonomists. Indeed, it was Camp and his student C.L. Gilly who first 
used the term "biosystematy", later altered to become "biosystematics" 
(Camp and Gilly 1943). As initially conceived of by Camp and Gilly the 
objectives of biosystematy were "1. the delimitation of natural biotic 
units and 2. the application of these units to, a system· of nomenclature 
adequate to the task of conveying precise information regarding their 
defined limits, relationships, variability and dynamic structure" (Camp 
and Gilly 1943: 323). Thus the objectives of biosystematy were roughly 
the same as those of experimental taxonomy as defined by Hall and 
Clements and later by Clausen, Keck and Hiesey. 
The central feature of Camp's writings in biosystematics was the 
claim that the term "species" as utilised by classical taxonomy lacked 
any precise operation definition. In order to prove this point Camp 
(1951) asked three herbarium taxonomists to classify the same set of 
herbarium samples into their component species. 13 The plant genus 
chosen for this "experiment" was North American material of the genus 
Rubus (blackberry), a group in which it is notoriously difficult to 
delineate species because its reporduction is partially apomictic. In 
dealing with this material, one taxonomist said that there were 381 
species, one said that there were 205 species and one taxonomist divided 
the material into just 24 species. Commenting on these results, Camp 
posed the question: 
Do these three leading exponents of classical taxonomy not 
know what a species is ••• Or is it that classical taxonomy 
lacks precise definitions of its terms? 
( Camp 19 51 : 118) 
13. The taxonomists were L.H. Bailey, M.L. Fernald and H.A. Gleason. 
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And he concluded that: 
The naked truth is that the basic working unit of classical, 
empiric taxonomy - 'the species' - is not, and never was, 
defined with sufficient biological soundness and precision 
to be called a science. It is an art. 
( Camp 19 .51 : 118) 
Camp's solution to the "species problem" was that the term "species" 
should be abandoned altogether. In orthodox taxonomy he recommended that 
the term should be replaced by the concept of the "binom", the latter 
being "a tentatively defined taxon, consisting of one or more specimens 
in a museum collection to which a binomial ha.S been attached, but of 
whose biogenic pattern we have no experimental information" (Camp 19.51: 
120). In bi~ystematics the term species should be replaced by a whole 
" battery of concepts designed to illuminate, from a genetical and 
evolutionary perspective, the different kinds of plant populations which 
were formerly referred to as species. (This positive aspect of Camp and 
Gilly's work is looked at in more detail in a later section of this chapter). 
Underlying this attempt at nomenclature reform was the desire to 
modernise taxonomy and make its system of classification relevant to the 
needs of geneticists, cytologists and students of evolution. As Camp 
forcefully stated in an earlier paper: 
The day of the taxonomist who putters alone in his herbarium with 
an other-worldly state is done. He must shed off his robe of 
academic classicism and seclusion, brush off the accumulated dust 
of the centuries, and come face to face with the dynamics of 
living populations. 
(Camp 1943: 342-343) 
The idea that plant classifications could and should reflect 
evolutionary, genetical and cytological lrnowledge about the taxa concerned 
was thus a prevalent notion in the writings of experimental taxonomists in 
the 1930's. However, by 193.5 evidence was beginning to accumulate 
within genecology which suggested that intraspecific variation was not 
of a kind which was amenable to systems of classification either of the 
orthodox or of the biosystematical and genecological kind. The chief 
exponents of this new approach within genecology were a group of Scottish 
botanists led by James Wylie Gregor (1900- ). It is the work of 
Gregor and this Scottish school of genecology that we shall examine next. 
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James W. Gregor and the Scottish School of Genecology 
James W. Gregor was born at Innerwick, Midlothian in 1900. :Educated 
at the University of F.dinburgh from which he obtained a Ph.D. in 1926, 
Gregor went on to become chief assistant (1926-1949) and later Director 
(1950-1965) of the Scottish Plant Breeding Station at Corstorphine, 
near F.dinburgh. 
Gregor had read the first of Turesson's papers in Hereditas and his 
interest in genecology stemmed from this. The doctoral dissertation 
(Gregor 1926), although primarily concerned with a study of the genetics 
of agricultural grasses with the aim of finding improved techniques in 
their breeding, incorporated a genecological perspective in its 
theoretical orientation. 
Gregor's earliest papers on genecology also concerned Graminaceous 
plants (Gregor and Sansome 1927, 1930; Gregor 1931). Much of this early 
research was done in conjunction with the cytologist F.W. Sansome, a 
student at the Plant Breeding Station who later moved to Glasgow University 
and then to the John Innes· Horticultural Institute at Merton in London. 
The aims of these early papers were, as the authors put it, "to elucidate 
the connection between genetics and ecology, a connection which until 
recently has not been made prominent" (Gregor and Sansome 1927: 349). 
By using the techniques of transplant anC3:lysis Gregor and Sansome were 
able to show that there existed definite habitat types within the species 
of the grasses being studied and that the variation between them was 
inherited. In applying a classificatory scheme to these findings Gregor 
employed the ecotype-ecospecies terminology of Tu.reason who was praised 
for bringing into being "a constructive attempt to place the groupings 
of organisms on a more natural basis" (Gregor 1931: 206). Indeed, 
Gregor's 1931 paper adds to the genecological terminology a new concept -
the "geo-ecotype" - used to denote units of ecotypic status, the 
distinctive characters of whic have arisen by chance geographical 
isolation, rather than under the forces of natural selection. 
However, it was not the studies on grasses which were to prove 
the most important work of Gregor and his colleagu.es. In the late 
1920's Gregor had also begun similar studies on the sea plantain 
(Plantago maritima L.). Planta.go maritima proved an excellent species 
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for study, with a circumpolar distribution, wide intraspecific variation 
and easily measurable growth characteristics. In a series of classicaJ. 
papers on the experimental taxonomy of this species published between 
1930 and 1942 Gregor and his co-workers set out to substantially alter 
the trends which had been prevalent in genecological research during 
the previous decade. The methods used to study P. maritima were the by 
now familiar ones - a combination of cytological research, studies of 
fertility and experimental transplants (Gregor, Davey and Lang 19 36: 
326). However, the results obtained indicated a significant departure 
from those obtained in previous genecological studies. 
The first indication of the unusual data being obtained on Plantago 
was contained in the 1936 paper where the authors reported that "in sea-
plantains discontinuous variations are few and have little importance ••• 
Many quantitative characters ••• vaxy continuously within the populations" 
(Gregor, Davey and Lang 1936: 347). However, the decisive break came in 
a 1939 paper, with Gregor as the sole named author, which summarised the 
results of the previous nine years of research on European and North 
American material of Plantago maritima. The starting point of Gregor's 
argument was that experimental. taxonomists must evolve their own systems 
of classification rather than employ the existing morphological. system: 
Until more is known of the specific and infra-specific 
categories of variation in the wild, a too precipitate 
amal.gamation of experimental and traditional. taxonomy would 
al.most inevitably have repercuss.ions detrimental. to the 
present usefulness of the established morphological system. 
Therefore, in the meantime, it would seem more appropriate 
for experimental taxonomists to refrain from attempting to 
meet their requirements by any redefinition of the orthodox 
classificatory categories, but instead to use a complementaxy 
system of classification with a distinctive terminology, at 
least until the true value of the new categories, and their 
possible place in a more comprehensive system can be assessed. 
(Gregor 1939: 294) 
The question became: what sort of terminology should experimental. 
taxonomists adopt? Gregor argued that the Turessonian terms 
"coenospecies" and 11ecospecies" should be retained, but he al.so argued 
for the need to create new terms to replace the ecophene and ecotype. 
To describe a population in terms of morphological discontinuities 
implies that such combinations (i.e. ecotypes) are static and 
morphological.ly stable. But, using the data obtained on P. maritima 
- 147 -
Gregor argued that few populations within this species are morphologically 
stable in this manner. Thus, emphasis must be shifted from describing 
populations in terms of discontinuities in character complexes to the 
recording of populations typifying particular kinds of variation, regard-
less of the degree of aggregate morphological distinctiveness involved. 
To this end Gregor proposed a new infra-specific terminology centred 






any gradation in measurable characters; 
a cline following a geographical gradient; 
a cline apparently correlated with an observable 
ecological gradient; 
a population in a geographical region possessing 
characters differing from those of another region. 
A topotype may be extraclinal if it does not fall 
within a geographical gradient in character expression, 
or intraclinal if it has reference to a particular 
range on a geographical gradient; 
a particular range on an ecocline; 
microtopotype: a micro-geographical population, primarily the result 
of a chance fractionation of a parent population; 
exotype: a hereditary aberration which occurs so rarely and so 
sporadically, that it never becomes a feature of any 
population: the category of exotype is, therefore, 
not a population concept. 
(Gregor 1939: 321-222) 
The most important property of the cline terminology is that it 
can be used to describe intraspecific variation in terms of continuous 
characters rather than discontinuous types. The ecotype, where it occurs 
at all, becomes a range on an ecocline. Gregor was not the first botanist 
to suspect that intraspecific variation might be --- continuous in form. 
The Swedish physiological ecologist Otto Langlet had suggested in an 
autecolgical study of the genus Pinus made in 1934 that, since most 
major habitat factors vary spatially in a continuous and not a stepped 
manner, graded rather than discontinuous variation might be expected 
in wide-ranging species as a consequence of adaptation to the habitat 
(see Langlet 1934, 1936 and Faegri 1937a). Nor indeed was the clinal 
concept itself original, since Gregor had borrowed the term from Julian 
Huxley's work on animal populations (Huxley 1938). 14 However, Gregor 
14. This is of interest because it represents one of the few substantial 
links between the growth of animal and plant biosystematics. 
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was the first genecologist to advise a full nomenclatural system from 
this work and set it up in opposition to the established ecotype 
hierarchy - a move which inevitably highlighted the differences between 
the two approaches to intraspecific variation and its taxonomic treatment. 
As indicated above, the change to a model of continuous variation 
for dealing with taxa below the level of the species necessitated a 
rethinking of the boundaries between genecology and orthodox taxonomy. 
In his 1944 review of the ecotype concept Gregor recommended that 
ecological variation within species should only be given taxonomic 
recognition where the populations concerned possessed very clear and 
definable morphological markers. He suggested the term "ecoclinal 
subspecies" to cover such cases. Where, as in the more common case, 
variation is clinaJ. and can only be subjectively defined, formal 
taxonomic names should not be given (Gregor 1944: 29). Indeed for 
Gregor the urge of genecologists to classify ecological variation was 
becoming a hindrance rather than a help. The object of genecology 
should be to study the processes of speciation, and Gregor, unlike Hall, 
Clements, Turesson and Clausen, came to see this aim as an objective 
incompatible with that of classification. Thus, in a 1946 paper on 
genecology and its relation to classification we find Gregor arguing 
for the separation of these two objectives: 
In conclusion it is tempting to suggest that instead of trying 
to define all intra-specific variation in terms of traditional 
taxonomy, a more detailed picture of the internal structure of 
species woul~ be obtained by freely admitting that the 
classification of ecotypic variation is a special purpose one 
involving its own peculiar concepts and techniques. The need 
at the moment is to overcome the almost subconscious desire to 
resolve intra-specific variation into categories capable of 
being absorbed into the orthodox taxonomic system, and the 
current emphasis on the discontinuities in the distribution of 
ecotypic variation, rather than on ecotypic trends, is perhaps 
only a reflection of this taxonomic undercurrent. 
(Gregor 1946a: 389-390) 
And this passage is immediately followed by one in which Gregor defended 
orthodox taxonomic practice and the general-purpose classifications 
thereby produced. 
The desire to keep micro-evolutionary units separate from those 
employed in orthodox taxonomy is also evident in the second genecological 
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nomenclature produced by Gregor - the "deme" terminology founded in 
collaboration with J.S.L. Gilmour (Gilmour and Gregor 1939), and later 
modified by Gilmour and Heslop-Harrison (1954) and Gilmour (1958). 15 
The units of formal taxonomy were rigidly excluded from this system, 
even as prefixes or suffixes in compound terms. The basis of this 
terminology was the "deme", defined simply as, "an assemblage of 
taxonomically closely related individuals" (Gilmour and Gregor 1939: 
333). To this term there could be added appropriate prefixes as more 
information was gained about the populations under study. Thus, for 
example, we can have: 




demes occupying a specified geographical area; 
demes occupying a specific ecological habitat. 16 
The deme terminology was meant as a "neutral" system of concepts to 
be applied in cases where little evidence had been accumulated about the 
populations of plants under study. It was not intended to replace either 
the ecotype or ecocline systems, although the term "ecodeme" was supposed 
to be used in situations where insufficient data had been gathered to make 
application of either of these terms feasible. Similarly, it was not 
intended to replace the morphologicaJ. species, subspecies, and varieties 
of the herbarium taxonomist (Gilmour and Gregor 1939: 333). The chief 
-
advantage of the system was its flexibility. However, in practice, the 
system was little used and, where it has been employed, this has been in 
a manner inconsistent with the original intentions of its creators 
(Gregor, personal communication, 1 July 1977). 
15. In these later publications Gilmour advocated the deme terminology as 
a system which could be used by evolutionary taxonomists without 
recourse to the term 'species 9 even in the peripheral sense of 
Turesson's ecospecies and coenospecies. In effect, Gilmour's suggestion 
was that the best strategy for evolutionary taxonomists was to abandon 
altogether any attempt to revise the orthodox categories of taxonomy and 
instead provide "special-purpose" classifications of their own. 
16. These were the three examples given in the original 1939 paper. Others 
have been added since, most notably the cytodeme - used to denote 
chromosomal races within the Linnaean species. 
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In summary, it can be said that, while the work of Gregor and his 
associates had its origins in the genecological studies of ~te Tu.reason, 
their findings, especially after 1935, reveal a growing movement away from 
Tu.reason's original position. While Tu.reason and Clausen maintained that 
ecological variation within the Linnaean species was discontinuous in 
form, Gregor came to view such variation as normal clinal.. For Tu.reason 
populations which occupied a distinct habitat represented an objective, 
territorial ecotype. For Gregor the ecotype was to be defined subjectively, 
as an assemblage of more or less separate breeding communities lying along 
gradients of climatic, edaphic, or biotic factors. Finally, Tu.resson had 
held that genecological classifications would replace the Linnaean system 
used in orthodox taxonomy. In Gregor's work genecological systems 
represented "special-purpose" classifications intended to supplement and 
not to replace the normal approach, and the task of constructing such 
classifications was only given a minor role: the prime task of genecology 
was to be the study of evolutionary processes, a task not always compatible 
with that of classification. 
Gregor was not the only botanist who worked on Plantago from a 
genecological perspective. The Danish phytogeographer and cytologist 
Tyge ~cher (1909- ) working at the University of Copenhagen carried 
out, between 1939 and 1941, cytological, taxonomical and transplant studies 
on the Danish populations of Plantago lanceolata L. BBcher (1943) was 
able to confirm that ecological variation in this species of Plantago was 
also clinal and not discontinuous. Since, in his earlier papers on 
genecological studies of Campanula rotundifolia (BBcher 1936) and Brunella 
vu.lgaris (BBcher 1940), he had employed Tu.reason's ecotype terminology, 
B8cher's conversion to the ecoclinal concepts of Gregor represented a 
further advance of the Scottish school's position. The questions raised 
" by the work of Gregor and Booher as to whether ecological variation is 
primarily continuous or discontinuous and the extent to which genecologists 
should be concerned with classifying such variation, have remained central 
themes in the genecological literature up to the present day. 
The work of Gregor and his associates is, like the work of Clausen' s 
school, hard to reconcile in terms of Putnam's account of scientists as 
people who go out and classify the world in terms of hidden essences. In 
his later work Gregor came increasingly to see· classification of 
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intraspecific units in any terms as something which might hinder rather 
than help in understanding evolutionary processes and relationships: 
(W)hen a graded series of forms exists naming them does 
nothing to bring out the connections between the forms 
and it may, indeed, even serve to disguise such relation-
ships. (Gregor 1946b: 268) 
Gregor's argument was not one designed to show that scientists 
should cease the activity of classification altogether. But Gregor did 
realise that §B.Y: system of classification by its very nature involves 
emphasising some relationships more than others, and §B.Y: classification 
involves obscuring some relationships as well as highlighting others. 
The value of a classification lies in the usages to which it is put. 
No system of classification can be said to be more "real" or more "perfect" 
than any other in some final and transcendent sense. All systems of 
classification can be evaluated only in the context of the purposes to 
which they are designed to serve. In recognising that genecological 
classifications, and indeed morphological classifications as well, were 
of the nature of "special-p'lirpose" classifications, Gregor and his 
associates did more than just suggest a new avenue of research for 
genecology; they made a point of fundamental importance to the under-
standing of all systems of classification. 
Other British Biosystematists, 1930-1950 
While James Gregor was undoubtedly the most prominent figure in 
British genecology during this period, there were a number of other 
British botanists concerned with the interface between plant genetics 
and taxonomy of whom the most important were W.B. Turrill, E.M. Marsden-
Jones, J. Heslop-Harrison, D.H. Valentine and J.S.L. Gilmour. Of these 
figures W.B. Turrill (1890-1961) is of particular interest in that he 
was one of the most influential herbarium taxonomists in Britain and a 
highly respected figure in the orthodox taxonomic community, being 
assistant keeper (1909-1946) and later keeper (1946-1957) of the 
herbarium at Kew. Tu.rrill's main research output concerned floral and 
phytogeographical studies of the Balkan Peninsula, but in collaboration 
with the cytologist E.M. Marsden-Jones (1890-1960), he also published a 
considerable amount of research on the genetics and ecology of Silene, 
Centaurea, Ranunculus, Anthyliss and Saxifrage. 
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In his writings Turrill was careful to stress the value of orthodox 
taxonomic research, which he labelled "alpha" taxonomy, in contrast to 
the "omega" taxonomy which becomes possible when a group's full ecology, 
genetics and cytology is known. Like Gregor, Turrill saw the ecotype 
system as a special-purpose classification, which did not serve as a 
replacement for the existing morphological system: 
It is hardly necessary to remind readers of the great 
achievements of alpha taxonomy... Further, probably 
only a taxonomist working in one of the large museums 
or herbaria can realise how much still reamins to be 
done by the established taxonomic methods. 
(Turrill 1938a: 33) 
And Turrill was particularly critical of those experimentalists who 
wanted to define species in terms of genetic criteria without regard 
to morphological relationship: 
There has been an increasing tendency in theory to emphasise 
sterility-fertility criteria The taxonomist cannot help 
objecting to the overwhelming importance that is given to 
sterility-fertility criteria at the ecospecies level. 
(Turrill 1946: 39-40) 
However, these criticisms were not levelled at experimentalists 
because Turrill wanted to seal off herbariu.m taxonomy from the new 
approaches. On the contrary, Turrill was concerned that efforts should 
be made to incorporate the new kinds of methods into "alpha" taxonomy 
whenever this was practically possible. It was one of Turrill's maxims 
that an experimental garden and laboratory should be attached to every 
herbariu.m and vice versa (Turrill 1925: 360; Marsden-Jones, Summerhayes 
and Turrill 1930). In his forward to Heslop-Harrison's (1953) textbook 
on experimental taxonomy, Turrill talked of the need for an introgressive 
hybridization of methods and ideas, the result of . which will be "hybrid 
vigour" in taxonomy. The same objective is also evident in a joint 
letter to Nature, written with E.S. Anderson, urging that herbariu.m 
workers should begin to collect specimens in such a way as to permit 
biometrical analysis of the plant material which was being assembled 
(Anderson and Turrill 1935; .and see also .Anderson 1941). 
The work of Turrill, with its emphasis on the need for mutual 
cooperation between taxonomists, geneticists, cytologists and ecologists, 
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has many parallels with the position adopted in Clausen's research. 
Enphasis again is placed on the value of diverse methods combined into 
a synthetic approach to the problems of classification. Indeed, 
Turrill was an enthusiastic advocate of Clausen's work, which he saw 
as a positive attempt to correlate genecological nomenclature and 
practice with orthodox taxonomic methods and aims (Turrill 1939). 
However, Tu.rrill's belief that a synthesis was possible between 
genecology and orthodox taxonomy was at variance with James Gregor's 
genecological theories (Gregor, personal communication, 1 July 1977). 
In fact, the prevailing trend in genecology since 1950 has been one 
involving a separate development from orthodox systematics, a trend 
which in his later years Turrill tried very hard to reverse (see, for 
example, Turrill 1958). 
Genecology in Russia 
.An important school of genecological studies developed in Russia 
under the direction of Eugenija Nikolaevna Sinskaya (1899-1965). 
Sinskaya was an external student from 1909 to 1917 at the Petrov 
Academy of Agricultural Science in what is now Leningrad. After 
completing her degree she was, from 1919 to 1921, an assistant to the 
great Russian plant breeder N.I. Vavilov, and she moved with Vavilov 
to join the staff at the Bureau of Applied Botany, later re-named the 
All Union Institute of Plant Industry, Leningrad. Apart from three 
years of exile during World War II, Sinskaya remained in Leningrad 
until her death in 1965. Her work at the Leningrad Institute produced 
a voluminous literature on the genetics, ecology, taxonomy and breeding 
systems of higher plants, many of these studies being conducted on 
crops of agricultural importance in the Cru.ciferae. 17 
The genecological research of Sinskaya and her associates can be 
divided into two periods. The first of these, which involved pre-War 
investigations, was concerned with eco"tyi>e recognition and classification 
in wild populations. This result of this phase of the research was 
published in Sinskaya's book Dynamics of Species (1948). Post-War 
investigations were more concerned with studies of plants of agricultural 
significance. A summary, in English, of this later phase of research is 
given in Sinskaya (1958). 
17. Most of this work has never been published in English. However, a 
complete list of the English translated titles of her works was 
published together with an obituary notice in taxon. See 
Bakhteyev, Lizgun.ova, Mordvinkina, Suvorov and Sebalina (1966). 
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Russian genecology placed a different emphasis than any of the 
other schools on the importance of zonal and geographical variability. 
Typical is the work on populations of Onobrychis (Sinskaya 1958: 31-32). 
The Caucasian Onobrychis species, are, according to Sinskaya, difficult 
to classify along traditional morphological lines. But it is possible 
to distinguish vertical belt-populations on the basis of physiological 
characteristics such as flowering-times. Thus we get: 
(1) The high mountain belt. 
flowering, winter perennials; 
(2) The middle-mountain belt. 
Here plants are slow growing, early 
These populations have taller stems 
than is the case for populations in the high mountain belt. Also, most 
of the plants do not flower in the first year, and flowering occurs 
later in the season; 
(3) The sub-mountain belt. 
spring perennials; 
(4) The adjacent steppe belt. 
These populations are late-flowering 
Here all plants flower in the first 
year and are drought resistant, spring perennials. 
The second novel element in the genecological writings of Sinskaya 
is the stress on biotic factors and their influence in the development 
of plant races. Thus, for example, in their study of the flaxweed 
(Camelina sativa), Sinskaya and Beztuzheva (1931) were able to show 
that flaxweed imitates the races of flax on which it grows and that 
intraspecific variations in the group are dependent upon adaptations 
both to climate and biotic influences. 18 Genecologists in Scandinavia, 
America and Britain had paid little attention to the role of biotic 
factors in adaptation and it was this aspect of Russian genecology to 
which Gregor paid most attention in his 1944 review of the ecotype 
concept (Gregor 1944: 25-26). 
It is interesting to speculate on why these distinctive features 
developed in Russian genecology. It seems possible that one reason 
for the neglect given to biotic factors and their influence on 
adaptation within the species by Western genecologists was due to 
the influence of synecological writings in their research. 
18. For a brief English account of this research see Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey (1948: 121). 
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Synecologists in .America and Britain were strongly influenced by 
Clements' work on climatic clim~s and his stress on the importance 
of climate in explaining vegetation distribution and cover. British 
and American genecologists appear to have accepted this aspect of 
Clements' work, even where they rejected his neo-Lamarckian views on 
speciation. Indeed, the whole question of the relations between 
synecology and genecology is one which has been neglected by historians 
of ecology and which requires more analysis. However, this is not a 
theme which can be developed further within the context of the present 
study. 
Alternatives to the Genecological Hierarchy in Biosystematics 
The ecotype system and derivatives from it (e.g. the cline and deme 
terminologies) has been the most important of the classification 
hierarchies used by experimental taxonomists. However, the period after 
1930 saw several fresh attempts to construct a system of classification 
for experimental taxonomy. The starting point of most of these efforts 
has consisted of an attempt to redefine the species-concept in a more 
"objective" ma:nner, by recognising that a variety of different kinds of 
species exist which are definable by cytological and genetical criteria. 
We shall consider three examples of such classification systems - the 
comparium - convivia terminology of B.H. Danser, the genetic species of 
the British plant geneticist Cyril Darlington, and the biosystematic, 
population categories of W.H. Camp and G.L. Gilly. 
( 1) The Comparium, Commiscuum and Convivia 
The Dutch taxonomist and geneticist B.H. Danser (1929: 339) 
introduced these terms to provide a set of experimental categories 
which could be defined on a non-morphological basis. Capacity for 
gene-exchange is the major criterion used to define these units. Thus 
we get: 
The Comparium: all individuals which can hybridize regardless of 
the fertility or sterility of the product of the cross; 
The Commiscuum: all individuals within a comparium which can 
freely exchange genes; 
The Convivia: those groups of individuals within the commiscuum which 
can freely exchange genes but which are isolated by geographical barriers. 
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In practice this system has been rarely used. The commiscuum is 
practically synonymous with the term "ecospecies" as it was later 
defined by Turesson. The comparium was used by Clausen as a unit 
above that of the coenospecies (see Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1945: 
63-64). 
(2) Darlington's genetic species 
Darlington (1933: 813-814) distinguished six different kinds of 
species according to their cytology and genetic-reproductive mechanism. 
Thus, we get: 
(a) The habitually self-fertilized diploid; 
(b) The habitually cross-fertilized diploid; 
(c) The sexually reproducing fertile polyploid; 
(d) The mixed species containing both diploid and polyploid forms; 
(e) The complex-heterozygote species (balanced lethal type), as 
in Oenothera; 
(f) The clonal species which does not reproduce sexually at all. 
Darlington introduced this division of the species in terms of the 
genetics of the breeding system because, he argued, different patterns 
of variation could be expected in each of these groups. It was the 
purpose of the taxonomist and cyto-taxonomist to elucidate what these 
different patterns of variation might be (Darlington 1933: 814). 
3. The Biosystematic terminology of Camp and Gilly 
In the same paper as that in which they introduced the term 
"biosystematy", Camp and Gilly (1943) also put forward a complex set 
of terms designed.to remove the subjective term "species" .altogether 
and replace it with categories based upon genetics, cytology and 
evolutionary data. Thus, Camp and Gilly maintained that the species 
of classical taxonomy could be divided as belonging to one of twelve 
new categories defined as follows: 
(a) homogeon: a species which is genetically and morphologically 
homogenous, all members being fertile; 
(b) phenon: a species which is phenotypically homogenous and whose 
individuals are sexually reproductive, but which is composed of 
intersterile fragments; 
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(c) paragenon: a species with relatively little morphological or 
genetical variation throughout its range, but which contains some 
aberrant genotypes. All its individuals are interfertile. 
(d) dysploidion: a species composed of morphologically similar 
members of a dysploidon series, the individuals of which are sexually 
reproductive. 19 
(e) euploidion: a species whose individuals are sexually 
reproductive and which is composed of segments with a common origin 
arranged in a euploid series; the segments are morphologically 
separable although similar in appearance, but, because of different 
responses in various environments, appear to interg.rade. 20 
(f) alloploidion: a species derived by allopolyploidy, its 
individualsj although highly variable, are interfertile. 
(g) micton: a specfes, often of wide distribution, the result of 
hybridization between individuals of two or more species; all individuals 
are interfertile with themselves and with the ancestral genotypes. 
(h) rheogameon: a species composed of segments of reasonably marked 
morphological divergence whose distributions are such that gene 
interchange may take place in sequence between them; individuals of 
contiguous segments are interf ertile. 
(i) cleistogameon: a species which, in part, reproduces by means 
f 1 . t 21 o c eis ogarrry. 
(j) heterogameon: a species made up of races, which, if self-
fertilized, produce morphologically stable populations but when crossed 
may produce several types of variable and fertile offspring. 
(k) apogameon: a species containing both apomictic and non-
apomictic individuals. 
19. "Dyploid series" refers to groups wherein there exists a series of 
chromosome numbers either greater or less than the expected number. 
20. In a euploid series the plant populations have each of the different 
chromosomes of the set present in the ~ number and, therefore, 
possess an exact multiple of the haploid chromosome number. 
21. Cleistoga.my is the process whereby flowers may sometimes set seed 
without the flower opening or pollination taking place. 
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(1) a.gemon: a species containing only apomictic individuals. 
Camp and Gilly 9 s proposals represent the most ambitious effort yet 
devised to divide the species into its component genetic and evolution-
ary types. Similar, but more recent, attempts to formulate classific-
ations of an analogous kind are found in the work of Lamprecht (1959) 
and Al varez-Lope:-t. ( 19 57) • 
22 
In general these attempts to distinguish kinds of species according 
to genetical and evolutionary criteria have won little popularity, 
either in experimental or in orthodox taxonomy. It would appear that 
the different kinds of genetic and evolutionary situations that they 
were designed to represent are too manifold and complex to be accommod-
ated within any single taxonomic framework. However, the persistence 
of such attempts shows that the trend away from the activity of 
classifying which is discernible in genecology after 1935 was by no 
means a universal one amongst experimentalists. 
Genecologv and Biosystematics since 1950 
It is not intended here to deal in any depth with changes in 
genecology and biosystematics in the period since 1950. However, in 
order to relate the historical material of the last three chapters 
with the account of modern research in taxonomy represented in chapter 
one, a brief survey of some of the major developments in post-1950 
biosystematics and genecology is in order. This account is not 
intended to be a definitive or exhaustive account of these developments. 23 
22. Lamprecht's paper is a far reaching attempt to recognise different 
kinds of species formally by making appropriate additions to the 
normal binomiaJ. nomenclature. Alvarez-Lope~argues that species 
are of three kinds: euspecies, which are groups with marked 
morphological and geneticaJ. differences; genospecies, in which 
genetic differentiation has occurred but morphological markers are 
slight or absent; and morphospecies in which morphological 
differentiation is marked but is associated with weak or non-existent 
genetic barriers. For a discussion of both papers see Davis and 
Heywood (1963: 460-461). 
23. The two best recent reviews of trends in biosystematics and genecology 
since 1945 are those of Raven (1974) and Heslop-Harrison (1964). Both 
accounts stress the way in which experimental studies of species since 
1950 have had as their objective the study of evolution as a process 
rather than classification. 
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Experimental studies of evolutionary processes with taxonomic 
revision as a major or auxiliary objective have remained an important 
element in plant science. Further, America, Britain and Scandinavia 
have continued to be the most active centres of this research. 24 In 
Britain the work of J. Heslop-Harrison, v. Heywood, D.H. Valentine, 
and D.A. Wilkins have special importance in this field. In the United 
States detailed genecological investigations are being carried out on 
several plant genera including Gilia (V. Grant and his associates), 
Clarkia (H. Lewis) and Helianthus nuttallii (R. Long). 25 In Scandinavia 
" work of particular interest is being undertaken by B. Lovkvist whose 
research has included a reinvestigation of some of Turesson's ecotypes 
with the inclusion of cytological studies of the populations (see 
LBvkvist 1962). 
Most of the trends discernible in this research were present in 
the writings of experimental taxonomists prior to 1950. In particular, 
the debate which was initiated in the 1930 9s over the continuous or 
discontinuous nature of intraspecific ecological variation has remained 
a central problem throughout this period, sometimes engendering heated 
controversy (e.g. O. Langlet 1959, 1963; J.W. Wright and H.I. Baldwin 
1957). The consensus of opinion in recent research is that both types 
of variation may occur, depending upon the underlying pattern of 
important ecological gradients. Where such gradients were very sharp, 
more or less discontinuous variation will be found; where they are 
continuous this will in turn be reflected in genotypical and 
phenotypical characteristics in the plant population. However, the 
relative importance of these two kinds of ecological variation is 
still a divisive issue. 
Another trend in modern experimental taxonomy apparent in the 
earlier work, especially of Gregor and his associates, is seen in the 
continuing discussion of the role which taxonomic objectives should 
24. The continued dominance of American and British botanists can be 
seen from an analysis of the citations in Heslop-Harrison (1964) 
review. Of the 35 authors with two or more papers cited 12 are 
American, 18 British and 3 Scandinavian. 
25. An account of the work of Grant and his associates is given in 
chapter 6. For the work on Clarkia and Helianthus see Lewis (1957) 
and Long ( 1966). 
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play in research on speciation and intra.specific variation. Here, as 
Raven (1974) correctly emphasises, there is a growing consensus that 
biosystematical data do not lead to an unequivocal definition of the 
taxonomic units in most cases and that they do not dictate taxonomic 
decisions. Heslop-Harrison, writing in 1953, described this trend: 
Recently, there has been a tendency among more radically minded 
evolutionists to deplore the "taxonomic" attitude in their 
science - the attitude which seeks to detect and define and 
classify "types", be they "eco-", ''topo-", "cyto-" or of other 
form, rather than to study processes. Looking past the conflict 
of categories which has proceeded in the field of experimental 
taxonomy, we may perhaps glimpse a future in which defining of 
categories has been abandoned altogether, and experimental study 
of natural variation proceeds without "typification". 
(Heslop-Harrison 1953: 121) 
According to Raven (1974: 178), in the 25 years since the publication 
of Heslop-Harrison's New Concepts in Flowering Plant Taxonom.y, this view 
has become one held by the majority of biosystematics and genecologists. 
However, here again, opinion is still divided. The sensitivity of this 
issue is shown by the fact that when, in 1962, the announcement was made 
that the biosystematJ.cs committee of the International Association of 
Plant Taxonomists had recommended the setting up of a separate 
International Organization of Biosystematics, this prompted worried 
letters to Taxon that an artificial division was being created within 
plant systematics (see Tryon and Wallace 1962). 
A third trend within genecology since 1950 has been the search for 
physiological variation which is of an adaptative and ecological kind. 
A particularly interesting example of this trend has been the work on 
lead tolerance in Fesiuca ovina which has been carried out in Wales by 
A.D. Bradshaw and D.A. Wilkins (Bradshaw 1952; Wilkins 1957, 1960a, 1960b). 
Lead is normally highly toxic to this species, yet lead-tolerant races 
are found on mine-soil tips. Using an assay method based on the growth 
of adventitious roots in vitro and under uniform conditions, Wilkins 
was able to show that three races of Festuca were present: intolerant, 
medium tolerant and highly tolerant. Genetically, the property of 
tolerance is dominant and may be controlled by a single locus. An 
interesting facet of these investigations was that no morphological. 
features could be found which separated the populations; they are 
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physiological races within the species but lack any apparent morphological 
markers. 
A fourth trend within genecology is also evidenced in Bradshaw's 
work on another grass species, Agrostis tenuis (Bradshaw 1959, 1960). 
This is the tendency towards studies of small-scale genecological 
~ifferentiation. Bradshaw was able to show, using techniques of 
experimental cultivation in both standard and varied environments, 
small-scale differences in physiology and morphology between 33 populations 
of this grass growing in Wales. These variations were adaptive and could 
be correlated with environmental factors, although in Bradshaw's opinion 
they were of too minor a character to warrant taxonomic recognition, 
either as clines or as ecotypes. Very little work of this kind has been 
done, and it seems a likely area for future genecological research. 
A sign of the increasing status of research in experimental taxonomy 
was the foundation," in 1962, of the International Organization of 
Biosystematics, whose first President was the Icelandic cyto-taxonomist 
Askell Lgve. A further sign of the increasing importance and stature of 
this type of research is the publication in recent years of several 
undergraduate textbooks dealing exclusively with the subject of 
biosystematics - most notably those by Heslop-Harrison (1953), Solbrig 
(1966, 1970) and Briggs and Walters (1969). In addition, it is now 
usual for even more orthodox textbooks on systematics to devote 
considerable space to biosystematics and genecology (e.g. Davis and 
Heywood 1963; Heywood 1967). 
Turning from genecology and biosystematics to more general trends 
within taxonomy as a whole, it is now possible to see that the "new 
systematics" of the 193ovs and 40's was only the first in a series of 
innovatory approaches to classification which have been a persistent 
feature of plant classifactory sciences during this century. More 
recent challenges to traditional taxonomy have come from chemotaxonomy 
and, most notably, from the numerical taxonomy of Sokal and Sneath 
(1963). A brief discussion of the latter approach to classification 
is given in Appendix A. Certainly, the controversy surrounding these 
new techniques has been just as great, and in many ways parallels, the 
controversies which developed around genecology and biosystematics in 
the 1_920's, 30's and 40 9s. 
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Discussion: Combinational Strategies in Species Ma.king 
Much of the most highly credited work which has been done in taxonomy 
since the 1930's has involved a method for applying the term "species" 
which involves neither using a cluster of identifying descriptions 
(Description theory) or rigid application of a single criteria 
(essentialism). Rather, combinational strategies have been employed. 
Clausen and Babcock represent two experimental taxonomists who 
employed a strategy of this kind. A combinational strategy works as 
follows. Firstly a morphological classification of the genus in question 
is made or, if a modern treatment of the group exists, accepted as 
provisionally correct. Then biosystematical data is accumulated on the 
group under study (which is usually a genus or section of a genus). It 
is at this stage that ecological transplants will be made, chromosomes 
counted, and populations crossed in experimental gardens to study 
fertility relationships. If the evolutionary and phylogenetic data 
accumulated agree with the groups classification in terms of purely 
morphological considerations then the original classification is left 
unaltered: indeed, it is vindicated. However, if the new data appears 
to be at variance with the classification made along traditional lines 
then a new morphological classification is attempted. The groups 
morphology is re-examined with an eye to finding correlations between 
the groups morphological characteristics and the newly acquired 
biosystematic evidence. If such correlations are discovered then a 
taxonomic revision of part or whole of the genus is undertaken. 
However, if morpholo9ical markers cannot be found then the old taxonomic 
treatment is left unaltered, as being the best available. 
In philosophical terms combinational strategies are very "messy". 
The resulting classification is neither truly phenetic (i.e. based on 
overall resemblance) or phylogenetic. It is not truly phenetic because 
genetical and cytogenetical data are heavily weighted in such an approach. 
Moreover, the desirability of such weighting is an a priori commitment in 
taxonomy of this kind. However, the classification adopted does not 
accurately reflect cytological and genetical "essences" either. Indeed 
in cases where the identifying description (in terms of morphology) is at 
variance with chromosomal and genetical data, it is the former rather than 
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the l&tter which is ultimately given precedence. 
Although combinational strategies have been largely ignored in 
philosophical accounts of classification, they represent the only way 
of incorporating evolutionary data into ta.Xonomy in a manner which is 
acceptable to the aims of orthodox taxonomists. And it is notable that 
the best example of work of this kind, e.g. Clausen's researches on 
Potentilla and Babcock's on Crepis have been widely approved of by both 
orthodox and experimental taxonomists. At the present time combinational 
strategies look like becoming the most widely accepted way in which 
evolutionary data can be given recognition in scientific classifications 
of biological natural kinds. The question of why this approach is 
widely approved of in spite of its apparent ad hocness on theoretical 
grounds opens up the general question of how different strategies of 
classifications are justified and maintained. 
will be considered in chapter 6. 
This is a topic which 
Summary and Discussion: The Species Concept from 1930 to 1950 
As is clear from the preceding discussion genetical and cytological 
evidence became increasingly important in theoretical discussions about 
species after 1930. Many experimentalists held, and still do hold, that 
genetical criteria (i.e. tests of fertility and ·sterility) are the only 
objective basis by which real (biological) species can be delimited. 
However, many taxonomists have continued to challenge this interpretation. 
' The latter position is well summarised by Heywood in his textbook Plant 
Taxonom.y. 
Although isolating mechanisms are of great evolutionary 
importance since they allow populations to build up 
differences and evolve as independent units, the groups 
of plants which we recognise as species are in practice 
defined largely by morphological criteria. In very many 
cases there is a high degree of correspondence between 
morphological differentiation and inability to interbreed, 
but the two are not necessarily correlated ••• (V)arious 
degrees of fertility may exist between members of different 
populations of the same species. 
(Heywood 1967: 56) 
So there is at present no universal consensus that genetical data 
provides an unambiguous criteria for defining what is meant by the 
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term "species". What about cytological evidence - does this provide 
a criterion for distinguishing species? 
In fact, whether or not cytological evidence should be used in 
this way has been a source of contention in the recent literature on 
cyto-taxonomy. The form these arguments have taken is best illustrated 
by an example. Thus, we may consider the recent controversy between 
the English cyto-taxonomist I. Manton and the Icelandic cyto-taxonomist 
II 
A. Love. 
The usual treatment of the discovery of chromosome races within 
the Linnaean species (i.e. the discovery that individuals which were 
previously regarded as members of the same taxonomic species have 
different chromosome numbers) has been to keep the members within the 
same species, unless good morphological markers can be found to 
correlate with the observed difference in chromosome number. This was 
the position which Clausen adopted in his work on polyploids and the 
same position was taken by Manton (1934) in her treatment of chromosome 
races within the Linnaean species Biscutella laevigata L. There were 
at least three chromosome races in this species - one hexaploid, one 
tetraploid and one diploid. However, Manton was unable to find any 
morphological differences between these populations and concluded that 
no taxonomic revision was possible in the group. 
It was this last claim that was challenged by L~ve (1951 ). 
According to L8ve different chromosome "races" within the species 
always can be separated on morphological grounds, even if the 
morphological differences are only slight. And he argued that such 
forms should always be given taxonomic recognition as separate species: 
Cytologists observing differences in chromosome numbers 
within some collective species are rendering little service 
to scientific taxonomy by reporting them only as new cases 
of "intraspecific polyploid.y" and examples of lack of 
morphological characters of taxonomical value for separating 
the biologically isolated groups. Before publication they 
should always send good herbarium sheets to an able taxonomist •• \' 
In most if not all cases he will be able to tell the cytolotist 
that his "intraspecific" types have previously been separated 
as species, or ought to be classified as such based on some 
major or minor morphological differences, perhaps not observable 
at first glance to the untrained eye. 
(LBve 1951: 283) 
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However, this recommendation was challenged by B8cher who, like 
Manton, had worked on groups where morphological markers were very 
hard to correlate with chromosome number. In a summary of their 
research on one of these groups BBcher and his associates concluded 
that "we cannot accept the view of LBve that all types differing in 
the number of chromosomes should be classified as distinct species" 
(B8cher, Larsen and Rah:h 1953: 301). More generally, Davis and Heywood 
have argued that cytological data should, for taxonomic purposes, be 
given the same weighting as data from a:ny other source: 
A special role is claimed for cytological data in taxonomy 
since the chromosomes are the seat of the hereditary 
material. From an interpretative viewpoint this claim is 
justified, but chromosome number and morphology as comparative 
data have to be considered on a par with other kinds of 
taxonomic evidence. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 193) 
And Turrill (1958) advanced a similar argument at a symposium on 
cyto-taxonomy held by the Linnaean Society of London. 
The question of whether chromosome populations should be treated 
as separate species has a direct bearing on the philosophical models of 
classification outlined in chapter 2. In terms of the network model of 
classification the positions taken by the two sides can be illustrated 
as in figure 5. 7. For the sake of illustration an imaginary case is 
presented here involving a Linnaea.n species ("Planta typica L.") 
previously thought to have a chromosome number n = 6. A "race" of 
P. typica is discovered with a chromosome number n = 8 and with minor 
morphological differences as well (slightly hairy leaves). However, 
it is to be imagined that this morphological marker is not a "g"Ood" one 
in the taxonomic sense, e.g. suppose the "hairs" are so small that they 
are only visible with an electron microscope or that a few cases are 
found where "hairy" plants have a chromosome number of n = 6 and vice 
versa. Should the "P. newiensis" population be considered as a part 
of "P. typica" or not. Presumably for Putnam "P. typica" and 
"P. newiensis" are two different natural kinds (on all possible worlds!). 
However, for a description theorist, and especially one of the Searlian 
kind, a single difference such as chromosome number should not be use_d __ 
to separate the two types if they bear all or most of their other 
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treatment is possible. It so happens that the majority of botanists 
would probably agree with the "Mantonian" treatment of this case rather 
than the "LBvian" one. However, there is nothing in the nature of the 
"facts" or in the "logic" of the arguments used which forces adoption 
of either view. 
To summarise: genetical and cytological data have become increasingly 
important in modern experimental research on classification. A number of 
attempts have been made to use genetical data (sterility and fertility) 
and cytological data (chromosome number) as rigid designators of the 
natural kind term "species". However, a great many taxonomists, both of 
the herbarium school (e.g. Davis and Heywood) and of the experimental 
school (e.g. Clausen, Turrill, Manton, BBcher) have denied the possibility 
of using genetical and cytological evidence in this fashion. In Pu.tnam's 
terms scientists in this latter camp are presumably acting irrationally 
or illogically, because genetical and cytological evidence is the nearest 
we have to hidden essences in plant and animal natural kinds. However, 
from the point of view of the network model of classification, neither 
group is acting in a manner which is "illogical" or "irrational". 
Whether scientists wish to use genetical or cytological data to rigidly 
designate natural kinds is a point which they themselves must decide. 
There is nothing in the "logic" or semantics of a historical natural 
kind terms usage which gives one position precedence over its rival. 
Essentialism is a strategy of concept application. Whether, in any one 
instance, it is a~ strategy is not a matter which can be given over 
to a priori considerations. These are problems which the scientist 
himself must decide. 
A second interesting facet of recent discussions concerning 
classification at the species level has been the various attempts to 
restrict the term "species" to one or other of its "biological" or 
"morphological" senses. Two of these attempts have been dealt with 
already and so need only be briefly reviewed here. Thus Camp (1951) 
recommended that morphological species should be termed "binoms" 
and that the term "species", if used at all, should be only employed 
in its biological sense. Similarly, but in the opposite direction, -
Gregor and Gilmour introduced the "deme" terminology partly in 
order to remove the term "species" from the units of experimental 
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taxonomy and restrict its usage to herbarium taxonomy. A notable feature 
of these attempts to restrict the meaning of the term species is that none 
of them have enjoyed widespread popularity or currency amongst either 
experimental or orthodox taxonomists. The deme terminology has been 
little used by genecologists and, similarly, Camp's term "binom" has not 
replaced the term "species" in the floras and manuals of the herbaria. 
As Grant (1971: 31-36) has pointed out in a recent discussion of the 
literature pertaining to these efforts at nomenclatural reform, this 
failure has not been due to any fault in the logic of reasoning behind 
such prescriptions. In terms of clarity of exposition and "logical" use 
of language it would be an excellent idea to restrict the term species 
to either its morphological or biological sense. However, efforts to 
bring this situation about ignore the strong commitment which different 
research groups can have in using and deploying the same term. Language, 
like culture, is a resource and, like any resource, people are loath to 
throw it away or donate it as a gift to someone else. As Grant succinctly 
put it, attempts to restrict the term species "stand little chance of 
becoming adopted because, in each case they ignore long-standing 
historical claims on the term species by one or another large group 
of workers" (Grant 1971: 36). 
Linked to these ollg'Oing debates over the meaning of the term 
species there has also been, since 1935, a continuing failure amongst 
experimental taxonomists to agree on a common objective or goal for 
their discipline's development. Experimental taxonomy as conceived by 
Hall and Clements had a two-fold objective, namely, 1) to account for 
the processes whereby "natural" units arise in wild populations and 
2) to classify these units on the basis of the information gained. 
Some later workers (e.g. Clausen, Camp and Gilly) kept to these two 
aims, but others (e.g. Gregor) have seen these two objectives as being, 
in some ways, incompatible. 
The objectives of experimental taxonomists have affected the 
stance which they have taken towards traditional taxonomic practice. 
The early experimentalists were very critical of orthodox taxonomy; 
in the writings of later taxonomists the strategies adopted towards 
orthodox methods were more diverse. Some experimentalists (e.g. Grant 
and Camp) have remained highly critical of orthodox systematics; 
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others (e.g. Clausen and Gregor) adopted a more lenient approach. Two 
factors seem of special importance here. Firstly, some experimentalists 
came to the conclusion that mutual exchange of information between the 
two camps would be of benefit and this encouraged a rhetoric in which 
the traditional skills of the taxonomist were not devalued. This is 
especially evident in the writings of the Carnegie school where the 
team of workers included "alpha taxonomists". Secondly, the controversy 
within experimental taxonomy over the relative importance of continuous 
and discontinuous patterns of intraspecific ecological variation has 
also had a bearing upon this issue. Genecologists such as Gregor who 
emphasised the clinal nature of such variation saw in the desire for 
experimentalists to find classifiable units in nature an obstacle to 
progress. The natural result of such a view is to urge the separate 
development of the two disciplines of orthodox and experimental taxonomy 
and this is a position w~ich is strongly advocated in Gregor's later 
research. For Gregor orthodox and experimental taxonomy were two 
related but separate concerns, each valid in its own sphere, but 
possessed of different aims and objectives. We have turned full 
circle from the early imperialistic claims of experimentalists dealt 
with in the previous chapter. 
The methods of experimental taxonomy have also become increasingly 
diversified since 1930. Between 1920 and 1930 transplant studies had 
been the major method of experimental taxonomy. After 1930 these 
remained important, but newer techniques, such as breeding tests to 
establish fertility relations and cytological studies of the chromosome 
complement, also gained increasing currency. This diversity of 
technique was also reflected in the wider backgrounds of those entering 
the field after 1930. In the 1920 1 s experimental taxonomists and 
genecologists had backgrounds in ecological botany or phytogeography. 
Experimentalists active after 1930 came from a number of background 
disciplines. Some, like Clausen, B8cher and Babcock were primarily 
cytogeneticists by training. Others (e.g. Turrill, Camp and 
Heslop-Harrison) had been trained in herbarium taxonomy- and either 
learnt the laboratory skills associated with experimental taxonomy or 
worked in collaboration with experimental biologists (an example of 
the latter is Tu.rrill's collaboration with the cytologist E.M. 
Marsden-Jones). Still others (e.g. Gregor and Sinskaya) had moved 
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into genecology from a background of research in applied aspects of 
plant breeding. 
The increasing diversity of methods and aims in experimental 
taxonomy in turn also reflects the very wide diversity of approaches 
now manifest with plant taxonomy as a whole. The evaluation of such 
new approaches to classification as chemotaxonomy and numerical 
taxonomy is likely to occupy plant systematists for many more decades. 
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Chapter Six: The Role of Interests in the Development of Systems of 
Classification part one: the Role of Interests in Technical Prediction 
and Control. 
In Chapter 2 some general models of classification were described 
which were taken from current philosophical debates about the nature of 
extension and reference. These models were treated as naturalistic i.e. 
as attempts to describe how scientific classifications have actually 
been formulated, modified and sustained. With the empirical material 
of Chapters three, four and five now presented it will be of value here 
to summarise the major findings which have resulted in treating 
philosophical theories of classification in this naturalistic way. In 
carrying out this task we shall focus mainly on classification of 
natural kinds at the species-level. Other levels of the taxonomic 
hierarchy could be used but it is on the question of the nature of 
species and how they should be delimited that controversies between 
different groups of systeinatists have been most acute. 
The first point which emerges from the empirical material presented 
so far (and which will be further demonstrated by more material in this 
chapter) is that there is no agreed procedure for classifying species or 
even for defining what is meant by the term "species". In very broad 
terms, two main classes of species definition have been employed in 
botanical systematics: definitions using manifest properties of 
morphology (morphological species definitions) and definitions using 
reproductive criteria (biological species definitions). And it follows 
from this that the extension of a:ny given species is not pre-determined 
in advance. Two plants may share most of their important morphological 
attributes in common but be members of different species in the 
biological sense. Conversely, two plants may be fully fertile but 
strikingly different in their morphology (indeed they may even on 
occasions be members of different genera). 
Secondly, it will also now be clear that even working within one 
of these two main definitions of the species, options remain open. This 
is most obvious in the case of procedures for classifying species based 
on morphology, where species delimitation is notoriously subjective. 
Thus, morphological taxonomists themselves may employ broad or narrow--
morphological species concepts. They may be "lumpers" or "splitters". 
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However, the point is equally tru.e of procedures for delimiting species 
along biological lines. All types of fertility relationships are 
formed in nature from complete fertility to complete sterility. Indeed 
it was to take account of this that led biosystematists to recognise 
different types of species in a genecological hierarchy (the coenospecies, 
the ecospecies etc.). But even within these units choices still remain. 
Consider the different uses of the term "ecotype" in genecology. 
Turesson used the term originally to cover ecological races within 
the Linnaean species which were local populations. The ecotypes of 
Clausen were studied in populations covering a much wider geographical 
area and delimited regional populations. And still others (e.g. Gregor) 
have maintained that ecological populations within the species grade 
continuously into one another in most cases. On this view the ecotype 
is a range on an ecocline and can only be more-or-less arbitrarily 
designated as a separate unit. 
This then is the first major conclusion which follows if 
philosophical theories of classification are treated naturalistically: 
the extension (and hence the meaning) of natural kind terms is not 
pre-determined in advance. The second major finding is that description 
theories of meaning and essentialist theories describe strategies of 
classification procedure. This point has already been made for each 
of the major figures discussed in Chapters three, four and five. 
However, it is worth stressing again here because it opens the question 
of the criteria by which different strategies of classification are 
selected and developed. 
It was argued in Chapter two that classifications are conventions 
and the network model of classification developed from the work of 
Mary Hesse was used to illustrate the possibilities of this approach. 
In this chapter it will be argued that a conventionalist account of 
classification is of value in understanding two key aspects of the 
historical material presented in the last three chapters: 
1. As a framework for understanding the nature of the controversies 
which took place between orthodox and experimental taxonomists. 
2. As a framework for understanding the controversies that developed 
within experimental taxonomy over the question of how new species evolve. 
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We shall now examine each of these topics in turn, showing also how 
the empirical material can be used to give further insight into the 
nature of the network model of classification itself. 
As we have already seen, the response of herbarium taxonomists to 
the sometimes extremely critical attacks of experimentalists on their 
methods, procedures and results has been varied. However, a marked 
feature of this response has been that there has been no wholesale 
abandonment either of the Linnaean system of nomenclature or of the 
procedures by which plant species are described, catalogued and named. 
The categories of the Linnaean system (class, order, species etc.) have 
continued to find employment in monographs and floras; herbarium 
taxonomists have continued to insist that different species, to be 
so-called, must exhibit clear-cut morphological distinctions which 
allow their separation from related species. 
It is a point of great interest that where orthodox taxonomists 
have had to justify their continued adherence to traditional methods 
of taxonomic practice they have usually done so in pragmatic and 
instrumentalist terms. For classification accurately to reflect the 
evolutionary or cytogenetic aspects of a plant's history is seen as 
laudable in its own right, but on practical grounds it is denied that 
this objective can or should always be acted upon: 
Classification should not be inconsistent with what evolutionary 
evidence is known, although there may be instances where it may 
be more convenient and serve more purposes if it is. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: xviii) 
And again: 
If a general classification is going to be widely used, 
it needs to work. We must be able to place taxa in 
higher taxa so that we can find them again. This means 
that practical considerations, which mitigate against 
the 'objective' aspect of classification, are very 
important in systematics and necessitate that science 
shall come to terms with art if biological classification 
is to be of maximum use to science. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 83) 
As a:r\l.le orthodox taxonomists have not denied the value of 
experimental taxonomy for the production of "special purpose" 
classifications, but it is denied that such classifications should 
be seen as a replacement of the existing system. As the entomological 
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taxonomist T.D.A. Cockerell (1926: 588) put it in an early and 
generally enthusiastic review of Turesson 1 s work: 
(W)hile the ecotype system is highly illuminating, it should 
not take the place of definite names accompanied by precise 
descriptions and supported by the type specimens of the 
herbaria. 
And they have pointed to the sheer practical difficulties which stand 
in the way of the widespread developments of experimental methods in 
taxonomy. The Norwegian phytogeographer Knut Faegri ( 1937b: 401), 
for example, says in another review of Turesson's work that: 
The thorough taxonomic-genetical analysis of a genus, of its 
inner structure and relations to other genera ••• is, if not 
always the work of a lifetime, at all events the work of many 
years' intense studies; in the case of trees perhaps the 
work of centuries. One can hardly expect taxonomists and 
phytogeographers to wait so long. 
The fact that orthodox taxonomists usually legitimate their methods 
and classifications on pragmatic grounds has resulted in a tendency to 
see the units of experimental taxonomy as somehow more 'objective' or 
'real' than those of orthodox taxonomy, and to perceive the 
classifications of orthodox taxonomy as having only a heuristic or 
instrumental value. Certainly there has been and continues to be a 
widespread tendency for experimental taxonomists to characterise the 
categories of orthodox taxonomy in this way (Hall and Clements 1923; 
Turesson 1930; Grant 1957; Dobzhansky 1958). As Dobzhansky puts it: 
A systematic working with mammal or bird skins or with pinned 
insects or with dried plants in a herba.rium has obviously no 
direct knowledge of whether the forms which he examines could 
or could not exchange genes. It would be preposterous to 
expect him to acquire such information before he classifies 
his specimens. Making a classification cannot be postponed; 
it is needed now as an aid to all other biological studies ••• 
The species of the systematist a.re inferences concerning the 
biological species which a.re the reality of nature. 
(Dobzhansky 1958: 39; emphasis added) 
However, it is worth noting that there is no necessity to regard 
the units of orthodox taxonomy in this fashion. As Davis and Heywood 
(1963: 94-95) point out in an interesting development of an argument 
first put forward by Valentine and L8ve (1958), the units of orthodoX---
taxonomy can be seen as just as 'real' as those of biosystematics. 
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The taxonomic species is often criticised by biosystematists 
on the grounds that it is less important biologically than 
species defined in terms of gene po~ls and ster. ility barriers. 
But ••• this objection can be taken too far, since it would be 
absurd to underestimate the biological significance of the 
morphological (and physiological) differences between 
populations ••• The form of a plant represents its response 
to its environment; it has come, in the course of evolution, 
to have leaves of just such a shape and flowers of just such 
a colour and to occupy a habitat in which the soil is of a 
certain texture and acidity. If another plant has leaves, 
flowers and habitat preferences which are all different, it 
is arguable that these differences are of at least as great 
biological significance as the ability of plants to exchange 
genes freely. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 94-95). 
The continued use of Linnaean taxonomy by orthodox systematists 
has meant that, for some groups at least, alternative or "competing" 
orthodox and experimental classifications now exist side-by-side. It 
is where competing taxonomies occur that controversy between orthodox 
and experimental taxonomists have often been most acute. This is 
especially the case at the level of the species where, as we have 
seen, the conflicting accounts employ different species criteria. 
For orthodox taxonomists, species are populations of morphologically 
similar individuals separated by visible morphological gaps from 
related species. For the biosystematist, species are normally 
defined as interbreeding populations of individuals, linked by a 
capacity for gene-exchange. In practice, especially in sexually 
breeding groups, these two conceptions of the species do not produce 
conflicting classifications ·(e.g. all human races are both capable 
of breeding with each other and morphologically distinguishable from 
related living primate species). However, frequently, and especially 
in plants with asexual or partly asexual breeding cycles, this is not 
the case. It is in these groups that competing taxonomies may be 
found. The nature of these competing taxonomies can best be 
illustrated by giving detailed consideration to some examples drawn 
from the historical literature • 
..;;C~o~n;..;t,::;ro~v.;;:;e,::;r.;.s,::;i..;:;.e.;.s_.;;;;in;;;;..,..C.;;.;l;;;.as~s;;;;.;1~· f;:;..;1;;;.,· c;;.;a:;;.t~1;:;.;· o_n;;;....;:i;;;.;n:;;....;;;P;..:l;;.;:an~t~~e-c;.;;:i-=e-.s Example 1 
Spiraea ulmaria ROSACEAE 
For details see Tu.reason (1925! 162-168). Tu.reason demonstrate~_by 
means of transplant studies that there were three ecotypes of this species 
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in Sweden: a coastal type with curved leaves, an inland type with 
straight leaves and long internodes between the leaflets, and an 
upland type from Central Sweden with shorter internodes. Systematists 
working on this material had previously recognised varieites on the 
basis of leaf shape and pubescence (i.e. presence and amount of hairs 
on the leaf). Both of these characters are well preserved and easily 
recognised in herbariu.m specimens. However, Turesson found that these 
characters were of little value in determining the ecotypes of ulmaria: 
The treatment of spiraea ulmaria by systematists has resulted 
in a large number of forms and varieties generally based upon 
characters pertaining to the differences in leaf-shape and 
hairiness. The great majority of these systematic forms, 
however, are of no value for the grouping of ulmaria -
populations of ecotypes ••• Extensive cultures of material 
from widely different regions is needed before any under-
standing of the ecology of this species, as well as other 
species can be obtained. 
(Turesson 1925: 168) 
Thus, for example, the variety S. ulmaria var. denudata of the 
systematic handbooks, Turesson found to be present in all three 
ecotypes. Similar cases could be cited from many of the other 
genera on which Turesson worked. 
Example 2 Madia citrigracilis and its allies, Madia subsection 
eu.madia (COMPOSITAE). For details see Clausen, Keck and Hiesey (1945: 
22-45). Clausen and his co-workers first became interested in this 
group when they discovered a new species, Madia citrigracilis growing 
at high elevations in California. The pop:ulations of this plant were 
found to have 24 pairs of chromosomes ( 6x = 48). This is an unusual 
number for this section of the Madia where all previous records 
indicated populations which were either diploid (2x = 16) or tetraploid 
(4x = 32). The likeliest origin for a population with 48 chromosomes 
was from a cross between a diploid and a tetraploid with subsequent 
doubling of the number of chromosomes ( allotetraploidy). On 
morphological evidence the likeliest diploid ancestor for 
M. citrigracilis was Madia citriodora, a species not previously treated 
taxonomically as within this subsection of the genus. The likeliest 
tetraploid was Madia gracilis. By means of artificial crossing between 
these two probable parental species, Claus.en et al. were able to 
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synthesise M. citrigacilis artificially, providing strong circumstantial 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
However, further research indicated that relations within this 
complex were even more complicated than this. Thus, further cytological 
study showed that M. gracilis was itself composed of two chromosome 
races. One of these, found at low elevations, had a chromosome number 
of 4x = 32. The second population, which grew at high elevations, was 
hexaploid (6x = 48). Also, indirect evidence supported the conclusion 
that this hexaploid gracilis was itself derived by allotetraploidy from 
the tetraploid race of gracilis (4x = 32) and another diploid Madia -
M. subspicata. Finally, hybridization experiments revealed that the 
two hexaploid populations (i.e. M. citrig:racilis and hexaploid gracilis) 
could exchange genes. This rather complicated set of relationships is 
shown diagrammatically in figure 6.1. 
This example illustrates particularly well how species definitions, 
whether evolutionary, biological or morphological, can lead to different 
results when applied in critical cases. From the perspective of the 
phylogenetic or evolutionary viewpoint the complex can be split into 5 
units, all of equal importance (Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 1945: 43). From 
a genetical viewpoint the two diploids and the tetraploid are distinct, 
but the two hexaploids, since they can cross and produce fertile offspring 
are one unit. From the morphological viewpoint only ci triodora is very 
clearly set off from the rest, and Clausen, Keck and Hiesey found the 
two races of gracilis to be completely indistinguishable morphologically. 
These two populations could only be distinguished by chromosome counting. 
In their actual treatment of the group Clausen, Keck and Hiesey 
(1945: 43-44) take none of these positions. Rather, taxonomic names 
are given to all populations within the complex except the two races 
of gracilis, which for practical reasons, are considered to be of one 
species. 
Example 3 Phleum pratense and Phleum alpinum (GRAMINAE) 
For details see Gregor (1931) and Gregor and San.some (1930). These 
two grasses, recognised as separate species by Linnaeus, had long been 
known to be closely related and had sometimes been lumped together as 
a single species. However, Gregor and his associates, using genetical. 
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and cytological techniques, were able to show a pattern of complexity 
which had not hitherto been suspected on the basis of morphological. 
studies. Thus Phleum pratense was shown to consist of two cytological.ly 
distinct races, one diploid in its chromosome number (2x = 14) and one 
hexaploid ( 6x = 42). Similarly, Phleum alpinum could be diploid ( 2x = 
14) or tetraploid (4x = 28). By crossing diploid P. pratense with 
tetraploid P. alpinu.m, Gregor and San.some were able to produce a 
synthetic hexaploid which was fertile with naturally occurring populations 
of hexaploid P. pratense. This led Gregor and Sansome (1930; 385) to 
the conclusion that the natural.ly occurring hexaploid race of P. pratense 
had probably a.risen in an anal.ogous way. In addition, transplant 
studies on Phleum pratense showed that there were at least 7 ecotypes 
and others were suspected to be present in the material of P. alpinum 
as well. The relationship between pratense and alpinum is shown in 
figure 6.2. 
In his taxonomic treatment of the group Gregor (1931: 211-213) 
suggested that the two chromosome races of Phleum pratense, hitherto 
unrecognised by taxonomists, should be given specific, or at least 
subspecific, status. However, in his own classification of the group 
he used not the units of orthodox taxonomy, but the genecological 
system of Turesson (see table 6.1). On this view the whole complex 
represents a single coenospecies ('Phleum pratense-alpinum') with 4 
ecospecies and at least 7 ecotypes. 
This classification of the group elicited a sharp attack from 
A.J. Wilmott, a herba.riu.m taxonomist working in the botany department 
of the British Museum at South Kensington in London. In his paper 
Wilmott (1932a: 49-50) attacked Gregor on the grounds that Phleum 
pratense and alpinum a.re separate morphological entities and that they 
should not, therefore, be united as a single "coenospecies". However, 
the wider implication of the paper is that, if progress is to be made 
in taxonomy, it will require not only that taxonomists become competent 
in genetics and cytology but also that geneticists must be competent 
taxonomists. Gregor' s work on Phleum is cited as an example where 
this is not the case. Wilmott argues that taxonomists should take 
account of genetical. criteria in deciding what counts as a species, 
but he denies such data any special. significance: 
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The author (i. e. Gregor) forgets that apart from morphological 
characters there would be no genetics, for the geneticist is 
only formulating theoretical explanations of an observed 
morphological succession. The author needs to think in terms 
of the realities behind words. The Scottish Universities 
generally supply a philosophic basis, which seems to be 
lacking in this paper. After reading it P. alpinum remains 
an entity morphologically, distributionally and historically 
distinct from P. pratense. 
(Wilmott 1932a: 49) 
In his reply Gregor (1932) accused Wilmott of arguing that taxono-
mists should take account of information obtained from genetics and 
cytology, but of ignoring such data when, as in the case of Phleum, it 
suggested a treatment at variance with his pre-conceived opinions on the 
groups' taxonomic status. Gregor also pointed out that treating the 
group as a single species was in agreement with the conclusions of some 
previous taxonomists. Wilmott replied (1932b) that the taxonomist 
must be prepared to use genetical and cytological data when necessary, 
but that they should not be forced to employ it in the manner in which 
geneticists and cytologists wanted such data used. The controversy might 
well have continued, but A.B. Rendle, the keeper of the botany department 
at South Kensington and the editor of the Journal of Botany in which the 
interchanges appeared, stepped in and refused to publish any further 
correspondence on the issue. 2 
Examole h Gilia inconspicua (POLEMONIACEAE). For details see 
V. Grant (1957, 1971: 31-33) and A. Day (1965). The plant genus Gilia 
is a group whose biosystematics and genetics have been the subject of 
a great deal of work in recent decades by Grant and his co-workers in 
California. We shall examine taxonomic problems in two "species" or 
"species-complexes" within the Gilia genus, these being Gilia inconspicua 
and G. tenuiflora. 
As Day has demonstrated, the Gilia inconspicua complex consists 
of not less than five inter-related 'sibling' or 'biological' species. 
Three of these species are diploid with respect to their chromosome 
2. Gregor sent Turesson offprints of Wilmott's article in the Journal of 
Botany and suggested that Turesson should write a letter criticising 
the paper for Nature. However, no publication of this type ever 
appeared. (Gregor M.S., letter to G8te Turesson, 6.4.1932), this 
correspondence is part of the Turesson archives at Lund University· .• 
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number, the remaining two are tetraploid. Analysis of the chromosome 
complement of each group showed that one of the tetraploids had been 
derived, by hybridization and doubling of the chromosome number, from 
two of the diploids (G. minor (2x) + G. clokeyi (2x) = G. transmontana 
(4x)). The other tetraploid is derived also in part from G. minor and 
in part from a third diploid G. aliquanta (G. minor (2x) + G. aliguanta 
(2x) = G. malior (4x)). Artificial hybridization shows that the five 
groups, although fertile in themselves, are highly intersterile in all 
combinations, so that biologically they are 'good' species. However, 
external phenotypic differences, while present, are not such as to allow 
identification in every instance. The tetraploid G. transmontana bridges 
the morphological gap between its two diploid ancestors so that clear-cut 
morphological differences do not occur. Similarly, G. malior intergrades 
morphologically into its two diploid ancestors. Also, since the G. minor 
genome is common to both tetraploids, these also cannot always be 
separated from each other on purely morphological grounds. In practice 
it is only with the aid of a microscopic examination of the chromosomes 
that we can distinguish any one of these "species" from another. 
Morphologically they form a single group. This situation is illustrated 
diagrammatically in figure 6.3. 
Example 5 The Gilia tenuiflora-latiflora complex For details 
see Grant (19.57). This group consists of at least 4 different "elements" 
which are quite distinct morphologically but also capable of gene-
exchange. Apparently, at some time in the past, primary speciation 
began in this group but was interrupted by subsequent hybridization. 
The situation is illustrated in figure 6.4. 
The taxonomic problems here are in many ways a mirror-image of 
the Gilia inconspicua case mentioned above. In this instance the rather 
striking morphological gaps between the constituents of the group would 
mean that the orthodox taxonomist would probably wish to retain them 
as distinct species despite the evidence of gene-exchange. Alternatively, 
for the strict adherent of a biological species concept, one is dealing 
here with only a single species. Grant's (19.57) discussion of the group 
recommends that the Linnaean term species ought to be abandoned altogether 
in this particular instance. Instead he uses the term 'syngameon' to 
describe the whole complex and he refers to the individual elements 
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within it as 'semispecies'. For the formal taxonomist this does not, 
of course, present a viable solution and such an account would be at 
odds with the rules laid down in the International Code of Botanical 
Nomenclature; for according to that code, all individual plants.belong 
to a species. 
Problems like the ones in Gilia taxonomy outlined above illustrate 
again the issues which separate orthodox and experimental taxonomy. 
For the herbarium taxonomist species are units of morphological 
discontinuity. Practical concerns of identification necessitate that 
this shall be the case. The general point has been put.by Davis and 
Heywood (1963: 461) 
• • • if we are going to continue to employ the formal taxonomic 
hierarchy ••• , the less we attempt to redefine its categories 
in evolutionary and genetic terms the better. To do so is to 
enter such a quaking bog of conflicting aims and interests 
that practical clas·sification would be paralyzed. 
And in their flora of the Pacific North-west C.L. Hitchcock, A. Cronquist 
and M. Ownberg (1959: 109) make the same point in a specific reference to 
Gilia and the work of Grant: 
In such complexes ploidy level has little direct taxonomic 
significance and a proper taxonomic treatment must continue 
to be found largely on classical morphologic-geographic 
methods. 
For the experimentalist operating with a species concept based 
upon capacity for gene-exchange such concerns are not sufficient to 
prevent splitting, say, a group like Gilia inconspicua into its component 
biological species. As Grant (1957: 57) rather scathingly comments: 
The naming of sibling species as a result of biosystematic 
studies has provoked a certain discontent among many herbarium 
curators and floristic taxonomists. The biosystematist does' 
indeed have a responsibility to determine and annotate as many 
large herbarium collections as is feasible. He also has a 
responsibility to science not to suppress those findings 
merely in order to facilitate the task of herbarium filing. 
Nor should it be imagined that examples like the ones given above are 
exceptional occurrence and hence of little importance to most 
systematists. The modern period of biosystematic investigations 
(i.e. since 1950) has revealed ever increasing numbers of such problem 
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groups. Grant (1957: 53) argues that such taxa are the rule rather 
than the exception in higher plant taxonomy. 
Discussion: Classification as Invention and the Role of Interests in 
Technical Prediction and Control 
The material presented above is of general significance because it 
lends support to the view that classification is a process of invention 
rather than discovery, that our classifications of the natural world 
are 'made' rather than 'found'. If this is the case, then in an 
important, indeed fundamental, sense, classifications of the natural 
world have the status of conventions and are thus sustained and modified 
in response to changing patterns of social contingencies. 
The further merit of these examples is that they lend support to 
this view in a context which in the past has been thought particularly 
supportive of the alternative view, viz. that there is a unique pattern 
of classification isomorphous·with the real structure of nature. In 
the realm of plant and animal classification certain modes of approach 
have appeared as particularly distinct and obvious, certain ways of 
drawing boundaries particularly fundamental.3 However, here, as 
elsewhere, the natural world is so complex and rich in information 
that particular ways of drawing boundaries always involve selection and 
processing of information. The particular methods of selection and 
processing adopted in any one instance are, therefore, conventional in 
character, dependent upon prior commitments to certain shared objectives 
and concerns. To show that .2J:!!:. classifications of the natural world 
have the characteristics of invention is strongly to support the notion 
that all systems of classification have such a character. To show 
that systems of natural classification are designed to serve and 
maintain shared interests and objectives is to suggest that classification 
is never a passive and disinterested process of discovery unrelated to 
social objectives and concerns. Attempts to classify the world of 
natural kinds have the status of being a 'hard case' for any theory of 
3. This latter point is well illustrated in some of the recent work in 
botanical anthropology. When primitive tribesmen classify plants 
using morphological criteria the result often agrees closely with 
the species lists of herbarium taxonomists working in the same 
geographical area (cf Raven, Berlin and Breedlove 1971). 
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classification as invention to overcome, for it is in classifications 
of this sort that the instrumental and contextual concerns involved in 
the construction of all systems of classification are least evident and 
hardest to locate. 
How can we evaluate competing taxonomies like those found in 
Spiraea, Madia, Phleum and Gilia? Is it possible to make a direct 
appeal to nature in order to evaluate the best taxonomy. Evidently, 
no. In these cases both taxonomies are conventions designed to 
emphasise different aspects of the real world. Consider again Gilia 
inconspicua, morphologically we do indeed find only a single species; 
experimentally, evidence can be accumulated whereby five different 
species may be discerned. Both taxonomies are built upon perceptible, 
systematizable, stable distinctions between individuaJ. plants. In this 
sense the natural order sustains both taxonomies; neither can be said 
to be erroneous. 
to be made. 
Nature· does not in itself allow such an evaluation 
As a philosophical problem the argument between realism and 
conventionalism has endless ramifications and appears to be doomed to 
indefinite continuation.4 Nor can every component of realist accounts 
of classification be dismissed at the level of naturalistic description 
(Putnam's work illustrates this point). However, at this level, the 
present examples do concern classifications which in many important 
respects do have a conventional, instrumental character and they 
indicate how, in these respects, classifications generally might be 
expected to have such a character. 
A remarkable feature of the controversy over experimental methods 
in taxonomy is that the conflict between the two groups of scientists 
involved has led to no emergent consensus; thus in this respect the 
4. For a recent statement defending a conventionalist account of 
scientific knowledge see Douglas (1975: ix-xxi). For a defence 
of the realist view of science see Hesse (1974: 283-382). In 
the mainstream of philosophy arguments between realists and 
conventionalists have been especially evident in the disputes 
over realist and nominalist theories of universals. For a brief 
but lucid account of this controversy see Flew (1971: 442-461). 
' 
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present example seems to be at odds with other accounts of conflict in 
the history of science (cf. Kuhn's (1970) account of conflict and crisis 
revolution in the physical sciences.) On the contrary, questions 
concerning the value of experimental methods in taxonomy have continued 
to be voiced for over half a century, and many of the central issues 
remain quite as controversial today as they were fifty years ago. 
This has been the case because the alternative systems of 
classification of orthodox and experimental taxonomy are designed to 
portray different aspects of reality and to satisfy different demands 
for technical prediction and control.5 Linnaean taxonomy has continued 
to flourish into the present century because it continues to serve 
particular interests in prediction and control not readily replaced by 
an experimental approach. It makes possible what Heslop-Harrison (1953: 
10) calls the "primary survey" of the plant kingdom. However, because 
the method failed to satisfy these biologists concerned with a more 
detailed analysis of the mechanisms of evolution and speciation, 
alternatives to the Linnaean approach have been, and are likely to 
continue to be, formulated. To the extent that nature is conceived of 
as corresponding to the systems of classification which result, groups 
of professional scientists have sustained conflicting accounts of what 
natural kinds exist. 
It would seem then, that whatever their rhetoric of justification, 
scientists in fact evaluate classifications in instrumentalist terms. 
At this point, therefore, we need to examine more closely the notion 
of "interests in technical prediction and control". Two points deserve 
special emphasis. The first is that the idea of interests in prediction 
and control cannot be used as a criterion for demarcating science from 
non-science or even "good" science from "bad" science. Certainly, 
interests in prediction and control have been important in the development 
of western science. But, history also is typically produced in a manner 
which lays heavy emphasis on its value as an instrumental body of lrnowledge 
(see Barnes 1977: 14-15). Neither are interests in prediction and control 
of the environment an exclusive feature of Western knowledge---systems. A 
5. The notion of "interests in technical prediction and control" stems 
initially from the work of Habermas but is used here in the sense 
discussed by Barnes (1977: 1-26). 
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very strong case can be made for seeing the "magical" cosmologies of 
primitive societies as being primarily concerned with instrumentalist 
b . t• 6 o Jec 1ves. 
The second important feature to observe about interests in 
technical prediction and control is that they are dependent upon the 
social practices in which any given system of classification is 
embedded. In a different context from the present one Barnes (1978: 
12) made this point in the following manner: 
What activities and judgemental decisions would be indicated 
by an interest in prediction and control? Perhaps a 
philosopher might talk in terms of the root mean square 
reliability of all the generalisations on the net being 
maximised, and maintained at a maximum as new information 
becomes available. But such a notion makes no sociological 
or anthropological sense, and even a philosopher would be 
hard put to it to translate it into any plan for rational 
activity. As we know, this sort of thing does not happen 
at all. Rather interest in prediction and control is 
socially structured and focussed; it is always a function 
of a particular social context; wherein it is centred upon 
particular generlizations, and the reliability and scope of 
particular methods and procedures. 
Thus, orthodox and experimental taxonomists deploy different craft 
skills and competences learned in different social networks and 
communities. And this in turn affects the instrumental evaluations 
which they make concerning their work. There is no objective point 
at which a given methodology becomes too expensive or too time-consuming 
for the results obtained to be no longer worth the labour and effort 
required. Rather what constitutes such a "doompoint" is itself a 
variable linked to the social interests and g'Oals of the community and 
supported by the social matrix. 7 For Faegri experimental methods in 
6. This point is made particularly well in J. Willer's (1971) 
comparison of the belief-systems of magic, religion and science. 
7. The notion·of "doompoint" is taken 'from the work of the 
anthropologist Mary Douglas (see Douglas 1970). 
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taxonomy were too time-consuming and expensive to ever become the basis 
for most taxonomy. At best they could be used to provide insight into 
the nature of a few plant genera susceptible to such an approach. For 
Tu.resson, in contrast, it was the purpose of taxonomists to produce 
those classifications which would best serve the needs of biology as a 
whole, regardless of the effort and money involved. 
Clearly the instrumentalist justification of scientific beliefs, as 
with the legitimation of belief in general, is only understandable from 
a sociological approach which is symmetrical in its style of explanation 
and impartial with respect to the tru.th or falsity of legitimation claims. 
In the dispute between orthodox and experimental systematists consensus 
has yet to be achieved as to which side is "right" or "wrong" and this 
makes the necessity for a symmetrical approach obvious. If the early 
experimentalists had succeeded in their stated aim of replacing orthodox 
taxonomy with an experimental approach, it is highly probable that the 
value of such a symmetrical approach would have been harder to establish. 
When, in a scientific controversy, consensus is achieved, whether by 
genuine synthesis or by fiat, the symmetricality of the preceding dispute 
is masked. Often the realisation of this symmetry can only be reachieved 
by the most painstaking historical research and by a methodological 
willingness not to allow current beliefs to be the criteria by which 
past belief is compared, evaluated and judged. A controversy like the 
one between orthodox and experimental taxonomy, which is at once both a 
historical and extant phenomena, provides a demonstration of the value 
and correctness of maintaining such an approach. 
To summarise then, the present case demonstrates the plausibility that 
the alternative classifications of orthodox and experimental systematics are 
conventions, chosen according to different prior interests in prediction 
and control. It is also clear that these different interests and the 
different craft skills and practices with which they are associated, affected 
not only which of a given set of classifications was selected or utilised in 
any given instance, but that they played a vital role in the actual 
constru.ction of the classification. In an important sense the 
classifications took the form that they did because of the interests and 
objectives of those who constru.cted the classifications. In many 
important ways classifi.cation is a process of invention rather than 
;-
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discovery. The form these inventions take is in turn influenced by 
socially focussed interests and objectives. Also, these in turn can 
be directed and changed by wider concerns in other communities and 
disciplines. Using the example of experimental systematics in botanical 
classifications it has been possible to locate how some of these changing 
social interests and concerns have been developed and modified. It is a 
point of some importance that none of these interests have been in any 
way scientifically inappropriate or in some way 'beyond the bounds' of 
science. In the traditional idiom of the history of science, the 
controversy between orthodox and experimental taxonomists has been 
'internal' to science. And yet, as has been shown, the controversy 
remains intelligible only if science is considered as a human activity 
and if reference to such factors as socialization, patterns of reward, 
objectives and interests is taken into account. These are sociological 
issues. To deploy sociological explanation is not necessarily to do 
'external' history of science or to show the influence of 'external' 
factors on scientific growth •. Even in a case like this, without 
'external' socio-political factors being particularly evident, a 
sociological approach is essential to an understanding of the development 
and distribution of different classifications of the natural world. 
The major claim made in Chapter two, that the classifications of 
natural kinds are developed in ways which are not layed down in advance, 
has now been vindicated. What of the theories about how those natural 
kinds originate? The network, it will be recalled, incorporates all 
the terms used in a culture both "theoretical" and "observational". 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall explore the possibilities of 
the network model as a perspective for understanding theoretical 
divisions within taxonomy over the question of how natural kinds arise. 
A Conventionalist Interpretation of Theoretical Divisions within 
Experimental Taxonomy 
We have seen that the network model outlined in Chapter two is of 
value in understanding the controversies which took place between 
experimental taxonomists and orthodox taxonomists. However, as was 
shown in the historical material discussed in Chapters 3-5, not all the 
arguments about experimental systematics were concerned with this issue. 
There were considerable controversies within experimental taxonomy as 
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to the origins and mechanisms of speciation. Three of the theories 
which were prevalent after 1900 were as follows: 
1. That there existed a fixed number of basic underlying species, 
subsequent forms being derived from these by hybridization. 
the "hybridization theory" of Lotsy. 
This was 
2. That new forms of "adaptants" arose by the direct action of 
the environment on the plant form (ecogenesis) and its subsequent 
fixation (adapatation). This was the theory championed by F.E. Clements. 
3. That species possess a hidden capacity for genetic variability 
which is selected for when the plant responds to an unusual growth 
habitat. This was the conventional, nee-Darwinian interpretation 
championed by Turesson and later experimental taxonomists. 
A feature of the debates over the relative merits of these 
hypotheses was the great conviction with which opinions were held. A 
striking example of this is seen in F.E. Clements' work. Clements did 
not die until 1945, long after Turesson 9 s pioneering work on the ecotype 
concept had become the standard starting point for biosystematical 
enquiry. Yet, Clements never relinquished his claim that adaptation 
was the only experimentally verified process discovered in nature to 
account for the origin of new forms. Neither was this the result purely 
of Clements ignorance of genetics (cf. Tansley 1946). His discussion of 
the work of Turesson and Clausen (Clements, Martin and Long 1950: 170, 
251) shows that he was familiar with the arguments that were being used 
against him, but unable to appreciate or unwilling to implement the 
consequences for his own position. 
Can the network model provide a framework for explaining why this 
was the case? Certainly, if the network model is a naturalistic account 
of knowledge then it ought to be able to yield insights applied to 
historical material of this kind. 
Consider first a hypothetical example which will be used to 
illustrate the possibilities of the network model when applied to 
this kind of data. Imagine a botanist examining a little known flora 
in a geographical region whose two main ecosystems are meadow and 
woodland. In the course of his investigations the botanist observes 
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populations of a plant growing in the meadows of this region, 
populations which for the moment we may design.ate as "population type A". 
At a later stage of his investigations the botanist also discovers in 
the woodland nearby small numbers of plants very similar in overall 
appearance to A, but with minor, consistent differences in external 
morphology. Let us call these plants "population B". For our purposes 
it does not matter very much what the external features which separate 
A and B are. For the sake of argument we can say that members of 
population B have a different shape of leaf to population A and that 
the leaves of B are a darker green in colour. If our imaginary botanist 
is a taxonomist he may decide that population B merits taxonomic 
recognition as a variety of A. Indeed let us suppose that this is the 
case and that the taxonomist calls population A Planta typica and 
population B Planta typica var. shadensis. 
If our botanist were a modern biologist, how would he interpret 
such a finding in evolutionary terms? A likely hypothesis he would 
formulate would be that var. shadensis evolved from P. ty;pica as a 
shade form, in response to the selection pressures of the woodland 
habitat. If our botanist was a genecologist, the next thing he would 
want to know was whether or not the variation exhibited in population 
B was purely a response to environment or whether it was hereditary. 
How can this be determined? 
It is very likely that to test out these two hypotheses our 
imaginary botanist would conduct transplant experiments in a uniform 
habitat very like those which Tu.reason conducted in Sweden in the 
1920's. That is he would grow samples of population A and population 
B in a uniform habitat, where conditions of high light intensity 
prevailed. If in subsequent generations var. shadensis retained the 
morphological features which separate it from Planta typica then it 
wolild be an ecotype of the latter, in Tu.reason's original sense of 
that term. Alternatively, if subsequent generations of var. shadeilsis 
grew up as identical with P. typica, then this would be interpreted 
as showing that the growth habits of var. shadensis in woodland were 
purely a response to habitat factors, and we would have an ecophene 
in genecological terminology. These two possibilities are outlined 
diagrammatically in figure 6.5. 
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That then is the kind of interpretation which a modern botanist 
might well place on the observations he had made. We can call such 
a botanist a "neo-Turessonian". Now let us try to forget what we 
"lmow" about the "facts" of modern biology and try to imagine how a 
botanist with a theoretical commitment to neo-Lamarckian doctrines of 
evolution might interpret such data. For the sake of argument, and 
to demarcate such a botanist from the "neo-Turessonian" genecologist, 
we can call this botanist a "neo-Clementsian". Would such a botanist 
be forced to abandon his beliefs in neo-Lamarckianism, given that he 
made the same observations? 
The answer, surely, is that he would not, although the theoretical 
"gloss" which he would construct to account for such findings would be 
quite different. To begin with, the neo-Clementsian would challenge 
the assertion that population A and population B belonged to the same 
species. He would remind the neo-Turessonian botanist that the term 
"species" is a notoriously vague one, a hang-over from the pre-scientific 
era when taxonomy was a herbarium "science". Population A and population 
B would, from this perspective, represent not two different sub-groups 
within a species but simply two different "forms" or "adaptants", both 
of which had evolved from the direct influence of the environment on the 
plant body ( ecogenesis). If, on carrying out transplant experiments, 
population B maintained its marker characters then the neo-Clementsian 
would interpret this as proof that the variation caused by the environment 
in population B had become "fixed". Alternatively, if population B 
reverted back to type then this would be proof that the fixation stage 
which follows ecogenesis had not been completed. 
So much for the neo-Tu.ressonian and neo-Clementsian. What would 
happen if a "neo-Lotsyan" joined the discussion? Would his theories 
be in jeopardy from the observations which had been made? Again, this 
is surely not the case. A neo-Lotsyan would, though for different 
reasons than the neo-Clementsian, challenge the neo-Turessonian's 
initial assumption that population A and population B are members of 
the same species. Indeed, for the neo-Lotsyan the transplant experiment 
would itself become a test of this assumption. If population A and B 
remained distinct in subsequent generations, then this would constitute 
a proof that A and B were not the same species. Alternatively, if 
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population B reverted back to type, then this would be a proof that 
population A and population B were really the same Jordanon and that 
this fact had been masked by environmental, non-hereditarian influences 
which had acted upon population B when it was growing in the wild. 
The case given above is an imaginary one, al though arguements over 
theory very like this case did take place in the history of experimental 
taxonomy during the course of the twentieth century. Naturally, the 
actual development of these arguments in their historical context was 
immensely more subtle and complicated than this simple example suggests. 
However, at the very least, this example does help to clarify the 
problem posed for the historian of science at the beginning of the 
section. It does show, in a plausible way, the kind of processes 
which were operating that led a botanist as good as F.E. Clements to 
reject the refutation of his evolutionary views that was put forward 
by Tu.resson, Clausen, and others prior to his death in 1945. 
Discussion: Theory change in Science, the Role of "Side-bets" and 
"Making-out" in the Development of Scientific Culture 
We saw in our discussion of the history of experimental taxonomy 
or biosystematics that there was (and for that matter there still is) 
no agreed consensus as to what constitutes a species. Given this it 
is not surprising to find that there are no crucial experiments or 
definitive observations which can unambiguously settle the question of 
how species. are formed. From the point of view of the network 
theorist this should not be surprising either. Concepts of how species 
originate such as "hybridization", "adaptation", "selection" and 
"ecogenesis" are open-ended and negotiable in the same way that concepts 
like "whale", "fish" and "mammal" are open-ended and negotiable. 
Indeed the present study is far from unique in reaching the 
present conclusion. An increasing number of studies in the philosophy 
and history of science have emphasised that theory change in science 
is problematical and not susceptible to easy and neat "logical" 
solutions. To take but two examples from this literature, we may 
consider briefly the work of Toulmin and also of Farley and Geison. 
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Toulmin (1957, and see also Toulmin and Goodfield 1962: 207-238) 
has demonstrated that there were no crucial experiments which established 
the supremacy of Lavoisier's theory of oxygen over its great rival, the 
phlogiston theory of calcination. Priestly was aware of the experiments 
which Lavoisier had conducted, but could explain them in terms of the 
phlogiston theory. In fact, Priestley believed that he had conducted 
an experiment which provided a crucial test in favour of the phlogiston 
theory. Toulmin's conclusion is that there is no need in this instance 
to see Priestley's continued support of the phlogiston theory as an 
'irrational' one. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Farley and Geison (1974) in 
their account of the nineteenth-century controversies in France over 
the question of spontaneous generation. As Farley and Geison show, 
this controversy was not resolved at the level of experimental fact. 
Indeed, Pasteur (the leading opponent of abiogenesis) was only able to 
deny the possibility of spontaneous generation by suppressing part of 
his own researches. He never found any convincing explanation for 
the apparent success of some of the experiments to create micro-organisms 
and his own dislike for the doctrines of spontaneous generation appears 
to stem as much from religious and political concerns as from purely 
scientific considerations. 
Studies like these, and the present one, raise interesting problems 
when considered in the light of philosophical accounts concerning 
scientific rationality. They show that cultural change in science is 
a non-rational process, if by the term "rationality" we mean what most 
previous philosophers of science have meant by that term. 8 Does it 
follow then, that cultural change in science is a non-rational process? 
In fact that conclusion does not follow, although in order to save 
the concept of rationality we shall have to develop it in a manner 
which is naturalistic rather than normative (for a fuller discussion 
of the general approach being adopted here see Barnes 1976). 
8. For a critical attack on the notions of scientific rationality 
applied in philosophy of science see Bloor (1971). 
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To demonstrate the validity of this claim we shall begin by 
considering the work which has been done in social psychology on the 
general problem of how and why individuals change and develop their 
beliefs and life-styles. The relevance of this material to our 
present concerns will be fully justified later. For the moment let 
us consider, in particular, the brilliantwork which has been done on 
personal changes in adult ~ife by Howard S. Becker (1964). 
The starting point of Becker's work is the realisation that, in 
accounting for changes in people's behaviour and beliefs, we must seek 
an explanation not solely in terms of internal changes of "personality" 
or "values", but in the effects of social structure on the individual's 
perception of his experience. Thus, as an individual moves in and 
out of a variety of social situations and interactions, he learns the 
requirements of continuing in each situation and of achieving success 
within it. If he has a strong desire to continue, the ability to 
assess accurately what is required, and to deliver the required 
performance, becomes a major goal for the individual concerned. Becker 
describes acting in this manner as situational adjustment or "making-
out". Situational adjustment can be used to explain the changes in 
attitudes and behaviour which actors underg'O as they move through the 
varied social experiences of their adult life. 
However, changes in attitude and behaviour, even if they are 
potentially infinitely plastic and mutable, are rarely developed in 
this way. Individuals often do show consistency in behaviour which 
is genuine and not simply a gloss. How can we account for the 
consistency which we observe in adult development? To account for 
this phenomenon Becker introduces the related notions of commitment 
and side-bets. A person is said to be committed, "when we observe 
him pursuing a consistent line of activity in a sequence of varied 
situations" (Becker 1964: 49). The process of commitment involv-es 
linking extraneous and diverse lines of action towards particular 
long-term goals. By the very act of living a person normally becomes 
involved in an increasing number of side-bets - getting a job, getting 
a car, getting married, having children - which will serve to 
constrain future behaviour and produce a consistency of lifestyle and 
belief. The erratic behaviour of the juvenile delinquent, suggests 
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Becker, may stem precisely from a lack of involvement in situations 
which commit him more or less permanently to a given line of action. 
For Becker then, the change which occurs in any given individual's 
life-style and belief is a vector, the product of two antagonistic 
forces. On the one hand there are situational adjustments which 
necessitate continual change and shifts in behaviour and belief. On 
the other hand, there are past and current commitments and side-bets 
which can make such change difficult to achieve. Of what relevance 
has this to the problems of theory changes in experimental taxonomy 
during the twentieth century? 
To see the relevance consider again the work of F.E. Clements. 
In Becker's terms Clements had a very strong commitment to neo-
La.marckianism as an explanation for the origin of new species or 
"forms" in nature. The reasons why this commitment was such a strong 
one in Clements' work were probably varied and are difficult to 
precisely locate. In part no doubt the commitment stemmed from the 
fact that, during the early period of his career, neo-La.marckianism 
was a perfectly respectable scientific doctrine, which seemed to 
explain some of the problems surrounding the origin of species in a 
much better way. than could "nee-Darwinism". In part perhaps, the 
commitment sprang from an "ecological determinism" which was linked 
in turn to a strong desire to see ecology become a major discipline 
with~n biology. And it is also possible that ideological or political 
factors. played a role in Clements' support of neo-Lamarckian theories 
of speciation (see Chapter 7). However, whatever the reasons for his 
continued commitment to these doctrines, the fact of his commitment 
is beyond dispute. It manifested itself in nearly every paper and 
article which Clements produced, both in ecology and taxonomy, from 
his earliest papers until his death in 1945. Indeed, these 
publications themselves from, in Becker's terminology, side-bets-or 
investments in neo-La.marckian theory. 
Clearly in Clements' case these side-bets and commitments to 
neo-La.marckianism made adjustment to the developments which took place 
in genecology and experimental taxonomy after 1930 very difficult. 
By 1945 Clements must have been aware that his views were no longer 
in accord with those of the modern generation of biologists, trained 
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as they were in the new disciplines of genetics, cytology and synthetic 
evolution. Clements tried in his later works to make some attempts to 
adjust to the work which Turesson and Clausen were doing, but the 
attempts were feeble and lacking in conviction. The result was that 
by 1953, only eight years after his death, Clements' name was already 
being written out of the textbooks. Heslop-Harrison in his popular 
textbook on experimental taxonomy makes only one reference to Clements' 
work in the text, and that is to dismiss his work for its lack of 
knowledge of modern genetics and for its lack ofawareness of the pit-
falls surrounding experimentation with plants (Heslop-Harrison 1953: 22; 
and see also Heiser 1969: 110). Indeed, in a later publication in which 
he reviews "forty years of genecology", Heslop-Harrison (1964) does not 
mention Clements' work at all, he begins his account immediately with a 
" discussion of the work of Gote Turesson. 
This interpretation of Clements' later work in experimental taxonomy 
becomes even more plausible wh~n we consider the later writings of 
Clements' colleagues and co-author, Harvey Monroe Hall. Hall, like 
Clements, had made certain commitments to neo-Lamarckianism because in 
The Phylogenetic Method in Taxonomy, which was the product of their 
joint autho:r;ship, Hall and Clements had interpreted their experimental 
data in the framework of a neo-Lamarckian theory of "species" evolution. 
However, unlike Clements, Hall had never previously taken this position 
with regard to evolutionary questions. His previous work had been 
either "pure" taxonomy or descriptive phytogeography. In addition 
Hall, again in contrast to Clements, had connections with Californian 
biologists, notably E.B. Babcock and his associates at Berkeley, who 
were strong selectionists. As a result Hall did, in his later 
publications, firmly repudiate neo-Lamarckian theories of adaptation, 
even although he died some 13 years before Clements, in 1932. 
In retrospect, we might wish to say that Hall was "right" in 
endorsing natural selection as the major force in speciation and 
that Clements' theories of ecogenesis and adaptation were "wrong". 
However, in explaining why Clements and Hall acted in the manner in 
which they did, such an evaluative stance is neither necessary nor 
helpful. The action of both men can be accounted for in terms of 
notions like situational adjustment, commitment and side-bets, in a 
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manner which is symmetrical with respect to the truth or falsity of 
the beliefs which they held. 
Indeed, Becker's work can be applied not just in dealing with 
the work of individuals but at the level of whole disciplines or 
research traditions as well. Consider again orthodox and experimental 
taxonomy. Experimental taxonomy can be seen as an attempt to "make 
out" or create a kind of plant taxonomy which would be of value to 
the needs of twentieth-century biology. Those needs, as interpreted 
by experimental taxonomists were, as we have seen, to provide a 
better system of classification for units below the level of the 
species and to produce classifications which would be genuinely 
phylogenetic. In the later development of experimental taxonomy these 
aims become substantively modified, but during the early phase of the 
disciplines development these were objectives which were shared, even 
between such otherwise diverse figures as Clements, Turesson and 
Gregur. These figures were attempting to make a situational adjustment 
to the needs of biology as it entered the modern period of its 
development. And, the major commitment or side-bet which had to be 
made was nothing less than the commitment to an experimental methodology 
for the discipline of plant taxonomy. 
The notions of situational adjustment, commitment and side-bet 
can also be used to fill out the concept, presented at an earlier 
~oint, of interests in technical prediction and control. For 
situational adjustments, previous side-bets and the like form the 
"backdrop" against which interests in prediction and control are 
formulated, modified and sustained. Good science is the art of knowing 
what you can achieve with the resources at your disposal and when to go 
about doing it. To succeed in creating a new discipline or sub-
discipline the right "tools" (both conceptual and instrumental) have 
to be available and there has to be a market for the finished product. 
And this is especially true in a discipline like taxonomy, where the 
finished product (i.e. classifications) are supposed from the very 
start to be of service to other pure and applied branches of biology. 
Finally, we can return to the atarting point of this discussion 
and consider what should be done with the notion of scientific 
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rationality. The answer can only be sketched here, but it would seem 
to us that there is little justification in calling, for example, the 
actions and beliefs of either Hall or Clements "irrational". Both men 
were making rational decisions in the light of the situation which was 
developing in experimental plant taxonomy as they perceived such 
developments. There are no grounds whatsoever for thinking that 
either of them was acting in "bad faith" or trying to "fudge" the 
issues involved. But, the kind of rationality which they were 
employing is not one that is unique to science or scientists. Actors 
in all institutionalized systems of action and belief employ this kind 
of rational decision making (Barnes 1976: 124). The notion of 
rationality cannot be used, like an axe or a sword, to separate tru.e 
belief from falsehood, to separate "us" from "them". 
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Chapter Seven: The Role of Professional Vested Interests and Ideological 
Concerns in Controversies between Orthodox and Experimental Taxonomists 
It will be clear from the material already presented that the 
introduction of experimental methods in taxonomy was attended by a 
considerable degree of controversy. The early pioneers of experimental 
taxonomy such as Clements and Turesson believed they were formulating 
a new kind of taxonomy which would eventually replace orthodox herbarium 
methods, and controversy prior to 1930 mainly centred on discussions 
conc·erning the validity of this claim. In the 19 30 v s and 40' s, as the 
complexity and diversity of intraspecific patterns of variation became 
increasingly apparent, this "strong programme" for experimental 
taxonomy was increasingly abandoned. However, although conflict 
between the two camps was diminished in the 1930's, it by no means 
ceased. Highly polemical disputes between orthodox and experimental 
taxonomists continued to rise after 1930 and have remained a feature 
of contemporary taxonomic research. 
The issues through which these disagreements became manifest were 
varied. One major facet of dispute revolved around conflict over how 
best to define species; in effect "species" was a term which both 
experimental and orthodox taxonomists felt they had a right to claim. 
A second issue of related concern was that of whether sibling species 
should be given formal nomenclatural recognition. A third area 
around which much controversy crystallized after 1930 was the taxonomic 
treatment of hybrids. And underlying these substantive issues of 
disagreement has been the wider question of to what extent is it 
desirable to incorporate experimental and evolutionary data into taxonomy, 
an issue which, as Rollins (1953) observes, remains unresolved. 
How did this controversy, or rather series of controversies arise, 
and by what mechanisms has such conflict been sustained. In Chapter 6 
it was shown that the orthodox and experimental taxonomic colDIIIllil.ities 
have different goal orientations or interests. These different interests 
in technical prediction and control show why the classifications of 
natural kinds deployed by the two communities are different in their 
nature. Is it enough to point out different conflicting aims to account 
for the controversy between the two sides? Or does an understanding of 
this controversy require an explanation which goes beyond the purely 
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cognitive aspects of science and makes reference also to professional 
interests or perhaps even ideological concerns? 
The object of this chapter is to examine these questions in the 
light of a number of recent models which have been presented as general 
accounts of the nature of scientific controversy. In presenting this 
material these general accounts will thus be compared with the historical 
evidence presented in earlier chapters. We shall begin with theories of 
scientific controversy put forward in positivist accounts of science. 
The Positivist Account of Controversy in Science 
According to the positivist doctrine science is the only means by 
which genuine knowledge can be derived. 1 The scientific method, which 
allows statements to be given empirical meaning, results in the 
cumulative discovery of more and more pieces of reality or experience. 
Consonance with reality (or experience) defines the content of science, 
and the latter consists of genuine knowledge rather than mere belief 
or prejudice. 
On this account the basis for scientific controversy cannot be in 
knowledge itself - for this is shared - but in incidentals. For example, 
who discovered a piece of knowledge might be a legitimate source of 
controversy, but not what was discovered. Controversy does not 
involve the heart of science for that is a set of statements whose 
truth has been verified. As an example of a sociologist whose vision 
of scientific controversy was attuned to this philosophical position we 
can consider the work of R.K. Merton. 
Merton sees conflict in science as a product of competition for 
recognition (Merton 1957, 1961). Such a desire for recognition on the 
part of the scientist stems not from individual eg'Ocentricity but in 
response to the institutional patterns of reward manifest in scientific 
practice. Such an emphasis on recognition and reward led Merton to 
stress the role of priority disputes in scientific conflict. Priority 
1. This doctrine had its origins in the writings of Comte, Mill and 
Spencero For an account of these philosophers' ideas see Watson (1895). 
.,..J 
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disputes are functional because they settle the issue of who really should 
get recognition for being first to make an important discovery or 
theoretical advance. However, other forms of scientific controversy are 
dysfunctional. They violate the norm of Organized Scepticism, the latter 
being a methodological and institutional mandate that urges: 
The suspension of judgement until the facts are at hand and 
the detached scrutiny of belief in terms of empirical and 
logical criteria ••• 
(Merton 1968: 614) 
Whatever the final assessment of normative sociology proves to be,'2-
there is no doubt that Merton's account of scientific controversy yields 
little insight in understanding the conflicts surrounding the use of 
experimental methods in taxonomy. Priority disputes do occur in 
taxonomy and the International rules of botanical nomenclature are 
designed to take account of this fact. However, priority disputes have 
not been a feature of the disagreements between orthodox and experimental 
taxonomists. The controversy in this case has been a long and sustained 
one, often involving violent polemic, and yet disputes have involved not 
priority claims but (in the first instance) questions of definition, 
technical practice and differing theoretical and methodological commitments. 
Nor is there any evidence that these disputes have been abnormal or 
dysfunctional. Indeed, a fundamental weakness of functional analysis is 
that it is almost impossible to see how evidence of such "dysfunctionality" 
could be obtained. Certainly, protagonists in the disputes have sometimes 
deplored the highly polemical nature of the debate, often as a way of 
further criticising their opponents position (see, for example, Turrill 
1958). However, other taxonomists have argued that the controversy in 
their discipline is a positively healthy sign, showing a willingness to 
vigorously debate the relative merits of changes as opposed to simple 
rejection or acceptance (Rollins 1953). We can never know how taxonomy 
would have developed if there had been no controversy over the usage of 
experimental methods. In the absence of such evidence we have only the 
scientists' opinions and judgements and these cannot be taken at face 
value, nor indeed are they consistent. 
2. For a general discussion of "normative" and "interpretive" approaches 
to the sociology of science see Law and French (1974). 
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To summarise: the present case study indicates that organized 
scepticism although it is sometimes advocated by scientists, is rarely 
obeyed. Nor is the present case study the only one to demonstrate 
such a conclusion. Hagstrom ( 1965) found a similar pattern to be 
prevalent in the physical sciences: 
Whatever the validity of the positivist ideal as a norm - and 
it is questionable - it is certainly false as a description 
of the behaviour of scientists. Scientists do become 
committed to theories for which there is insufficient evidence 
to convince their colleagues, they do argue strenuously amongst 
themselves about the validity of opposed theories, and these 
arguments do become socially structured. There are "schools 
of thought" in physics as well as the other species. Scientists 
often act as if they did not accept the positivist ideal or as 
if its scope were limited. 
(Hagstrom 1965: 256) 
In conclusion it is tempting to pose the question of why Merton 
restricted his account of scientific controversy to priority disputes? 
As has been suggested above the answer to this question would seem to 
be that Merton held to a naively realistic philosophy of scientific 
progress. Such a position is implicitly rather than explicitly 
advocated in Merton's own work, but it is well brought out in the 
writings of the American philosopher of science Donald Campbell. For 
Campbell reality forces its conclusions upon the scientist, whatever 
his own interests and dispositions. The analogy here is with different 
rats in the same maze. Regardless of the initial starting points the 
rats will eventually be forced to the same "conclusion". So to with 
the scientist. Whatever his initial methods and interests he will 
eventuf!.1.ly be forced to discover the same knowledge as his colleagues: 
A major empirical achievement of the sociology of science is 
the evidence of the ubiquity of simu.l taneous invention. If 
many scientists are trying variations on the same corpus of 
current scientific knowledge, and if their trials are being 
edited by the same external, stable reality, then the selected 
variants are apt to be similar, the same discovery encountered 
independently by numerous workers. The process is no more 
mysterious than that all of a set of blind rats, each starting 
with quite different patterns of initial responses, learn the 
same maze pattern, under the maze's common editorship of the 
varied response repertoires. 
(Campbell 1974: 435) 
.. I 
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If this view were correct then a sociologicaJ. account of scientific 
controversy would indeed be restricted in scope. SociologicaJ. explanat-
ions would be needed to explain why some scientists irrationally refuse 
to be "edited" by reality just as presumably, species "psychologicaJ." 
explanations are needed if a rat refuses to learn the correct solution 
to a maze. However, no explanation would be required for rationaJ. 
correct "science-making". Happily, however, Campbell's quote puts 
things the wrong way around. Reality does not edit the scientists 
interests and beliefs. Rather the scientists g-oals and interests 
inform and structure the manner in which he organises and "edits" 
reality. For the rat the maze is a given, independent variable. But, 
knowledge is not reveaJ.ed in this fashion, like manna from heaven. 
And reality is capable of sustaining and supporting many different 
systems of knowledge and belief. 
The failure of positivist accounts of scients to yield useful 
insights on the controversy between orthodox and experimentaJ. taxonomists 
suggests that an aJ.ternative might be sought from more recent trends in 
the philosophy and sociology of science. The vaJ.ue of these recent 
trends is that, in contrast to positivism, they emphasise the problematic 
nature of cognitive aspects of science. As a consequence the content 
of science becomes a phenomena worthy of study in its own right. Kuhn 9s 
account of scientific growth and change was the seminaJ. influence 
in directing the attention of historians and sociologists along this 
pathway. 
Kuhn's essentiaJ. position as outlined in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions is well known and will only be briefly recapitulated here. 
The most novel insight of Kuhn's analysis is the claim that scientific 
practitioners are engaged for much of their time in doing "normal 
science", that is "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further 
practice" (Kuhn 1970: 10). These past achievements serve to legitimate 
and define what constitutes proper explanation and methodology for the 
science in question but are aJ.so open-ended leaving many problems unsolved.. 
The existence of this strong network of shared theoretical, instrumental 
• 
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and methodological commitments constitutes what Kuhn calls the paradigm 
o:f a normal science (Kulm 1970: 10-12). Paradigms consist o:f the 
community's shared system of beliefs and practices and are thus more 
than simply rules of research. 3 In working with a paradigm the 
scientist tries to make as close fit as possible between the world and 
the paradigm; normal science is thus a puzzle-solving activity. 
In the course o:f pursuing normal science the scientist.will generate 
anomaly. Some anomaly will be tolerated, but if such anomalies persist 
in defying resolution and grow in number, the science will enter a 
crisis state. At this stage anomaly as such will become more generally 
recognised by the scientists concerned.4 More time will be spent on 
examining fundamental assilmptions. More divergent and extreme 
revisions of theory will be attempted, revisions which at an earlier 
stage would have been considered illegitimate. Scientific conflict 
and controversy during such periods will be particularly manifest 
(Kulm 1970: 84-91). The resolution o:f this period o:f pre-revolutionary 
science comes when a new paradigm is successfully articulated. However 
switching paradigms is not an easy matter. Fundamental innovation is 
resisted. O:ften it takes a new generation o:f scientists to carry the 
day. And, it is only possible to see that a scientific revolution 
has ta.ken place after the successful emergence o:f the new paradigm 
( cf. IW~ 1962). 
Kuhn's view emphasises the scientist's coIIDnitment to particular 
theoretical-methodological traditions (paradigms) and the limits which 
these impose on radical innovation for most of the time. Scientists 
holding different paradigms are, in a sense, inhabitants o:f "di:f:ferent 
worlds" (Kuhn 1970: 111-13.5). An important :feature of paradigms is 
their incommensurabili ty. Adherents of different paradigms tend to 
'talk through' one another and they will evaluate each others' merits 
and weaknesses by the different criteria of their own paradigms. _ Thus, 
3. Although it is from paradigms that these rules of research are 
abstracted and deployed (Kuhn 1970: 43). Thus, one reading of 
Kuhn's account o:f science is that it provides cognitive norms 
to replace the Mertonia.n norms of organized scepticism, etc. 
( c:f. Mu.l:I!Cay ( 1969)). However, this is an approach which can 
be criticised from an interpretist perspective. 
4. Kuhn's treatment of anomaly is suspect here. There is no 
account of ~ anomaly is tolerated in some periods of a science's 
development but not others. 
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for Kuhn, controversy in science can be a result of different communities 
of scientists holding different paradigms.5 The result of such 
controversy and conflict in the long run is resolution as scientists 
switch from the old, defeated paradigm to the newly-emerging tradition. 
However, by the very nature of the context, the making of such a switch 
is not the logically determined process which previous philosophers of 
science had imagined it to be. For Kuhn, controversy is an inevitable 
outcome of different paradigm commitments. As such, it is closely 
connected to the emergence of new sciences. Controversy is a major 
mechanism whereby cognitive change in science takes place. 
Does Kuhn's account of controversy in science throw light on the 
controversy between biosystematists and orthodox taxonomists which 
were described in the earlier chapters of this account? Clearly 
Kuhn's work does provide some valuable insights. Orthodox and 
experimental taxonomists share very different instrumental, 
methodological and (to a lesser extent) theoretical commitments. To 
the extent that this is the case they can be said to constitute 
different paradigms sharing communities. In addition, the early 
experimental taxonomists did often claim that they were out to 
revolutionise and radically transform the nature of biological 
classification as a scientific activity. However, although the 
Kuhnian account of controversy in science can probably fit, at least 
in part, the controversies which have surrounded the development of 
experimental taxonomy, there are objections to accepting such an account 
as a full explanation of the episode. 
It might be thought that one problem which arises is that orthodox 
and experimental taxonomists, although they may have possessed different 
paradigms, nevertheless shared many background beliefs and assumptions 
as well. No modern herbarium taxonomist would question either that 
species evolve or that the species is a genetically and phenotypi~ally 
complex and heterogenous unit. What they would deny is that cytogenetical 
5. The relationship between the concepts of 'paradigm' and 'scientific 
community' is dealt with in the postscript to the 1969 edition of 
s.s.R. 
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and evolutionary evidence can always be usefully incorporated into 
formal plant classifications. However, in spite of the claim of 
Darden (1976), this is not a devastating criticism of Kuhn's position. 6 
We should expect scientists, even scientists who are members of different 
paradigmatic research traditions, often to share many background 
assumptions and beliefs. 
A more serious discrepancy is the fact that the controversies 
between orthodox and experimental taxonomists appear to have been 
engendered in a context which bears little resemblance to KuhnVs 
characteristation of science in a crisis or pre-revolutionary state. 
The legacy passed on to herbarium taxonomy at the start of the century 
was that of describing and ordering, by means of monographs and floras, 
the vast diversity of plant species found on the earth. In spite of 
the claims sometimes made to the contrary by experimentalists (e.g. 
Heslop-Harrison 1953: 10), this objective is still nowhere near 
completion. 7 In carrying out this task there has been no crisis of 
methodology or revolution, the methods employed are still largely those 
developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, notably herbarium analysis 
based primarily upon external morphology. And for much of this work 
experimental methods are not suitable, as some experimentalists have 
themselves admitted (e.g. HaJ.l and Clements 1923: 1; ·Clausen 1931: 303; 
Gregor 1939; Keck 1959). 
It is clear that orthodox and experimental taxonomy do represent, 
in some sense, different paradigms or research traditions within 
taxonomy. And, there is formal incommensurability between the 
classifications which are produced when either mode of approach is 
adopted. To take just one of the examples discussed in the last 
chapter, Gilia inconspicua cannot be both a single species and five 
6. Darden argues that Darwin and De Vries shared many assumptions in 
their scientific work, although they possessed different "paradigms" 
in Kuhn's terminology. 
7. It has been estimated that of the 10 million or so species in 
existence only some 10-15% have been described by taxonomists (see 
Raven, Berlin and Breedlove 1971: 1210). 
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different species. However inconunensurability is not, in itself, 
an explanation for why controversy has existed between the two 
disciplines. It would have been quite possible for orthodox and 
experimental taxonomy to have been regarded as mutually. complementary 
approaches to the study of biological natural kinds and indeed, such 
an approach is advocated in some of the more recent taxonomical 
literature (e.g. Raven 1974). Cognitive factors alone do not explain 
why conflict occurs because conflict itself is a choice rather than a 
matter of any logical necessity: 
Theorists can happily maintain opposing views in a state 
of peaceful coexistence as long as such theories remain 
inconsequential for group practice. Whenever 
professional or political interests are at stake, 
however, theoretical differences are transformed into 
heated controversy and elements of the intellectual 
substance of those theories will mirror threatened 
interests. 
(Harwood 1979, 232) 
To sununarise: Merton's account of controversy in science possesses 
the merit of emphasising science as a social activity and conflict as 
something which arises out of the social and institutional structure 
of scientific patterns of interest and reward. However, Merton 
restricted his account of scientific controversy to priority disputes. 
As a result, controversy in science becomes something which is peripheral, 
which takes place after a scientific discovery has been made. Kuhn's 
work removes this anomaly and places conflict and competition in science 
at the heart of enterprise - within scientific cognition. However, the 
weakness of this approach is that it does not give cognitive disagreements 
in science a satisfactory basis in institutional organization. "Why 
should different groups take opposed technical positions? 
Different cognitive interests (or interests in prediction and 
control) are a necessary but not sufficient condition for controversy 
to occur. To explain the controversy between orthodox and experimental 
taxonomists we must examine Harwood's "professional and political 
interests" and their respective roles in the material presented in 
earlier chapters. 
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Professional Vested Interests as an Ex:planation of the controversy 
between Orthodox and E?cperimental Taxonomists 
Biologists in the twentieth century have become increasingly 
experimental in their aim and outlook. As Garland Allen has observed: 
Contemporary biology is • • • marked by a highly experimental 
viewpoint. The twentieth century has witnessed the continuous 
attempt of biologists to bring their fields of endeavour within 
the rigorous domains of experimental analysis ••• Modern 
biologists have demanded more than observation and description 
or organisms or their processes. This demand is for the 
methods of experimental analysis and the attempt to study 
biological processes on a number of levels, chief of which 
has been the level of molecular interaction. 
(Allen 1975: xiv-xv) 
The change from observation and description to experimental 
analysis was more than just a matter of methodology. It also involved 
a change in the type of explanations considered appropriate in 
biological investigation. ·The biologists of the new experimental 
school were concerned with locating causes of biological phenomena, 
often in microstructure. Analogues with chemistry and physics 
were commonly made, and many adherents of the "New Botany" of the 
1880 9 s were mechanists in their approach to plants, holding that 
the proper explanation of biological phenomena lay in their chemical 
and physical make up. 
To begin with the use of the new experimental methods was confined 
mostly to physiology. It was also a movement which in the nineteenth 
century was especially prominent in Germany. However, the spread of 
experimental methods from German physiology to other countries and 
other disciplines of biology was well under way by the turn of the century, 
The spread of experimental methods from physiology to previously 
more descriptive areas came first· in embryology in the 1880 9s 
with the rise of the "developmental mechanics" of Wilhelm Roux 
(1850-1924) • • • From embryology the experimental approach 
spread to cytology and heredity, and finally to evolutionary 
theory. Each instance saw a transformation of the kinds of 
questions being asked and the kinds of methods used to answer 
those questions, from descriptive and speculative to 
experimental and quantitative. By the 1930 9s most areas of 
biology, except perhaps paleontology and systematics, were 
loudly claiming new advances because of the use of experimental 
analysis and the methods of physics and chemistry. 
(Allen 1975: xvii) 
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Seen in this light the attempt to introduce experimental methods 
into plant geography (ecology) and systematics (experimental taxonomy) 
were part of a much wider movement to experimentalise and quantify all 
forms of biological enquiry. The revolt. from morphology evident in 
the writings of experimental taxonomists in the 1920 1s was part of a 
general trend away from morphology, and a trend which united such 
otherwise diverse biologists as Bateson, Weldon, Morgan, Clements, 
Turesson, Lotsy and De Vries. 
In both ecology and taxonomy the use of experimental and 
quantitative techniques was linked to professional objectives and 
goals. These concerns are especially manifest in Clements writings. 
Clements believed that amateurs would have to be excluded from 
ecology if the status of the discipline was not to be damaged: 
No subject has suffered more from the lack of training and 
experiment or from the absence of basic procedure and 
adequate perspective. It has become obvious that this 
condition can be remedied and actual progress· insured only 
by instrumental and experimental methods and by a 
combination of intensive and extensive studies that will 
check superficiality on the one hand and broaden limited 
horizons on the other. It is certain that much work of 
purely superficial or local character will continue to be 
done under the name of. ecology, but the touchstones of 
instrument, quadrant, and experiment afford a ready means 
of eliminating such papers from consideration. No study 
deserves to be called ecological that does not deal with 
the cause-and-effect relation of habitat and organism in 
a quantitative and objective manner. 
(Clements and Weaver 1924: 3) 
And within taxonomy experimental and quantative technl:ques have 
continued to be justified on these grounds. According to Sokal and 
Sneath taxonomy is handicapped by the inadequate training and 
background of many of its participants: 
It is surely a reflection of the state of the science that 
the description and classification of organisms is today 
one of the few fields of biology to which amateurs without 
sound theoretical and practical training are able to 
contribute ••• As more sophisticated ideas and techniques 
percolate through systematics, amateurs not trained in 
modern taxonomy will find their sphere of activity 
progressively more circumscribed. 
(Sokal and Sneath 1963: 9-10) 
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One consequence of the triumph of experimentaJ.ism in twentieth 
century biology was that systematics of the more descriptive kind 
came to be seen as having a low status and of being, in effect, an 
amateur's discipline. Many experimental biologists could see little 
value or purpose in orthodox taxonomy which appeared to be an activity 
more akin to collecting postage-stamps than to proper science. Mayr, 
writing in 1942, recorded this decline in the status of systematics 
in the following terms: 
The rise of genetics during the first thirty years of this 
century had ·a rather infortun.ate effect on the prestige of 
systematics. The spectacular success of experimentaJ. 
work in unravelling the principles of inheritance and the 
obvious applicability of these results in explaining 
evolution have tended to push systematics into the back-
ground. There was a tendency among laboratory workers 
to think rather contemptuously of the museum man, who 
spent his time counting hairs and drawing bristles, and 
whose aim seemed to be merely the correct naming of his 
specimens. 
(Mayr 1942: 3) 
Experimental taxonomists held out the promise of being able to 
reverse this trend. In effect the experimentalists sought to 
.redefine and renegociate the scope of traditionaJ. taxonomic enquiry. 
The new systematist not only employed experimental methods in plant 
classification, he also was concerned with plant taxa as biological 
phenomena, with their origins, relationship and biological organisation 
( cf. Mayr 1942: 11). As a result taxonomy would become once again at 
the centre of biological research. Babcock saw adoption of such 
methods as "the only way to get taxonomy the fundamental place it 
deserves in biology" (1947: 31). Similarly, Turrill, at the end of 
his paper on "Taxonomy and Genetics", expressed the hope that: 
If my remarks do something to remove the common misconception 
that taxonomy is merely a dry museum or herbarium study, · 
hidebound by tradition, and limited to the preparation of 
technical descriptions, identification of specimens, and 
problems of nomenclature, they will achieve an important 
function. If, further, they serve to attract some younger 
biologists to studies helping directly towards an "omega" 
taxonomy they will have f'u.lfilled their main purpose. It 
remains a fact that taxonomy is now in an interesting 
condition, and one does not really know what it may bring 
forth. 
(Turrill 1938: 39) 
- 209 -
Thus, for orthodox taxonomists, experimental methods held out 
both a promise and a threat. The promise was that experimental 
methods would make taxonomy relevant to the needs of biologists in 
other disciplines. As Lincoln Constance put it in his opening 
address to the American Association of Plant Taxonomists, the adoption 
of the new techniques would make it "unthinkable for a department of 
botany to attempt to get along without a systematist" (Constance 19.51: 
231). However, the new methods were also a threat to established 
taxonomic practice. Taxonomists who saw this threat emphasised 
traditional professional boundaries. Rydberg (1926) did not believe 
that ecologists could tell taxonomists how classification should be 
achieved. Bremekamp (1939) made it clear that using experimental 
techniques involved work which was outside the "domain" of taxonomic 
enquiry. And even taxonomists who did use experimental methods (e.g. 
Turrill and Keck) emphasised that much basic research still needed to 
be done which would utilise .the non-experimental approach of the 
herbarium taxonomist. 
In many important ways the emergence of experimental taxonomy at 
the turn of the century has striking parallels with the birth of 
psychology in Germany in the 19th century. As Ben-David and Collins 
(1966) have shown, an important factor in the development of psychology 
wase role-hybridization. Role hybridization occurs when scientists 
move from one scientific discipline to another and attempt to deploy 
the methods and techniques of the old discipline to the new one, 
thereby self-consciously creating a new role. Role hybridization is, 
therefore, one form of situational adjustment (see Chapter 6). For 
role hybridization to occur three factors must be present (Ben -David 
and Collins 1966: 46.5). 
1 • The old and new disciplines must both be established with a 
professional base and thus allow for academic rather than amateu.r 
roles to be established. 
2. Intellectual migration must be taking place from a discipline 
or disciplines whose status or academic standing is high to one whose 
status or academic standing is relatively low. 
3. A better competitive situation must be present in the low 
status discipline, making migration attractive in spite of the more 
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lowly standing of the discipline into which migration is taking place. 
The result when these three factors are present is the formation 
of a new distinct discipline which uses the methods of the high status 
fields from which migration has occurred to tackle the problems of aims 
of the low status discipline in a new and different way. Thus, 
psychology arose because experimental scientists (physiologists) 
migrated into philosophy and applied to the latter experimental, as 
opposed to philosophical, methods. Experimental taxonomy arose in a 
similar fashion: migrating scientists from experimental disciplines 
(genetics, cytology and ecology) applied the methods learned in these 
disciplines to solve problems of plant classification which had, 
hitherto, been approached from a morphological and descriptive 
perspective. Clearly this migration also involved movement of 
scientists from a field with a relatively high academic standing or 
status to a field with a low. and declining standing. What is less 
clear in the present study is whether this mobility was caused by the 
existence of a better competitive situation in taxonomy vis-a-vis 
ecology, genetics and cytology. It is possible that it was not. 
However, to decide this point one way or the other is not possible at 
this time. It would require a detailed analysis of institutional 
location, sources of patronage and degree of scientific mobility which 
has been beyond the scope of the present investigations. As was 
stated in the introduction, no work of this nature has been done on 
twentieth century plant taxonomy and its related disciplines. 
What is not in doubt, however, is that professional matters -
that is matters of status, image, questions of training and reward -
played a key role in the rhetoric of the debate between orthodox 
and experimental taxonomists. And these professional interests 
and concerns were closely allied with the different instrumental 
interests of the two kinds of taxonomy discussed in Chapter 6. For 
these instrumental judgements are a reflection of the social interests 
of groups of practitioners with different technical competences and 
skills. The point here is a general one: because the construction 
of scientific knowledge is a social process, social and cognitive 
factors will always overlap and combine in this manner. 
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That this is the case has some important consequences for 
historical and sociological studies of science. That scientists 
are concerned over factors such as status, pedagogy and image should 
not be seen as an unexpected discovery. Their existence is only 
made invisible when the history of science is regarded entirely in 
terms of a history of ideas. However, such factors are also not 
properly seen as being in a:ny way "external" to science. Such factors 
will always be present in the emergence of a:ny piece of scientific 
knowledge and in the growth of all forms of scientific culture, 
although, of course, their nature and degree of significance in a:ny 
single concrete instance is a matter of empirical investigation. 
Their study, therefore comprises what a.mounts to a previously "hidden" 
internal component of the history of science. 
Thus far then we have analysed the differences between orthodox 
and experimental taxonomy in a manner which lays emphasis on "internal" 
factors in the growth of scientific knowledge. For the sake of 
exposition these internal factors were classified as being interests 
of two different kinds: interests in technical prediction and 
control (cognitive interests) and professional vested interests. In 
practice these two sets of interests are combined in the construction 
of a:ny given piece of scientific knowledge. What of the role of 
"external" or wider social interests? Whether interests of this 
nature shed light upon the differences between orthodox and experimental 
taxonomy will be discussed in the next section. 
t 
The Role of External Facors in the Controversies over Ex:perimental Taxonomy 
A 
That social, political and ideological factors of a kind usually 
considered as "external" to science can sometimes play a role in 
scientific conflicts and controversies is now beyond doubt. A number 
of case studies now verify that this is the case. 8 As one example from 
this growing literature we can consider the work of Mackenzie and Barnes 
(1975) on the controversy between the biometricians and the mendelians. 
8. Only a small proportion of this literature is considered below. 
For more examples see Mulkay (1979). 
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The major "scientific" issue in this debate concerned the nature of 
the variation through which speciation took place. The biometricians, 
of whom Karl Pearson was the leading advocate in Britain, held that 
evolution took place solely by the action of selection on small 
continuous differences within populations, differences which occurred 
at the extreme ends of any given characters normal distribution. For 
the mendelians, and especially for the leading mendelian of this 
period, William Bateson, evolution took place primarily through 
saltations or large-scale mutations and hence involved an element of 
unpredictability not easily susceptible to rigid mathematical analysis. 
The controversy had, of course, many other ramifications but this was 
the central point at issue (of. Provine, 1970: 1-24). 
Mackenzie and Barnes see this controversy, especially as evident 
in the writings of the two major protagonists Bateson and Pearson, as 
intimately linked to the gr~wth of the eugenics movement in Britain 
during the period from 1890 to 1914. The eugenic programme could be 
demonstrated as feasible only if evolution was a predictable process 
susceptible to mathematical analysis. Pearson was an active supporter 
of eugenics and the reformist and interventionist politics which such 
a programme of action would entail. Biometry, as developed by Pearson 
and his colleagues, was designed to provide the theoretical and 
practical basis for· a eugenic position. Eugenicists emphasised the 
importance of professional-scientific skills in the management of 
society. Pearson was a typical representative of the new professional 
middle-class whose interests eugenical reform was designed chiefly to 
serve (Mackenzie 1976). Bateson, on the other hand, was a conservative 
thinker opposed to the radical reforms of the new middle classes 
including eugenical reforms (Mackenzie and Barnes, 1975). For Bateson 
the chief source for progress, both in science and society lay in the 
existence of occasional novelty and genius, genius whose importance 
should be recognised and cultivated but which could not be reproduced 
as it were 'on demand v • Thus for both figures there are explicit 
links to be made between scientific beliefs and political, social and 
ideological interests which are normally seen as external to science. 
An important analytical tool in this type of approach to history 
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of science is the concept of 'styles of thought' first developed by 
the German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1936). The use of this 
concept is predicated on the notion of knowledge as the product of 
man as a vsocial animal'. In Mannheim's own words, "it is not men 
in general who think, or even isolated individuals who do thinking 
but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of 
thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical 
situations characterizing their common position" (1936: 2-3). Thus 
for Mannheim a style of thought can be understood as, "a set of 
concepts linked together by a coherent Weltanschauung" - and also as 
"a specific approach to reality which tends to influence the method 
of thinking and the presentation of the facts" (Mannheim 1953: 165). 
The most celebrated example of the use of such an analysis is 
Mannheim's own interpretation of the development of conservative 
styles of thought in Germany during the nineteenth century (Mannheim 
1953: 74-164). According to Mannheim, this style of thinking 
developed as a conscious repudiation of the "natural law" philosophy 
of the Enlightenment. The chief characteristics of this mode of 
thought is its stress on the highly rationalistic, scientific and 
progressive nature of knowledge. It is also characteristically a 
mechanistic style of thought. Wholes (be they of a physical, 
biological or social system) are seen as analysable into their 
constituent elements or atoms without distortion or error. The whole 
is the sum of its parts and can best be explained by reduction to its 
constitutent parts. 
Conservative thought was a counter-movement which is essentially 
traditionalist and opposed to the progressive orientation of natural 
law thinking. Conservative thinkers stressed the concrete and the 
practical as against the universal and the abstract. The importance 
of time and historical explanation is often especially emphasised in 
conservative thought. There is often stress on intuitive and 
irrationalist forms of methodology and on the failure of general 
and 'universal' explanations to deal with that which is unusual and 
unique. The whole is seen as more than the sum of its parts and as 
not reducible to its atomistic constituents; conservative thinking 
is holistic and anti-reductionist. 
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Styles of thought are reactions to specific political, social and 
intellectual circumstances and the tendency to conceive of them as 
archetypal or Platonic entities is to be restricted. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of conservative and natural law thought given by 
Mannheim does appear to yield insights when applied to other bodies 
of knowledge in other epochs. Also, in spite of Mannheim's belief 
that scientific knowledge should pe exempted from sociological enquiry, 
these styles of thought do appear to be useful tools in understanding 
some controversies within Sci·ence (Mannheim 1936: 38-39, 244, 268). 
Thus, Harwood ( 1976, 1977) has found Mannheim's categories of 
conservative and natural law thought to be illuminating when applied 
to modern debates over race and I.Q. He suggests that, "contemporary 
hereditarianism is an expression at the level of scientific theory of 
its proponents' classic liberal world-view" (1977: 10). 
A second use of Mannheim 1 s category of conservative thought is 
found in Coleman's work of William Bateson (Coleman 1970). Colemanvs 
argument is that it was Bateson's conservatism which explains his 
initial rejection of the chromosome theory of heredity proposed by 
Morgan and others in the period from 1900 to 1920. Indeed styles of 
thought can be used to explain not only controversies within science 
but also controversies about the nature of science. For example, 
the long and bitter dispute between Kuhn and Popper is explicable in 
these terms (Bloor 1976: 48-73). Social and political beliefs it 
would appear, influence not only positions taken within science but 
our very conception of the nature of science as an activity. 
It is clearly possible that an approach such as this might explain 
the controversies between orthodox and experimental taxonomists. 
Stress on the importance of classification as an activity has sometimes 
been associated with an enlightenment view of science. Gillispie has 
described opposition to the Linnaean system as "a touchstone of romantic 
and metamorphic (or stoicizing) tendencies in taxonomy" (Gillispie 1962: 
280). Thus, Linnaean botany was one of the major casual ties when 
Jacobin philosophy of science became dominant in France during the period 
immediately following the French revolution. However, in the twentieth 
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century the major criticisms levelled against taxonomists have been 
that they are too"conservative", and traditional in their scientific 
philosophy. And in attempting rebuttals to this claim, taxonomists 
occasionally use a language which reveals wider concerns with what 
are seen as overly liberal and progressive trends in our current 
socieities value-orientations. 
systematist Crowson writes that: 
For example, the zoological 
If systematics is eventually restored to its central 
position in academic botany and zoology, this will be one 
manifestation of a change in the general 'intellectual 
climate•. Other signs of such a change will be the 
official reeognition of natural history as an aspect of 
science entitled to parity of esteem with natural 
philosophy, and the reinstatement of the view that a 
prime function of universities is the preservation and 
transmission of a vast heritage of culture and knowledge. 
Much more effort will be made to inculcate in the young 
a profound respect for their cultural heritage and 
correspondingly less emphasis placed on the cleverness 
of the present. Instead of being taught to despise or 
patronise previous generations, students would be made 
to feel that only by tremendous efforts could they hope 
to match the achievements of their predecessors. 
(Crowson 1970: 305) 
Can we go ·further than this and see taxonomy in general as a body 
of knowledge which has been designed to legitimate and serve conservative 
social interests and beliefs? In fact, it seems almost certain that we 
ca.rmot make such an inference. The problems here are two-fold. Firstly, 
there is no evidence that taxonomists as a body of individuals are 
proportionately more conservative in their social and political views 
than other scientists. Such evidence has not, of course, been sought 
but in its absence there is no positive ground for taking the position 
jµst outlined above. Secondly, and of even greater significance, is 
the fact that taxonomists rarely link their role as scientists with any 
wider concerns of a political or socio-political nature. Crowson is 
one of the very few possible exceptions to this statement and even here 
the case is arguable. Does Crowson want a return to traditional 
values for their own sake or because he considers that the return to 
such values would aid taxonomy? And it is worth also noting that even 
if a conservative "style of thought" is provisionally accepted as being 
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applicable to some taxonomists this would still not necessarily have 
any value in explaining the controversy within taxonomy over the use 
of experimental methods. Crowson is an interesting case in point here, 
for in spite of his emphasis on the importance of tradition he is a firm 
advocate of the use of experimental methods in .taxonomy (Crowson 1970: 145). 
The above observations do not rule out the possibility that 
ideological concerns were manifest in the writings of scientists 
considered in earlier chapters. One figure whose work might be 
particularly rewarding to study from this perspective is F.C. Clements. 
Duff (1975) has argu.ed that Clement's organismic theory of vegetation 
development is explicable in Mannheim's categ;ories as a manifestation 
of conservative thinking. And this observation is consistent with 
Clement's insistence that classifications of plants should reflect 
evolutionary history. However, this explanation, if correct, applies 
only to Clements. It does not provide any evidence that ideological 
objectives were a systematic source of controversy between orthodox 
and experimental taxonomists. 
In conclusion then, the controversy between orthodox and 
Experimental taxonomists appears to be one which is largely explicable 
in terms of 'internal' factors. However, this is a purely empirical 
finding and one which might be overturned by future investigations. 
Scientific taxonomies, and by implication other forms of scientific 
knowledge, are conventional in character. Because of this there are 
no compelling a priori grounds for denying the possibility that 
external factors play a role in science. In the future, naturalistic 
studies of science, whether they invoke "internal" (cognitive and 
professional) or "external" (political and ideological) interests to 
account for the growth of scientific beliefs, can be confidently 
freed from the over-restrictive doctrines of metaphysical realism and 
essentialism. The sociology of science can never be merely the 
sociology of error for, as the present study has indicated, those very 
notions of "error' and "truth" are socially manipulated and sustained. 
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Appendix A: Numerical Taxonomy and its Significance to a Naturalistic 
Account of Classification 
The 1960's saw the advent of computers as aids to taxonomic 
investigations, both in zoology and botany. However, this period has 
seen more than just the use of computers for information, storage and 
retrieval. It has also seen the emergence of a new approach to 
systematics, centred on the use of computers and possessing its own 
philosophy and theory of classification as well. Most of the work 
in this field has been done in the United States; Sokal and Sneath 
(1963) have been two of the major advocates. 
The main theoretical tenet of numerical taxonomy is that biological 
classifications should be phenetic, that is based on overall resemblance 
and that for this reason characters should be weighed equally when a 
classification is produced. Michel Adanson, the eighteenth century 
Parisian botanist, held a position similar to this so that numerical 
taxonomy is sometimes referred to as "neo-Adansonian" taxonomy. 
Computers are employed in numerical taxonomy to prevent the, 
perhaps unintentional, weighting of characters which will occur when 
classifications are constructed in the normal way. Numerical taxonomists 
claim that, by avoiding such "subjective bias", numerical techniques 
provide a more objective classification than that which is possible by 
other methods. 
The production of numerical classifications involves five basic 
steps (see Sneath 1962 and also Davis and Heywood 196~: 132-137): 
1. The first procedure is to select the group of organisms to be 
studied. These will usually be individuals, either treated as such or 
taken as representatives of named taxa (normally species). The 
taxonomic entities to be employed in the classification are termed as 
operational taxonomic units (O.T.U. 1s). 
2. As many characters as possible are now found and scored for 
each O.T.u;· In the simplest case, which is all that need concern us 
here, each character is scored as either present (+), absent (-) or 
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as not applicable for the O.T.U. in question (N.C.). The result, 
when each character is scored is a coded data table (t x n table). 
An example of such a table is shown in figu.re A. l for 12 characters 
and 4 O.T.U.'s. In practice, of course, many more characters would 
be employed than this, but this can be ignored for illustrative 
purposes. 
3. The third step, having fed the information from the coded data 
table into a computer, requires calculating a figu.re which will act as 
a measure of resemblance fGr each pair of O.T.U. 1s. This is done by 
means of a coefficient of resemblance. In the simplest case this will 
consist of a numerical index of similarity (S), such as the following: 
s = x 100 
where N
8 
= the number of positive characters shared in common by any 
two O.T.U.'s, and Nd= the number of features positive in one O.T.U. 
but negative in the other. 
The result of these calculations is a similarity matrix (t x t table) 
like the one shown in figu.re A~2. 
4. The O.T. U. 's can now be arranged in a way which brings together 
those pairs with the highest degree of similarity. This stage of 
numerical procedures is termed cluster analysis. The simplest way of 
performing this operation is to take the similarity matrix and shade 
in the·figu.res in a way which indicates ranges of similarity. The 
table can then be re-arranged accordingly. This process is illustrated 
diagrammatically in figure A.3, for a similarity matrix consisting of 
10 O.T.u.•s." 
5. Finally, the information given by cluster analysis is ~sed to 
construct a dendogram. The dendogram for the 10 O.T.U.'s shown in 
figu.re A.3 is shown below in figure A.4. 
From this dendogram it is possible to derive the phenons which are 
the actual units of numerical taxonomy. What these groups include will 
depend on the level of the phenon employed. For example, the 10 O.T.U. 1-s-, 
shown in figure A.4 can be arranged in a 3-fold hierarchy representing, 
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respectively, 85%, 75% and 65% similarity. At the 85-phenon there are 
6 groups (ABEI, C, F, G, J, DH). At the 75-phenon there are 4 groups 
(ABEI, CFG, J, DH). At the 65-phenon level there are 3 groups (ABEI, 
CFGJ, DH). If desired these phenons can be regarded as species, 
subgenera, genera, etc. depending on the ranks of the original O.T.U.'s 
employed in the study. However, there is of course, no necessity to 
equate phenons with the taxonomic groupings of orthodox taxonomy in this 
fashion. 
The Significance of a Numerical Taxonomy to a Naturalistic Accormt of 
Classification 
As was stated above, the advantage of numerical taxonomy (or its 
claimed advantage) is that it delimits groups according to agreed (but 
arbitrary) levels of similarity which are "objectively" measured. The 
result is a phenetic classification free from the conscious or rmconscious 
weighting of characters which will occur when conventional methods are 
employed. It is not appropriate here to discuss the value of such 
methods to biological systematics or to discuss their likely future 
impact, although it is worth noting that both these questions have 
engendered heated controversy. What will be considered here is the 
significance of numerical taxonomy to a naturalistic theory of 
classification. 
The taxa (or phenons) of numerical taxonomy are polythetic, i.e. 
definable only by using a cluster of characters. As Sneath and 
Sokal (1962: 14) put it, "no single attribute is in theory sufficient 
and necessary for membership in the group so long as the members share 
a high proportion of characters". And as Hesse (1974: 48) points out, 
the eXistence of classifications of this sort in science in itself 
constitutes a refutation of the claim often made by philosophers that 
Wittgenstein's family resemblance theory of universals contains logical 
inconsistencies and circularities. 
However, the significance of numerical taxonomy to our account of 
classification goes further than this. For not only do computers 
programmed by numerical taxonomists produce polythetic taxa, the 
methods by which these taxa are produced are identical to the 
classification theory discussed in chapter two as 'logicalized cluster 
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description theory'. For the computer a given phenon (P) contains 
an O.T.U. if and only if that O.T.U. possesses a sufficient number of 
the cluster of characters used to define that phenon. No character 
is more important or essential than any other, all characters are 
weighed equally. 
Do humans classify in a manner which is analog-ous to the computer's 
functionings? The answer is almost certainly that they do not; indeed 
this is why computers were introduced. A major dissimilarity centres 
around the problem of character definition. This is no problem for 
the computer since what constitutes a character is defined for it by 
its human operator. However, when human beings undertake a 
classification there is good evidence that they do so on the basis of 
a gestalt of often unverbalized perceptions of similarity and 
difference: 
In assessing similarity the taxonomist working neurally does 
not have to make consciously the abstractions we call 
characters: it is only when he wishes to communicate about 
any particular aspect, e.g. for diagnosis, that he is forced 
to rationalize what he recognises as a gestalt of many 
independently varying elements, and break it down into 
component parts. As a consequence of this the taxonomist 
may produce a satisfactory division into species despite 
the characters set down in his descriptions. 
(Davis and Heywood 1963: 139) 
Moreover, the equal weighting of characters is itself a choice. 
Indeed it is a choice that many taxonomists see as a poor one. If 
the units formed are regarded as species then the groups so formed 
may not correlate with genetic and crossability evidence derived from 
studies .of the same populations. Also, the lack of weighting may 
result in groups where convergence and parallelism mean that the 
resulting classification conflicts with evolutionary evidence (e.g. 
in the fossil record). Finally, the species formed in numerical 
taxonomy may have no single morphological attribute which can be 
used to separate them from neighbouring populations, making recognition 
in the field and herbarium an exceedingly difficult task. For these 
reasons there arema.ny who would question the value of the numerical 
techniques outlined above. 
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It would seem then that 'logicalized cluster description theory' 
describes one strategy for classifying natural kinds. It is not a 
strategy with which many taxonomists would find favour, although it 
is a strategy which is particularly well exemplified in the procedures 
of numerical taxonomy. 
- 222 -
Bibliography 
ADAMS, M.B. (1968), 'The Foundings of Population Genetics: Contributions 
of the Chetverikov School', JournaJ. of the History of 
Biology 1:23-41. 
ADAMS, M.B. (1970), 9Towards a Synthesis: Population Concepts in Russian 
Evolutionary Thought, 1925-1935', JournaJ. of the History 
of Biology 3: 107-129. 
ADANSON, M. (1757), 9Histoire Naturelle du Senegal', Coqvilla.ges, Paris. 
ADANSON, M. (1763), 9Familles des Plan.tea', Paris. 
ALBURY, W.R. and Oldroyd, D.R. (1977), 'From Renaissance Mineral Studies 
to HistoricaJ. Geology in the Light of Michel Foucault's 
The Order of Things 9 , British J ournaJ. for the Histo:cy 
of Science, 10: 187-215. 
ALEXOPOULOS, C.J. (1952), 'Introductory Mycology', J. Wiley, New York. 
ALLAN, H.H. (1935), 'Leonard Cockayne 1855-1934', Proceedings of the 
Linnean Society of London, Session 1934-1935: 167-171. 
ALLEN, D.E. (1976), 9The Naturalist in Britain: A SociaJ. History', A. Lane, 
London. 
ALLEN, G. (1969), 'Hugo de Vries and the Reception of the Mutation Theory', 
Journal of the Histo:cy of Biology, 2: 55-87. 
ALLEN, G. (1975), 'Life Science in the Twentieth Century 9 , J. Wiley, New York. 
ALLEN, G. (1976), 'Essay Review: Genetics, Eugenics and Society: 
Internalist and Externalists in Contemporary History of 
Science', Social Studies of Science 6: 105-122. 
ALLEN, G. ( 1978) 'Thomas Hunt Morgan: the Man and his Science' , Prince ton 
University Press, Princeton (New Jersey). 
ALSTON, R.E. and Turner, B.L. (1959), 'Applications of Paper Chromatography 
to Systematics: Recombination of Parental. Biochemical 
Components in a Baptisia Hybrid Population9 , Nature 184: 
285-286. 
ALV.ARE'Z-LOPEZ, E. (1957),'Especificacion, Su.bspecificacion y Biogeografia9 , 
F.a.i toriaJ. Sunnna, Madrid. 
ANDERSON, E.S. (1928), 'The Problem of Species in Northern Blue Flags, 
Iris versicolor L. and Iris virginica L9 , AnnaJ.s of the 
Missouri Botanical. Garden 15: 241-332. 
ANDERSON, E.So (1936a), 'Hybridization in American Tradescantias!, AnnaJ.s 
of the Missouri Botanical. Garden 23: 511-525 · 
ANDERSON, E.S. (1936b), 'An Experimental Study of Hybridi~ation in the 
Genus Apocynum', Annals of the Missouri Botanical Garden 
23: 1$9-168. 
- 223 -
ANDERSON, E.S. (1936c), 'The Species Problem in~·, Annals of the 
Missouri Botanical Garden 23: 457-509. 
ANDERSON, E.S. (1941), 'The Technique and Use of Mass-Collections in 
Plant Taxonomy', Annals of the Missouri Botanical Garden 
28: 287-292. 
ANDERSON, E.S. (1949), 9Introgressive Hybridization9 , J •. Wiley, New York. 
ANDERSON, E.S. (1953), 'Introgressive Hybridization', Biological Review 
28: 280-307. 
ANDERSON, E.S. and Hubrich, L. (1938), 9Hybridization in Tradescantia: the 
Evidence for Introgressive Hybridization', American 
Journal of Botany 25: 396-402. 
ANDERSON, E.S. and Sax, K. (1936), 'A Cytological, Monograph of the 
American Species of Tradescantia, Botanical Gazette 
97: 433-476. 
ANDERSON, E.S. and Turrill, W.B. (1935), 'Biometrical Studies on 
Herbarium Material', Nature 136: 986. 
BABCOCK, E.B. (1920), 'Crepis - A-promising Genus for Genetical 
Investigations 9 , American Naturalist 584: 270-276. 
BABCOCK, E.B. ( 1934), 'Harvey Monroe Hall', University of California 
Publications in Botany, 17: 355-368. 
BABCOCK, E.B. (1942), 'Systematics, Cytogenetics and Evolution in Crepis', 
Botanical Review 8: 139-190. 
BABCOCK, E.B. (1944), 'New Light on Evolution and Research in Crepis', 
American Naturalist 78: 385-409. 
BABCOCK, E.B. ( 1947.), 'The Genus Crepis 9 , University of California 
· Publications in Botany, Vols. 21 and 22. 
BABCOCK, E.B. and Clausen, J. (1929), 'Meiosis in Two Species and Three 
Hybrids of Crepis and its Bearing on Taxonomic 
Relationship', University of California Publications 
in .Agricultural Sciences 2: 401-432. 
BABCOCK, E.B., Clausen, R.E., Collins, J.L. and Mann, M.C. (1922), 
'Progress Report on the Crepis Investigations by the 
Division of Genetics for the year ending June 30th 1922', 
Report of the College of Agriculture and the Agricultural 
Experiment Station of the University of California from 
July 1921 to June 1922: 3-9· 
BABCOCK, E.B. and Hall, H.M. (1924), 'Hemizonia congesta: A Genetic, 
Ecol0gica1 and Taxonomic study of the Hay-field Tan.weeds 9 , 
University of California Publications in Botany 13: 
15-100. 
- 224 -
BABCOCK, E.B. and Navashin, M. (1930), 'The Genus Crepis', Bibliog.raphia 
Genetica 6: 1-90. 
BABCOCK, E.B. and Stebbins, G.L. ( 1937), 'The Genus Youngia', Carnegie 
Institution of Washington Publication Number 484, 
Washington, D.C. 
BAILEY, L. (1896), 'The Philosophy of Species Making', Botanical Gazette 
22: 454-462. 
BAKHTEYEV, F.K., Ligunova, T.V. Mordvinkina, A.I., Suvorov, U.V. and 
Webalina, M.A. (1966), 'Eu.ginija Nikoldevna Sinskaya 
1899-1965', Taxon 15: 169-176. 
BARNES, B. (1976), 'Natural Rationality: A Neglected Concept in the 
Social Sciences', Philosophy of the Social Sciences 
6: 115-126. 
BARNES, B. (1977), 'Interests and the Growth of Knowledge', Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London. 
BARNES, B. (1978), 9Why is the Cassowary a Bird?' Unpublished paper, 
University of Ed~nburgh. 
BECKER, H.S. (1964), 'Personal Changes in Adult Life', Sociometry 27: 
40-53. 
BEN-DAVID, J. and Collins, R. (1966), 'Social Factors in the Origins 
of a New Science: the Case of Psychology', American 
Sociological Review 31: 451-465. 
BENNEI1, E. (1964), 9Historical Perspectives in Genecology', Scottish 
Plant Breeding Station Records 1964: 49-115. 
BENTHAM, G. and Hooker, J.D. (1862-83), 'Genera Plantarum', London. 
_BESSEY, C.E. (1908), 'Taxonomic Aspects of the Species Question', 
American Naturalist 42: 218-224 • 
. B~BY, C. ( 1967), 'The Fesence of T.H. Huxley: Selections from his 
Writings' , St. Martins Press, New York. 
BLACKWELDER, R.E. (1967), 9Taxonomy: A Text and Reference Book', 
Columbia University Press. 
BLOOR, D. (1971), 'Two Paradigms for Scientific Knowledge', Science Studies 
1: 101-115. 
BLOOR, D. (1976), 'Knowledge and Social Imagery', Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
" BOCHER, T.W. (1936), 'Cytological Studies on Qe.mpanula rotundifolia', 
Hereditas 22: 269-277. 
" BOCHER, T.W. (1940), 'Introductory Studies on Variation and Life-forms in 
Bru:riella vulga.ris L 1 , Dansk Bo tanisk Arki v 10: 1-15. 
- 225 -
BBCHER, T.W. (1943), 'Studies on Variation and Biology in Plantago 
lanceolata L', Dansk Botanisk Arkiv 11: 1-18. 
BBCHER, T.W. (1970), 'Jens Clausen 1891-1969 1 , Ta.xon 19: 350-352. 
BBCHER, T.W., Larsen, K. and Rahn, K. (1953), 'hperimentaJ. StudieE;J 
on the Nature of Species 1. Kohlrauschia prolifera and 
Plantago coronopus', Hereditas, 39: 289-302. 
BONNIER, G. (1890), 'Cultures Ex:perimentaJ.es dans les Alpes et dans les 
Pyrenees', Revue GeneraJ. de Botanigue 2: 513-546. 
BONNIER, G. (1895), 'Recherches experimentaJ.es sur 1 1 adaptation des 
Plantes du Climat Alpin 1 , Annals des Sciences 
Naturelles 7th Series, 20: 217-358. 
BONNIER, G. (1.920), 9Nouvelles Observations sur les Cultures Ex:perimentaJ.es 
a Diverses Altitudes', Revue GeneraJ. de Botanique 32: 
305-326. 
BOWLER, P.J. (1974), 'Evolutionism in the Enlightenment', History of Science 
12: 159-18 3. 
BOWYER, F.O. (1938), 'Sixty years of Botany in Britain 1875-1935: 
Impressions of an Eye-witness I' Macmillan, London. 
BRADSHAW, A.D. (1952), 'Populations of Agrostis tenuis Resistant to 
Lead and Zinc Poisoning', Nature 169: 1098. 
BRADSHAW, A.D. (1959), 'Population Differentiation in Agrostis tenuis 
1. Morphological Differentiation', New Phytologist 
58: 208-227. 
BRADSHAW, A.D; (1960), 'Population Differentiation in Agrostis tenuis III: 
Populations in Varied Environments', New Phytologist 
59: 92-103. 
BREMEKAMP, C.E.B. (1939), 'Phylogenetic Interpretations and Genetic 
Concepts in Taxonomy', Chronica Botanica 5: 398-403. 
BREJt1EK.AMP, C.E.B. (1942), 'ControversiaJ. Questions in Taxonomy', 
Chronica Botanica 7: 255-258. 
BRIGGS D. and WaJ.ters, S.M. (1969), 9Plant Variation and Evolution', 
Weidenf eld and Nicolson, London. 
BROOKS, F.T. and Chipp, T.E. (eds.) (1931), 'Fifth InternationaJ. 
BotanicaJ. Congress, Cambridge 16-23rd August 1930. 
Report on Proceedings', Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
BROWN, R. (1968), 'Words and Things', Glencoe Press, Illinois. 
BURMA, B.H. (1949a), 'The Species Concept: A Semantic Review', 
Evolution 3: 369-370. 
BURMA, B.H. (1949b)°, 'Postcriptum', Evolution 3: 372-373. 
- 226 -
CAMP, W. H. ( 1943), 'The Herbarium in Modern Systematics' , American 
Naturalist 77: 332-344. 
CAMP, W.H. (1951), 'Biosystematy', Brittonia 7: 113-127. 
CAMP, W.H. and Gilly, C.L., (1943), 'The Structure and Origin of Species', 
Brittonia 4: 323-385. 
CAMPBELL, D. (1974), 'Evolutionary Epistemology', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), 
fThe Philosophy of Karl Popper', Vol. 1, Open Court, 
Illinois, pp. 413-463. 
CASTLE, W.E. (1911), 'Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal 
Breeding', D. Appleton, New York. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1921), 'Studies on the Cqllective Species of Viola tricolor L', 
Botanisk Tidsskrift 37: 205-221. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1922), 'Studies on the Collective Species of Viola tricolor II', 
Botanisk Tidsskrift 37: 363-416. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1927), 'Chromosome Number and the Relationship of Species in 
the Genus Viola', Annals of Botanye, 41: 677-714. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1931), 'Cytogenetic and Taxonomic Investigations on 
Melanium Violets', Hereditas 15: 219-308. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1949), 'Evolutionary Patterns in Crepis', Evolution 3: 185-188. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1962), 'Stages in the Evolution of Plant Species', Haffner, 
New York. 
CLAUSEN, J. (1968), 'Genecology and Breeding', Carnegie Institution of 
Washington,Division of Plant Biology, Publication Number l.t47, 
Washington D.C. pp. 405-424. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey Wm. (1932), 'Experimental Ta.xonomye, 
Carnegie Institution Year Book 31: 201-205. 
CLAUSEN, J.,Keck, D.D. and Hiesey Wm. (1935), 'Experimental Taxonomy', 
Carnegie Institution, Report of the Division of Plant 
Biology 1934-35: 201-220. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. ( 1936), 'Experimental Taxonomy', 
Carnegie Institution, Report of the Division of Plant 
Biology 1935-36: 208-214. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. (1939), 'The Concept of Species 
Based on Experiment 1 , American Journal of Botany 26: 
103-106. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. (1940), 'Experimental Studies on 
the Nature of Species I Effect of Varied Environments 
on Western North American Plants', Carnegie Institution 
of Washington, Publication Number 520, Washington, D. C. 
- 227 -
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D., and Hiesey, Wm. (1941), 'Experimental Taxonomy', 
Carnegie Institution Year Book 40: 160-170. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. ( 1942), 'ExperimentaJ. Taxonomy', 
Carnegie Institution Year Book 41: 126-134. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. (1945), 'ExperimentaJ. Studies 
on the Nature of Species II Plant Evolution through 
Amphiploidy and Autoploidy, with examples from the 
Madinae,v Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication 
Number 564, Washington, D. C. 
CLAUSEN, J., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. (1948), 'ExperimentaJ. Studies on 
the Nature of Species III EnvironmentaJ. Responses of 
Climatic Races of Achillea', Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, Publication Number 581, Washington, D.C. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. (1897a), 'The Transition Region of the Caryophyllales', 
British Association Report 1897: 864. 
CLEMENTS, F.E., (1897b), 'The Poly:phyletic Disposition of Lichens', 






(1905), 'Research Methods in Ecology', The University 
Publication Co. , Nebraska. · 
(1907), 'Plant Physiology and Ecology', Holt, New York. 
(1908), 'An EcologicaJ. View of the Species Concept', 
American NaturaJ.ist 42: 253-264. 
(1916), 'Plant Succession', Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, Publication Number 242, Washington, D.C. 
(1918), 'Ecology', Carnegie Institution Year Book 17: 287-297. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. (1925), 'Researches in Ecology', Carnegie Institution Year 
Book 24: 309-343. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. (1926), 'Researches in Ecology', Carnegie Institution Year 
Book 25: 335-371. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. (1929a), 'Climatic Cycles and Changes of Vegetation', 
Report of the Carnegie Institution of Washington 
1929: 64-70. 
CLl!MEINTS, F.E. (1929b), 'ExperimentaJ. Methods in Adaptation and Morphology', 
JournaJ. of Ecology 17: 357-379. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. (1936), 'Nature and Structure of the Climax', Journal of 
Ecology 24: 252-284. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. and Clements, E.S. (1914), 'Rocky Mountain Flowers', 
H.W. Wilson, New York. 
- 228 -
CLEMENTS, F.E. and Goldsmith, G.W. (1924), 'The Phytometer Method in 
Ecology', Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
Publication Number 356, Washington, D.C. 
CLEMENTS, F.E., Martin, E.V. and Long, F.L. (1950), 'Adaptation and 
Origin in the Plant world: The Role of Environment 
in Evolution', Chronica Botanica Book Co. , Wal tha.m (Mass.). 
CL]}'IENTS, F.E. and Shear, C.L. (1926), 'The Condition and Needs of 
Systematic Mycology', Science 63: 393-395. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. and Shear, C.L. ( 1931), 'The Genera of Fungi', H. W. Wilson, 
New York. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. and Shelford, V.E. (1939), 'Bio-Ecology', J. Wiley, New York. 
CLEMENTS, F.E. and Weaver, J.E. (1924), 'Experimental Vegetation', 
Carnegie Institution of Washington Publication Number 335, 
Washington, D. C. 
COCK, A.G. (1977), 'Bernards Sumposium - the Species Concept in 1900', 
Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 9: 1-30. 
COCKAYNE, L. (1912), 'Observations Concerning Evolution Derived from 
Ecological Studies in New Zealand', Transactions of the 
New Zealand Institute 44: 1-50. 
COCKAYNE, L. (1923), Hybridism in the New Zealand Flora,New Phytologist 
22: 105-127. 
COCKAYNE, L. and Allan, H.H. (1927a), 'The Bearing of Ecological Studies 
in New Zealand on Botanical Taxonomic Conceptions and 
Procedure', Journal of Ecology 15: 234-277. 
COCKAYNE, L. and Allan, H.H. (1927b), The Present Taxonomic Status of 
New Zealand Species of ~' Transactions and Proceedings 
of the New Zealand Institute 57: 11-47. 
COCKERELL, T.D.A. (1926), 'Ecotypes of Plants', Nature 117: 588. 
COLEMAN, W. 'Bateson and Chromosomes: Conservative Thought in Science', 
Centaurus 15: 228-314. 
COLEMAN, W. (1971), 'Biology of the Nineteenth Century: Problems of Form, 
Function and Transformation', Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (England). 
CONSTANCE, L. (1951), 'The Versatile Taxonomist', Brittonia 7: 225-231. 
COP!, I. (1972), 'Introduction to Logic 9 , Macmillan, New York. 
COP!, I. (1977), 'EBsence and Accident', in S.P. Schwartz (ed.), 'Naming, 
Necessity and Natural Kinds', Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca and London. 
COULTER, J.M. (1908), 'Compositae of Southern California by H.M. Hall', 
Botanical Gazette 45: 285. 
- 229 -
COWLES, H.C. (1908), 'An Ecological Aspect of the Conception of Species', 
American Naturalist 42: 265-271. 
CRONQUIST, A. (1957), VOutline of a New System of Families and Orders of 
Diotyledonsv, Bulletin Jardin Botanique Bruxelles 27: 
13-40. 
CROWSON, R.A. (1970), 'Classification and Biology', Heinemann,. London. 
DANSER, B.H. (1929), 'Veber die Begriffe Komparium, Konun.iskuum und 
Konvivium und Veber die Estehungsweise der Konvivien', 
Genetica 11: 399-450. 
DARDEN, L. (1976), 'Reasoning in Scientific Change: Charles Darwin, 
Hu.go de Vries and the Discovery of Segregation 1 , 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 7: 
121-169. 
DARLINGTON, C. (1933), 9 Chromosome Study and the Genetic Analysis of 
Species', Annals of Botany 47: 811-814. 
DARWIN·, C. ( 1859), 9 The Origin of Species 1 , J. Murray, London. 
DAVIES, P.H. and Heywood, V.H. (1963), 9Principles of Angiosperm Taxonomy', 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London. 
DAY, A. (1965), 'The Evolution of a Pair of Sib~ing Allotetraploid Species 
of Cobwebby Gilias', Aliso 6: 25-75. 
DEAN, J.P. (1978), 'Empiricism and Relativism: A Re-appraisal of two 
Key Concepts in the Social Sciencesv, Philosophy of 
, the Social ·sciences 8: 281-288. 
DEAN, J.P. (1979), 'Controversy over Classification: A Case Study from 
the History of Botany', in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), 
'Natural Order: HistoricaJ. Studies of Scientific 
Culture', Sage, London and Beverley Hills, pp.211-228. 
De BEER, G.R. (1974), 'Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley, 
Autobiographies', Oxford University Press, London. 
DOBZHANSKY, T. (1958), 'Species After Darwin 9 , in S.A. Barnet (ed.), 
9A Century of Darwin', Heinemann, London. 
DONNELLAN, K.S. (1966), 9Reference and Definitive Descriptions', The 
Philosophical Review 75: 281-304. 
DOUGLAS, M. (1970), 9Environments at Risk 9 , Times Literary Supplement, 
30th October 1970. 
DOUGLAS, M. (1975), 'Implicit Meanings', Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London and Boston. 
DUFF, A. (1975), 'Organismic and Mechanistic Styles of Thought in Ecology', 
M.Sc. thesis, University of Manchester. 
Du RIEI1Z, G. E. ( 19 30) , 1 The Fundamental Uni ta of BiologicaJ. Taxonomy' , 
Svensk Botanisk Tidsskrift 24: 333-426. 
• 
- 230 -
EGERTON, F. (1968), 'Studies on Animal Populations from Lamarck to Darwin', 
Journal of the History of Biology 1: 225-259. 
En-ER.TON, F. (1970), 'Humbolt, Darwin and Population', JournaJ. of the History 
of Biology 3: 325-360. 
FA.EnRI, K. (1937a), 'Some Recent Publications of Phytogeography in 
Scandinavia',Botanical Review 3: 425-456. 
FA.EnRI, K. (1937b), 'Some FundamentaJ. Problems of Taxonomy and Phylogenetics', 
BotanicaJ. Review 3: 400-423. 
FARLEY, F. and Geisen, G. (1974), 'Science, Politics and Spontaneous 
Generation: the Pasteur-Pouchet Debate', Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine 48: 161-198. 
FEYERABEND, P.K. (1962), 'Explanation, Reduction and :Empiricism', in 
H. Feigh and P. Maxwell (eds.), 'Minnesota Studies of 
the Philosophy of Science', Vol. 2, Minneapolis, pp.28-97. 
FISHER, R.A. (1918), 'The Correlation Between Relatives on the Supposition 
of Mendelian Inheritance', Transactions of the RoyaJ. 
Society of Edinburgh 52: 399-433· 
FISHER, R.A. (1930), 'The GeneticaJ. Theory of Natural Selection', 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
FLEW, A. (1971), 'An Introduction to Western Philosophy', Thames and 
Hudson, London. 
FOSBERG, F.R. (1939), 'Taxonomy and Hybridism', Chronica Botanica 5: 397-398. 
FOSBERG, F.R. (1941), 'For an Open-minded Taxonomy', Chronica Botanica 
6: 368-370. 
FOUCAULT, M. (1970), 9The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences', Tavistock, London. 
GILMOUR, J.S.L. (1958), 'The Species - Yesterday and Tomorrow', Nature 
181: 379-380. 
GILMOUR, J.S.L. and Greg'Or, J.W. (1939), 'Demes - A Suggested New 
Terminology', Nature 144: 333-334. 
GILMOUR, J.S.L. and Heslop-Harrison, J. (1954), 'The Deme Terminology 
and the Units of Microevolutionary Change', Genetica 
27: 147-161. 
GILMOUR, J. S.L. and Turrill, W.B. ( 1951), 9The Aim and Scope of Taxonomy', 
Chronica Botanica 6:217-219. 
GILLESPIE, C.C. (1962), 'The Enc~clopedie and Jacobin Philosophy', in 
M. Clagett (ed.), 'CriticaJ. Problems in the History 
of Science', University of Wisconsin Press, 
Wisconsin, pp. 255-289 • 
- 231 -
GIRAY, E. (1976), 'An Integrated Approach to the Species Problem', 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 317-328. 
GODDIJN, W.A. (1931), 'In Memoriam', Genetica 13: 1-20. 
GODDIJN, W.A. (1934), 'On the Species - Conception in Relation to 
Taxonomy and Genetics', Blum.ea 1: 75-89. 
GOODLAND, R.J. (1975), 'The Tropical Origins of Ecology - Eugene Warmings 
Jubilee', Oihos 26: 240-245. 
GRANT, V.E. (1957), 'The Plant Species in Theory and Practice', in 
E. Mayr (ed.), 'The Species Problemv, American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Publication Number 50, pp. 39-80. 
GRANT, V.E. (1971), 'Plant Speciation', Columbia University Press, 
New York. 
GREEN, J.R. (1909), 'A History of Botany 1860-1900~, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
GR:ErIDR, J.W. (1926), 'The Pollination of Some Important Agricultural 
Grasses with a View to Improved Methods of Breeding', 
Ph.D. thesis, University of F.d.inburgh. 
GREXIDR, J.W. (1931), 'Experimental Delimitation of Species', New Ph.ytologist 
30: 204-217. 
GREXIDR, J.W. (1932), 'Correspondence', Journal of Botany 70: 154-155. 
GRmOR, J •. w. (1939), 'Experimental Taxonomy IV Population Differentiation 
in North American and European Sea Plantains Allied to 
Plantago maritima L', New Phytologist 38: 392-322. 
GRmOR, J.W. (1944), 'The Ecotype', Biological Review 19: 20-30. 
GB]I;OR, J.W. (1946a), 'Presidential Address: Some Reflections on 
Intra-specific Ecological Variation and its Classification', 
Transactions of the Botanical Society of F.d.inburgh 
34: 377-391. 
GRmOR, J.W. (1946b), 'Ecotypic Differentiation', New Phytologist 45: 254-270. 
GR:EnOR, J.W., Davey, V. Mc. and Lang, :J.M.S. (1936), 'Experimental Taxonomy I 
Experimental Garden Techniques in Relation to the 
Recognition of the Small Taxonomic Units•, New Phytologist 
35: 323-350. 
GR]X;()R, J.W. and Sonsome, F.W. (1927), 'Experiments on the Genetics of 
Wild Populations I. Grasses', Journal of Genetics 
17: 349-364. 
GRmOR, J.W. and Sonsome, F.W. (1930), 'Experiments on the Genetics of 
Wild Populations II Phleum pratense L and the Hybrid 
P. pratense x P. alpinum1 , Journal of Genetics 22: 373-387. 
HAGSTROM, W.O. (1965), 'The Scientific Community', Feffer and Simon. 
- 232 -
HALL, H.M. (1902), 'A Botanical Survey of San Jacinto Mountain', 
University of California Publications in Botany 1: 1-140. 
HALL, H.M. (1912), 'New and Noteworthy Californian Plants', University of 
California Publications in Botany 4: 195-208. 
HALL, H.M. (1928), 'The Genus Haplopappus: A Phylogenetic Study in the 
Compositae', Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
Publication Number 389, Washington, D.C. 
HALL, H.M. (1929a), 'The Taxonomic Treatment of Units Smaller than Species', 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Plant Science, 
Ithaca, New York 1926 2: 1461-1468. 
HALL, H.M. (1929b), vsignificance of Taxonomic Units and their Natural 
Basis ••• From the Point of View of Taxonomy, 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Plant Science, 
Ithaca, New York 1926 2: 1571-1574. 
HALL, H.M. and Clements, F.E. (1923), 'The Phylogenetic Method in Taxonomy', 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication Number326, 
Washington, D. C. 
HALL, H.M., Keck, D.D. and Hiesey, Wm. (1927), 'Experimental Phylogeny and 
Taxonomy', Carnegie Institution Year Book 26: 311-312. 
HARWOOD, J. (1976), 'The Race - Intelligence Controversy: A Sociological 
Approach I - Professional Factorsv, Social Studies of 
Science 6: 369-394. 
HARWOOD, J. (1977), 'The Race' - Intelligence Controversy: A Sociological 
Approach II - External Factors', Social Studies of Science 
7: 1-30. 
HARWOOD, J. (1979), 'Heredity, Environment and Legitimation of Social Policy', 
in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds.), 'Natural Order: 
Historical Studies of Scientific Culture', Sage, London 
and Beverley Hills, pp. 231-251. 
HEISER, J. (1969), 'Taxonomy', in J. Ewan (ed.), 'A Short History of 
Biology in the United States', Hafner Publishing Co., 
New York. 
HESLOP-HARRISON, J. (1953), 'New Concepts in Flowering Plant Taxonomy', 
Heinemann, London. 
HESLOP-HARRISON, J. (1964), 'Forty Years of Genecology', Advances in 
Ecological Research 2: 159-247. 
HESSE, M. (1958), 'Theories, Dictionaries and Observation', British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 9: 12-28. 
HESSE, M. (1963), 'Models and Analogies in Science', Sheed and Ward, London. 
HESSE, M. (1974), 'The Structure of Scientific Inference', Macmillan, London. 
- 233 -
HEYWOOD, V.H. (1959), 'The Taxonomic Treatment of Ecotypic Variation', 
in A.J. Cain (ed.), 'Function and Taxonomic Importance 9 , 
Systematics Association Publication Number 3, pp.87-112. 
HEYWOOD, V.H. (1967), 'Plant Taxonomy', Arnold, London. 
HITCHCOCK, C.L., Cronquist, A., Ownberg, M. and Thompson, J.W. (1959), 
'Vascular Plants of the Pacific Northwest•, pt. 4, 
University of Washington Pu.blications in Biology, 17. 
HOYER, B.H., McCarthy, B.J. and Bolt, E.T. (1964), 9A Molecular Approach 
in the Systematics of Higher Organisms 9 , Science 144: 
959-967. 
HULL, D. (1965), 9The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy - Two Thousand 
Years of Stasis', parts 1 and 2, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 15: 315-326 and 16: 1-18. 
HUXLEY, J.S. (1938), 'Clines - An Auxillary Taxonomic Principle 9 , Nature 
142-219. 
HUXLEY, J.S. (1940) (ed.), 'The New Systematics 9 , Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
HUXLEY, J.S. (1942), 'Evolution --the Modern Synthesis 9 , Macmillan, London. 
HUXLEY, L. (1918), 9The Life and Letters of Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker', 
J. Murray, London, Vol. 1. 
KECK, D.D. (1935), 9Studies on the Taxonomy of the Madinae', Madrano 
3: 4-18. 
KECK, D.D. (1959), 'The Future of Systematic Botany', Systematic Zoologist 
8: 76-82. 
KLEINER, S.A. (1977), 'Referential Divergence in Scientific Theories', 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 8: 87-1090 
KRIPKE, S. (1972), 'Naming and Necessity', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), 
'Semantics of a Natural Langu.age 9 , D. Reidel, Dordrecht 
pp. 253-355, 763-769. 
KUEN, T.S. (1962), 'Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery', Science 
136: 760-764. 
KUEN, T.S. (1970), 9The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', Chicago 
University Press, Chicago (!Ind edition). 
KUHN, T.S. (1971), 9The Relations Between History and History of Science', 
Daedalus 100: 271-304. 
KUEN, T.S. (1974), Second Thoughts on Paradigms in F. Suppe (ed), 9The 
Structure of Scientific Theories', Illinois University 
Press, Urbana. 
LAING, R.M. (1936), 'Obituary', Transactions and Proceedings of the New 
Zealand Institute 65: 457-467. 
- 234 -
LAMPRECHT, H. (1959), 'Die Artbegriff', Agriculture, Horticulture and 
Genetics 17: 105-264. 
L.ANGLEI', O.F.J. (1934), 'Om Variationen hos Tallen Pinus Sylvestris och des 
Samband med Klimatet', Meddel Skogsforsoksanstalt 27: 87-93· 
L.ANGLEI', O.F.J. (1936), 'Studien Uber die Physiologische Variabilitat der 
Kief er und deven Zusammenhang mi t dem Klima 1 , Meddel 
Skogsforsoksanstalt, 29: 219-470. 
L.ANGLEI', O.F.J. (1959), 'A Cline or Not a Cline - a Question of Scots Pine', 
Sylvae Genetica 8: 13-22. 
L.ANGLEI', O.F.J. (1963), 9Patterns and Terms of Intraspecific Ecological 
Variability', Nature 200: 347-348. 
LAW, J. and French, D. (1974), 9Normative and Interpretive Sociologies 
of Science 9 , Sociological Review 22: 581-595. 
LEWIS, H. (1957), 'Genetics and Cytology in Relation to Taxonomy', Taxon 
6: 42-46. 
LONG, R. (1966), 1Biosystematics of the Helianthus nuttallii Complex 
(Compositae)', Brittonia 18: 64-79. 
LOTSY, J.P. (1916), 'Evolution by Means of Hybridization', Martinus Nijhoff, 
the Hague. 
LOTSY, J.P. (1925), 'Evolution Considered in the Light of Hybridization,' 
Christchurch, New Zealand. 
LOTSY, J.P. (1927), 'A Popular Account of Evolution 9 , Nelson, New Zealand 
pp. 1-22. 
" LOVE, A. (1951), 'Taxonomic Evaluation of Polyploids 9 , Caryologia 3: 263-284. 
" LOVKVIST, B. (1962), 'Chromosome and Differentiation Studies in Flowering 
Plants of Skane, South Sweden I. General Aspects 1 , 
Botaniska Notiser 115: 261-287. 
LOWE, P.D. (1976), 'Amateurs and Professionals: the Institutional 
F.roergence of British Plant Ecology', Journal of the 
Society for the Bibliography of Natural History 
7: 517-535. 
MACKENZIE, D.A. (1976), 'Eugenics in Britain 9 , Social Studies in Science 
6: 499-532. 
MACKENZIE, D.A. and Barnes, B. (1975), 'Biometrician V. Mendeli81}: a 
Controversy and its Explanation 9 , Zeitschrift fur Soziologie, 
Special issue, 18: 165-196. 
MANNHEIM, K. (1936), 'Ideology and Utopia 9 , Routledge and Kegal Paul, 
London (English translation by L. Wirth and E. Shils). 
MANNHEIM, K. (1953), 'Conservative Thought' in 'Essays in Sociology and 
Social Psychology', Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
- 235 -
MANTON, I. (1934), 'The Problem of Bisc~tella laevigata', Z. Indukt 
Abstamm u. Vererblehne 67: 41-57. 
MARSDEN-JGNES, E. M. , Summerhayes, V. S. and Turrill, W. B. ( 19 30) , ' Special 
Herbaria as Adjuncts to Modern Botanical Research 1 , 
Journal of Ecology 18: 379-383. 
MATHER, K. (1942), 'Genetics and the Russian Controversy', Nature 149: 
427-430. 
MAYR, E. (1942), 'Systematics and the Origin of Species', Columbia 
University Press, New York. 
MAYR, E~ (1949), 'The Species Concept: Semantics Versus Semantics', 
Evolution 3: 371-372. 
MAYR, E. (1957), 'Species Concepts and Definitions', in E. Mayr (ed.), 
'The Species Problem', American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Publication Number 50, pp. 1-22. 
MAYR, J. (1973), 'The Recent Historiography of Genetics', Journal of the 
History of Biology 6: 125-154. 
MAYR, E. (1976), 'Evolution and the Diversity of Life: Selected Essays', 
Belknap Press, Cambridge (Mass.) and London. 
McINTOSH, R.P. (1976), 'Ecology Since 1900 1 , in B.J. Taylor and T.J. White 
(eds.), 'Issues and Ideas in America', University of 
Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, pp. 353-372. 
McNEILL, J. (1968), 'Regional and Local Herbaria 9 , in V.H. Heywood (ed.), 
'Modern Methods in Plant Taxonomy', pp. 24-50. 
MEGLITSCH, P.A. (1954), 'On the Nature of Species', Systematic Zoologist 
3: 49-65. 
MELLOR, D.H. (1977), 'Natural Kinds', British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 28: 299-312. 
MERTON, R.K. (1957), 'Priorities in Scientific Discovery', Sociological 
Review 22: 635-659. 
MERTON, R.K. (1961), 'Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery', 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
105: 470-486. 
MERTON, R.K. (1968), 'Social Theory and Social Structure', Free Press, 
New York. 
MOORE, L.B. (1967), 'Leonard Cockayne, Botanist', Transactions of the 
Royal Society of New Zealand, General 2: 1-18. 
MOLKAY, M. (1969), 'Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences', 
Social Research 36: 22-52. 
- 236 -
MULKA.Y, M. (1979), 'Science and the Sociology of Knowledge', G. Allen and 
Unwin, London. 
MilNTZING, A. (1930), VOutlines to a Genetic Monograph of the Genus 
Galeopsis', Hereditas 13. 
" MbNTZING, A. (1935), vThe Species Concept in the Light of Modern 
Research', in M.J. Sirks (ed.), vzedse International 
Botanisch Congres, Proceedings', Vol. 2, E.J. Brill, 
Leiden, pp. 56-57. 
MtlNTZING, A. (1971),'G8te Wilhelm Turesson', Taxon 20: 773-775. 
MilNTZING, A. Tedin, O. and Turesson, G. (1931), 'Field Studies and 
Experimental Methods in Taxonomy', Hereditas 15: 1-16. 
OLBY, R. (1966), 'Origins of Mendelism', Constable, London. 
OLIVER, F.W. (1906), VBotany in England', British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Report for 1906: 733-738. 
POPPER, K. (1962), 'The Open Society and its Enemiesv, Vol. 1, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
POUND, R. and Clements, F.E. (1896), VA Rearrangement of the North American 
Hyphomycetes', Minnesota Botanical Studies 1: 94-98, 
644-673, 726-738. 
PRATT, V. (1977), 'Foucault and the History of Classification Theory', 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 
8: 163-171. 
PROVINE, W.B. (1971), 'The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics', 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
PUTNAM, H. (1973), Explanation and Reference in G. Pearce and P. Meynard 
(eds.), 'Conceptual Change in Sciencev, D. Reidel, 
Dordrecht. 
PUTNAM, H. (1975), 'The Meaning of Meaning', in G. Gunderson (ed.), 
'Language, Mind and Knowledgev, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minnesota. 
RAVEN, P.H. (1974), vp1ant Systematics 1947-1972', Annals of the Missouri 
Botanical Garden 61: 166-178. 
RAVEN, P.H., Berlin, B. and Breedlove, D.E. (1971), wThe Origins of 
Taxonomy', Science 174: 1210-1213. 
ROLL-HANSEN, N. (1978), 'The Genetope Theory of Wilhelm Johannsen and 
its Relations to Plant Breeding and the Study of 
Evolution', Centaurus 22: 201-235. 
ROLLINS, R.C. (1953), 'Plant Taxonomy Today', Systematic Zoologist 
2: 180-190. 




RUSE, M. (1973), 'The Philosophy of Biology', Hutchinson, London. 
RYDBERG, P.A. (1908), 'N. American Flora', Vol. 22, 268-376. 
RYDBERG, P.A. (1929), 'Scylla or Charybdis', Proceedings of the 
International Congress of Plant Science, Ithaca, 
New York, 1926 2: 1539-1551. 
SAVORY, T. (1962), 'Naming the Living World', English Universities Press, 
London. 
SCHILLER, J. (1974), 'Queries Answers and Unsolved Problems in Eighteenth 
Century Biology 9 , History of Science 12: 184-199. 
SCHIMPER, A.F.W. (1903), 'Plant - Geography Upon a Physiological Basis 9 , 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, (English translation by 
W.R. Fisher). 
SCHWARTZ, S.P. (1977), 'Introduction', in S.P. Schwartz (ed.), 'Naming 
Necessity and Natural Kinds', Cornell University 
Press, Cornell and London. 
SEARLE, J.R. (1953), 'Proper Names 9 , Mind 67: 166-173. 
SIMPSON, G.G. (1944), 9Tempo and MOde in Evolution', Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
SIMPSON, G.G. (1953), 'The Major Features of Evolution', Columbia 
University Press, New York. 
SIMPSON, G.G. (1961), 'Principles of Animal Taxonomy', Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
SINSKAYA, E.N. (1948), 'Dynamics of Species', (in Russian). 
SINSKAYA, E.N. (1958), 'Investigations on the Composition of Ecotypical 
and Varietal Populations: A Brief Survey of Some of 
the Work in Russian', Report of the Scottish Plant 
Breeding Station 1958: 31-40. 
SINSKAYA, E.N. and Beztuzheva, A.A. (1931), 9The forms of Camelina sativa in 
Connection with Climate, Flax and Man', (in Russian), 
Trud.y po Prikladnoi Botanike, Genetike i Selektii 25: 
98-200. 
SKOTTSBERG, K. (1929), 'Comments on the Splitting of Genera', Proceedings 
of the International Congress of Plant Science, Ithaca, 
New York, 1926 2: 1552-1555. 
SOLBRIG, O.T. (1966), 'Evolution and Systematics', Columbia University Press, 
New York. 
SOLBRIG, O.T. (1970), 'Principles and Methods of Plant Biosystematics', 
Macmillan, London. 
SNEATH, P.H.A. (1961), 9The Mathematical Assessment of Taxonomic Similarity 
Including the Use of Computers', Taxon 10: 98. 
- 238 -
SNEATH, P.H.A. (1962), 9The Construction of Taxonomic Groups' in 
G. Ainsworth and P.H.A. Sneath (eds.), 'Microbial 
Classification', University Press, Cambridge (England). 
SNEATH, P.H.A. and Sokal, R.R. ( 1962), 'Numerical Taxonomy', Nature 
193: 855-860. 
SOKAL, R.R. and Sneath, P.H.A. (1963), 'Principles of Numerical Taxonomy', 
Freeman, San Francisco and London. 
STAFLEU, F.A. (1971), 'Linnaeus and the Linnaeans 9 , A. Oosthoeks 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, Utrecht. 
STEBBINS, G.L. (1950), 'Variation and Evolution in Plants', Columbia 
University Press, New York. · 
STEBBINS, G.L. (1971), 'Chromosomal Evolution in Higher Plants', 
E. Arnold, London. 
STURTEVANT, A.H. (1966), 9A History of Genetics', Harper and Row, New York. 
TAKHTAJAN, A.L. (1958), 'Origins of Angiospermous Plants', (translation 
from the Russian by the American Institute of Biological 
Science). 
TANSLEY, A.G. (1946), 'Obituary•, Journal of Ecolo€;l 34: 194-196. 
TANSLEY, A.G. (1947), 'The Early History of Modern Plant Ecology in 
Britain', Journal of Ecology 35: 130-137. 
TOBEY, R. (1977), 'American Grassland Ecology 1895-1955: The Life Cycle 
of a Professional Research Community', in F. F.gerton (ed.) 
'History of American Ecology', Arno Press, New York, 
pp. 1-31. 
TOULMIN, S. (1957), 'Crucial Experiments: Priestley and Lavoisier 1 , 
Journal of the History of Ideas 1957: 205-220. 
TOULMIN, S. and Goodfield, J. (1952), 9The Architecture of Matter', 
Hutchinson, London. 
TRYON, R.M. and Wallace, E. (1962), 'Comments on the International 
Organization of Biosystematists', Taxon 11: 139. 
TURESSON, G.(1914), 'Slope Exposure as a Factor in the Distribution of 
Pseudotsuga ta.xifolia in Arid Parts of Washington 1 , 
Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club. 
TURESSON, G. (1915), 9Pencillium avellanceum, a New Ascus - Producing 
Species', Mycologia 1915: 116. 
TU'RESSON, G. (1916a), 9Lysichiton camschatcense and its Behaviour in 
Sphagnum bogs, American Journal of Botany 2: 42-47. 
- 239 -
TURESSON, G. (1916b), 'The Presence and Significance of Moulds in the 
Alimentary Canal of Man and Higher AnimaJ.s v , Svensk 
Botanisk Tidsskrift 10: 81-94. 
TURESSON, G. (1917), 'Om Plagiotropi has Strandvaxtor', Botaniska Notiser 
1917: 273-296. 
TURESSON, G. (1919), 'The Causes of Plagiotropy in Maritime Shore Plants', 
Lunds Universitets Arsskrift, N.F. Ayd. 2, 16: 1-32. 
TURESSON, G. (t922a), 'The Species and Variety as Ecological Units', 
Heriditas 3: 100-113. 
TURESSON, G. (1922b), 9The Genotypical Response of Plant Species to 
Habitatv, Hereditas 3: 211-350. 
TURESSON, G. (1923), 'The Scope and Importance of Genecology', Hereditas 
4: 111-176. 
TURESSON, G. (1925), 'The Plant Species in Relation to Habitat and 
Clim~te: Contributions to the Knowledge of Genecological 
Units', Hereditas 6: 147-236. 
TURESSON, G. (1926), 'Studien uber Festuca ovin~ L.I. Normalgeschlecheliche 
halb-und Ganzvivipare typen Nordischer Herkunftv, 
Hereditas 8: 161-206 (N.B. this paper has a summary in 
English). 
TURESSON, G. (1929), 9 Zur Natur und Begrenzung der Arteneinheiten', 







(1930), 1Genecological Units and their Classifactory Value 9 , 
Svensk Botanisk Tidsskrift 24: 511-518. 
(1943), 'Variation in Apomictic Microspecies of 
Alchemilla vulga.ris L', Botaniska Notiser 1943: 413-427. 
(1925), 'Speciesv, Journal of Botany 63: 359-366. 
(1939), 9Ex:perimental Taxonomy in Americav, Chronica 
Botanica 5: 354-357. 
(1946), vThe Ecotype Concept: a Consideration with 
Appreciation and Criticism Especially of Recent Trends', 
New Phytologist 45: 34-43. 
TURILL, W .B. ( 1958), 'Symposium on Cyto-Taxonomy', Proceedings of the 
Linnean. Society of London 169: 110-112. 
TUTIN, T.G. (1957), 'A Contribution to the Experimental Taxonomy of 
Poa annua L.', Watsonia 4: 1-10. 
UITTIEN, H. (1939), 'Reflections on the Taxonomy of So-called Hybrids', 
Chronica Botanica 5: 212-214. 
- 240 -
VALENTINE, D.H. and Love, A. (1958), 'Taxonomic and Biosystematic 
Categories 9 , Brittonia 10: 153-166. 
VRIES, H. de (1910-11), 'The Mutation Theory', Kegan Paul, Trench 
and Trubner, London (translation into English by 
J.B. Farmer and A.D. Darbishire). 
WARMING, E. (1909), 'Oecology of Plants: .An Introduction to the Study 
of Plant Communities', Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(translation into English by P. Groom and 
I. Bayley-Balfour). 
WATSON (1895), 'Comte, Mill and Spencer: an outline of Philosophy', 
Glasgow. 
WIE&AND, K.M. (1929a), 'Some Factors Influencing the Popularity of 
Taxonomic Botany 9 , Proceedings of the International 
Congress of Plant Science, Ithaca, New York 1926 
2: 1473-1476. 
WI:E&AND, K.M. (1929b), 'Discussion', Proceedings of the International 
Cong:re·ss of Plant Science, Ithaca, New York 1926 
2: 1575. 
WILKINS, D.A. (1957), 'A Technique for the Measurement of Lead Tolerance 
in Plants 9 , Nature 180: 37. 
WILKINS, D.A. (196oa), 'Recognising Adaptive Variants', Proceedings of 
the Linnean Society of London, Session 171: 122-126. 
WILKINS, D.A. (196ob), 'The Measurement and Genetical .Analysis of 
Tolerance in Fest'O.ca ovina, 1 Report of the Scottish 
Plant Breeding Station 1959: 92-96. 
WILLER, J. (1971), 'The Social Determination of Knowledge', Prentice-HaJ.l, 
New Jersey. 
WILLIS, R. (1974), 'Man and Beast', Hart-Davis, London. 
WILMOTr, -. (1932a), 9Experimental Delimitation of Species 9 , Journal of 
Botany 70: 49-50. 
WILMOTT, -. (1932b), 'Reply to Gregor', Journal of Botany 70: 155. 
WINGE, O. (1917), 'The chromosomes: Their Number and General Importance', 
C.R. Laboratoire, Carlsberg 13: 131-275. 
WINSOR, M.P. (1969), 'Barnacle Larvae in the Nineteenth Century: a Case 
Study in Taxonomic Theory', Journal of the History of 
Medicine 24: 294-309. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1953) 'PhilosophicaJ. Investigations', Blackwell, Oxford. 
WORSTER, D. (1977), 'Natures Ecoho)V': the Roots of Ecology', Sierra Club 
books, San Francisco. 
WRIGHT, J.W. and Baldwin, H.I. (1957), 'The 1938 InternationaJ. Union Scots 
Pine Provenance Tests in New Hampshire,' Sylvae Genetica 
6: 2-14. 
Addendum Some works on botanical classification not discussed in the text 
Beckner, M. (1959), The Biological Way of Thought, New York. 
Beckner's book is an attempt, in its author's words, to "investigate the 
logical features that are characteristic of the biological way of 
thinking". The chapter on systematics is sympathetic to the claims of 
the "new systematists", especially Dobzhansky and Mayr. The book was 
important in persuading philosophers of the existence of polythetic 
concepts in biology. 
Daudin, H. (19~~a), De Linn~ a Jussieu. Methodes de la classification et idee 
Daudin, H. (19~6b), Cuvier et Lamarck. Les classes zoologigues et l'id~e de 
serie animale, Paris. 
Daudin's two works are the standard historical reference on biological 
taxonomy in the period before Darwin. 
Gould, S.J. (1979), "Species are not Specious", New Scientist 83 : 374-377. 
This paper is a continuation of the old debate over the reality 
(or otherwise) of species. Gould argues, citing evidence from the 
anthropological work of Berlin'.~hd~Bulmer, th~t species are realities of 
nature rather than mental fictions of the taxonomist's mind. 
Hull, ·.D. ( 1970), "Contemporary Systematic Philosophies", Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics 1 19-54. 
Hull's article provides a comprehensive review of the literature in the 
philosophy of biology on the arguments between phylogeneticists and 
pheneticists. 
Jardine, N. (1969), "A logical basis for biological classification", 
Systematic Zoology_ 18 : 37-52. 
Jardine uses set theory to formulate a model of how a hierarchic 
classification works. The aim is to provide an underlying logic for the 
use of numerical methods in taxonomy. An important aspect of this model 
is that it does not include an account of the way in which the meanings 
of taxa are to be specified, so that it avoids the controversies over the 
meaning of natural kind terms which are dealt with in the thesis. 
Levin, D.A. (1979), "The Nature of Plant Species", Science 204 : 381-384. 
This is a modern defence of the idea that species are mental fictions 
rather than realities of nature (c.f. Gould, op.cit~). 
Ospovat, D. (1978), "Perfect adaptation and teleological explanation : 
approaches to the problem of the history of life in the mid-nineteenth 
century", Studies in~the-History of Biology 2: 33-56. 
Ospovat describes a pre-Darwinian controversy in biology over the use of 
non-teleological explanations and laws in the life sciences. The paper is 
relevant because it provides a good example of a scientific controversy in 
which vested professional interests played an important role. 
Pratt, V. (1972), "Numerical Taxonomy", Journal of Theoretical Biology 36:581-592. 
Pratt argues that there are great difficulties in determining what 
constitutes a character of an individual organism. This is a major 
criticism against the use of numerical methods i~ taxonomy, since in these 
procedures characters have to be explicitly stated before a classification 
can be made. 
Pratt, V. (1972), "Biological classification", British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 23 : 305-327. 
Pratt argues that the purpose of biological taxonomists should be to form 
g~oups of taxa which allow reliable generalisations from facts established 
in connection with a few individuals to be made about less well-known taxa 
of the group. In practice this means our classifications should be 
phylogenetic. 
Pratt, V. (1977), "Foucault and the history of classification theory", 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 8 : 163-171. 
Pratt, following Foucault, argues that classical taxonomists, such as 
Adanson, had a notion of "character" that was finite. This is in marked 
contrast to the modern view that the number of characters possessed by an 
organism is (potentially at least) infinite. If Pratt's thesis is 
historically correct, then the concept of "character" has undergone a 
radical change of meaning in systematics since the eighteenth century, 
and this has implications for the claim that numerical taxonomy is 
"neo-Adansonian". 
Sloan, P. (1972), "John Locke, John Ray and the problem of the Natural System", 
Journal of the History of Bio.!.2..gy 5 : 1-53. 
Sloan's paper is an elegant study of a long-standing argument in taxonomy 
between those who argued that a natural syst~m of classification,should be 
based upon a few essential characters, and those who argued that a natural 
system must be based upon overall resemblances of form. The material is of 
interest because this controversy has parallels with the much more. recent 
··-
• -
controversies in philosophy between adherents of description theory, like 
Searle, and essentialists, like Putnam. 
Walter~',' s:irt'Ti'9iff), ''The Shaping of Angiosperm Taxonomy"' New Phytologist 60:74-84..11 
Walter~ claims that angiosperm classification can only be understood in ' 
relation to its development in a particular historical and philosophical 
context, - that of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. It follows 
that our classification of angiosperm families and genera would have been 
very different if, for example, botanical systematics had developed first 
in the tropics or southern hemisphere. The general position taken, i.e. 
that classifications are cultural phenomena that reflect the social 
asgirations and resources o~-~~eir creators, is fully consistent with the 
model of classification presented in the thesis. 
